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Introduction 
An introduction offers an interpretation of the arguments 
presented in the main body of the work and should not be just a menu 
of chapters. The main argument in this study is based on the relevance, 
rationality and usefulness of force in international relations, and the 
entire work, that follows this introduction, is structured around this 
cumulative argument. 
States coexist in a condition of anarchy. In conducting their 
foreign policies, states find it convenient or necessary to use force or to 
threaten to do so. This raises some pertinent questions: How can states 
most effectively employ military force in pursuit of national goals? 
What effects has the growth of national military power had on the 
ways in which force has been used ? What kinds of military threats are 
productive or otherwise ? Have nuclear weapons changed the nature 
of international relations or drastically altered the ways in which states 
can use military power? Does force, both in its employment and the 
threat of its employment, affect the behaviour of states in international 
relations? These are the questions that the present study attempts to 
answer. It examines the role of force in international politics in the 
nuclear age. It is based on the hypothesis that force does continue to 
play a role despite the development of thermonuclear weapons and 
ICBMs. There is a line of thinking that since, because of nuclear 
weapons, any future war may become a total war, such weapons have 
made war impossible. The present study asserts that, despite our best 
efforts to avoid a nuclear war, it may occur; and, therefore, it is 
necessary to try to understand what may lead to a nuclear war and what 
it might be like. Strangely, the relation of technology to military 
strategy and foreign policy has not been much discussed in 
contemporary writings. It is necessary to have some understanding of 
the effects that developments in military technology have on 
international relations. The search for disarmament and arms control 
has changed the focus and emphasis from the attempts by idealists to 
create a world of total peace to an attempt by realists to improve the 
nature of the military balance and to reduce the likelihood of general 
nuclear war, and to avoid situations of intense international political 
crisis. 
The existence of adequate force is necessary for the maintenance 
of national self-confidence in an era of negotiations. But what each 
country does with its force is a legitimate concern of all the others.To 
reiterate Clausewitz's central point, war does not have its own logic 
and it is, and ought to be seen as an instrument of policy and the logic 
of force must be that of politics. It is for this reason that the study of 
conflict among states is important. The task of studies, like this, is to 
outline, in times of complacency, a framework for national security to 
which a nation may turn at moments of crisis. This study is an analysis 
of how military factors determine the shape and nature of 
international relations. 
There has been little recognition, both among the professionals 
and the academics, that the use of force in international relations and 
the study of warfare is a matter worthy of more than technical study. 
Professionals have not put sufficient effort on the fundamental 
problem of a conceptual foundation of their profession. A more 
general theoretical appreciation would give a greater breadth to the 
vision of the strategist. Similarly, it would be useful if the University 
Dons compare how many doctoral theses have been written on topics 
that concern the survival of the state and its security environment, or 
on such weighty matters, time and time again, as Insignificantania's 
role in the NAM in the 'Sixties, or political participation of retired 
people in the municipal elections of Hoshiarpur, or some equally 
important place! 
During the past years, I have learnt much from discussing these 
issues with many scholars and strategists. Though the source of ideas 
and stimulation have been many, it is not possible to acknowledge, in 
this limited space, my debt to all of them. But I am particularly 
indebted, in this regard, to Mr K.Subrahmanyam, Prof.K.P.Misra, 
Prof.R.V.Chandrashekhar Rao, Prof. M. M. Puri, Prof.Stephen P. Cohen 
and Mr Rodney Jones. I am thankful to three very distinguished 
officers of the Indian armed forces, for making clear to me many 
strategic concepts, unfamiliar to a layman like me: Lt.General 
M.L.Chibber, Vice Admiral M.K.Roy, and Air Commodore Jasjit Singh. 
I am thankful to a number of colleagues for their stiff opposition to 
any studies of these issues as this only strengthened my resolve to 
continue working on them. I am grateful to my own University for 
providing me academic leave and to the Ford Foundation, through its 
support to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,USA, where 
I worked on this project at the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament 
and International Security. 
June, 1990 Akhtar Majeed 
III 
Force in International Relations 
A Prince should consider peace only as a breathing time, 
which gives him leisure to contrive, and furnishes an 
ability to execute, military plans. 
Machiavelli, The Prince 
The strategic approach to international relations is the one 
which takes account of the part played by force, or the threat of force, in 
the international system. The approach is both descriptive and 
prescriptive in the sense that it analyses the extent to which states have 
the capacity to use or threaten the use of armed force in their relations, 
and it also recommends policies which will enable states to operate in 
an international system which is conducive to such conditions. This 
approach visualizes the world in terms of possible armed conflict. 
Before progressing any farther towards understanding 
international conflict and the use of force, it is necessary to discuss 
what the theory of the use of force in international relations consists of 
and from where it is derived. Contemporary exponents of power 
politics have actually drawn upon a rich conceptual heritage 
established by Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. 
Heritage of the Theory of Force: 
The Athenian general Thucydides (460-400 B.C.) was a scientific 
historian also and, within the pages of The Peleponnesian War, he has 
proceeded systematically to develop a theory of power politics. His 
basic thesis was that all political action was an attempt by historical 
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actors to effectuate their self interests through exploitation of the 
degree of power they possess at the expense of, and also as limited by, 
the self interests and relative power of other actors; and this clash of 
interests / power creates a balance of power in which each actor's 
physical survival is constantly at stake. For Thucydides, power politics 
embraced the entire spectrum of political action. He believed that 
politics among city-states was an effectuation of their own interests 
based upon consideration of their respective powers. He equated 
politics with the quintessential zero-sum game, in which any player's 
gains are exactly balanced by the losses of others. 
While analyzing the causes and results of the Peleponnesian 
war, Thucydides concludes that military expediency prevailed over 
justice when the Athenians entered into a defensive alliance with 
Corcyra.(l). In foreign affairs, justice has no significance of its own but 
can have a meaning only when two equally powerful city-states seek to 
avoid a mutually destructive war by resolving their disputes in a 
peaceful manner. When there is no such equality, only a test of arms 
determines upon which side "justice" lies. The city state of Corcyra had 
sent a delegation to Athens to secure an alliance against Corinth, which 
itself had sent a delegation to prevent such an alliance. The delegation 
from Corinth had maintained that considerations of justice must be 
treated as paramount : "Abstinence from all injustice to other first-rate 
powers is a greater tower of strength than anything that can be gained 
by a sacrifice of paramount tranquility for an apparent temporary 
advantage" (3). On the other hand, the envoys from Corcyra invoked 
Athenian interest as the principal factor that should be weighed in 
determination of their request for an alliance (4). Thucydides has 
counterposed the power/interest argument of Corcyra to that of the 
Corinthians. He draws a dichotomy between justice and politics, which 
are said to comprise two different worlds where the operational rules 
are fundamentally different. Justice has any meaning among states if 
their power is equally distributed. Thus, foreign affairs have to remain 
unregulated except by considerations of pure power politics.( This 
theme of Thucydides was developed to its logical conclusion by 
Machiavelli in The Prince ) . He treats power politics as a universal and 
external law of history as it describes the course of interaction among 
city-states prescribing the type of behaviour which one city-state must 
exhibit towards all others to ensure continued survival. Foreign affairs 
is characterized by a state of constant warfare or a truce or an armistice, 
the main purpose of which is to prepare for renewed warfare. Peace 
cannot be there but only a set of shifting alliances which constitute 
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temporary balance of power in which conflict between, subjugation by, 
and elimination of the respective actors is the main rule of the game. 
For Thucydides, the only choice for man is between performance or 
non-performance of those actions which might be essential for 
survival. It might be possible for man to understand the principles of 
power politics but not to prevent, escape or control their inexorable 
operation. If he is foolish enough to try (as Melians did, when instead 
of accepting the inexorability of the logic of surrender before Athens in 
view of their superiority of arms, they relied on vagueness of justice, 
the uncertainties of war, the help from the gods, and their alliance with 
Sparta) (5) the destiny in foreign affairs is most often fatal, as was for 
the Melians. For Thucydides, the reason for the hegemony of power-
politics in foreign and domestic affairs of a city-state was human 
nature itself, reflecting "lust for power arising from greed and ambition 
and acting as the primal force behind the rule of power and interest in 
politics" (6). Thucydides' description of power politics involves a 
degree of personal tragedy because the machinations of power politics 
finally led to the subjugation of Athens by Sparta, at the end of the war. 
On the foundation erected by Thucydides earlier, Machiavelli 
constructed his own theory of power politics in The Prince. 
Machiavelli cites the source of his inspiration the teachings of the 
ancients (7); and specifically mentions Thucydides by name in 
reference to an incident narrated in the latter's work in support of his 
own proposition that men of extraordinary merit are neglected by 
republics in times of peace (8). The exposition given by Thucydides of 
the theory of power politics, and his own experience in foreign and 
domestic politics, convinced Machiavelli of the truth and usefulness of 
this doctrine. Since The Prince was so much based on the philosophy 
behind The Peleponnesian War, it was truly revolutionary in 
philosophical thought in the sense that the Latin word revolvere 
means " to roll backwards". 
For Machiavelli, power politics was the only guarantee of 
survival among states and the only reliably cohesive element within a 
new state as well.The prince has no friends but only present and 
potential adversaries and enemies, both domestic and foreign. 
Therefore, there can be no mitigation in the ferocity of application of 
power politics by the prince, who has to wage physical warfare 
unremittingly against foreign rivals and periodically (when necessary) 
against his own subjects and has to be continuously engaged in 
psychological warfare in all possible ways and upon all appropriate 
occasions (9). In effect, it was not necessary that the prince have some 
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good qualities, but only that he appear to have them, for " men are so 
simple-minded and so dominated by their present needs that one who 
deceives will always find one who will allow himself to be 
deceived"(10). Machiavelli sees no limitation on the exercise of power 
politics but the one that may be self-imposed, and that too merely to 
achieve and maintain the maximum degree of political 
aggrandizement and exploitation permissible under the given 
historical circumstances. 
Machiavelli ardently wanted the destruction of the balance of 
power system in international politics, and wanted to replace it with 
what contemporary international political scientists call an 
authoritarian or hierarchical system (11). He wanted the prince to first 
consolidate his position within his princedom, then to unite Italy by 
conquering disparate political units and finally to liberate Italy from 
foreign interventionists and thus to establish a second Roman Empire 
(12). 
Machiavelli believed that the vast majority of men are afraid to 
assume any political responsibility and are willing to surrender their 
freedom to the prince who possesses the force of character requisite to 
make the decisions that power politics demands. The prince has to 
respond appropriately, utilizing his own beastly character to tame the 
unruly nature of his subjects; because the political unreliability of the 
common man is most assuredly cured by the techniques of power-
politics (13). The despicable nature of man makes power-politics an 
historical necessity. Like Thucydides, Machiavelli's theory of power-
politics was based on his cynical conception of the nature of man. 
Machiavelli believed (14) that the prince is governed by a moral system 
that is different from that which pertains to the mass of common man, 
as the prince is subject only to the unique moral code of power-politics. 
It is only the violation of the law of power-politics that would 
constitute the sin for a prince; and success or failure is the reward or 
punishment for the prince for obeying or disobeying the law of power-
politics. For Machiavelli, history is written by the conquerors and, if 
the prince wants to be successful and to be remembered well, he must 
force his way into their select brotherhood; because there can be no 
second choice for the prince and, therefore, he must be absolutely 
certain of the methods he engages on the first attempt (15). The only 
safe and sure tactics to use in the zero sum game of interaction among 
the states are those of power-politics. 
Machiavelli repudiates the Augustinian doctrine of the "just 
war "(16) and believes that the only 'just' war was that which was 
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necessary. A war which is necessary has to be fought whether it is just 
or unjust. Requirement of necessity eliminated the few potential 
reasons [ i.e., religious, ideological] for resorting to war. Since necessity 
is a condition for the legitimate right of self-defense, contemporary 
writers on international law have traced the political foundation of 
international law, in the principles of power-politics, to this 
Machiavellian doctrine (17). Law is irrelevant in the face of power-
politics because the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what 
they must and , as Thucydides had observed, right comes into picture 
only between equals in power. Therefore, Machiavelli believes that in 
political affairs law has no significance of its own and is basically a 
function and product of power relationships, which is ultimately based 
on coercion and military force (18). 
Machiavelli's contribution to the understanding of war rests in 
his redefinition of war, peace and the good man. There is no notion of 
peace as distinct from war; and peace is little more than a period of 
thought and preparation about war. The prince should not think in 
terms of peace, for states do not exist for peace. The prince has to make 
an amoral decision to conduct war when to do so would reduce 
afflictions within the state, hence serving the public safety and national 
interest. The key to this decision was to choose the best time for war. A 
threat could be manufactured even if it did not exist ,when to do so 
would be in the national interest .The call to war has to be at the proper 
time and in the national interest, and this idea was opposite to the 
classical notion of war. 
It was the study of the Roman history (and by the Roman 
historians) that helped Machiavelli to understand the international 
system of his time in which states were steadily growing and 
expanding, were seeking to extend their power, influence and 
territories and were fighting, for their existence, those who were trying 
to subdue them. As Felix Gilbert says, " Machiavelli was one of the 
first to grasp the competitive nature of the modern state system and to 
conclude that the existence of a state depends on its capacity for war " 
(19). 
Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, imbibed the ideas of both 
Thucydides and Machiavelli and, on the operational dynamics of 
power-politics, laid the foundations of the modern civil society. 
Like Thucydides and Machiavelli, Hobbes had a profoundly 
cynical conception of human nature and believed that men are 
impelled by a biological-psychological imperative to acquire power 
over others in order to guarantee their own self-preservation and 
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welfare (20). Since only domination over others would provide the 
maximum probability of continued existence, it becomes essential for 
men to dominate, enslave or kill another; and this animus dominandi 
of human nature precipitates a state of war among all men. This state 
of war is the state of nature where "the life of man is solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short" (21). Hobbes saw three contemporary 
historical analogies to his state of nature: i- the primitive conditions of 
the new world ; ii- times of civil war; and, iii-the system of 
international politics . The states of the world exist in the state of 
nature tantamount to a state of war, and, therefore, in this system of 
international relations the lives of states would be " solitary,poor, 
nasty, brutish and short". The state of nature among states is 
characterized by a distinguishing characteristic. " But because they 
uphold thereby,the industry of their subjects, there does not follow 
from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men" 
(22). Since that age was one of mercantilism, not interdependence, it 
could have been concluded that eternal warfare among states would 
lead eventually to mass impoverishment for the citizens of all states. 
All the concepts of peace, morality or justice can exist only within civil 
society, not before it, without it or between civil societies. Thus, in the 
inter-state war, nothing is unjust and " force and fraud are in war the 
two cardinal virtues" (23). Since there is no absolute power above the 
states which could compel mutual,reciprocal respect for the rights of 
each other, in international relations , power-politics is natural, 
amoral and inevitable. Such international relations would be 
characterized by power-politics and war unless and until the states 
enter into a multi-lateral social contract, establishing an absolute 
sovereign, with the power to impose its will for the common good. 
Since this seems improbable, international relations are destined to 
remain the state of nature, or a state of war. Each state has to safeguard 
itself by any means„either alone or in the form of a " open league 
between commonwealths". The creation of such an organization, in 
the form of a confederation, would mean the formation of a balance of 
power system for international relations. 
A modern balance of power system, as envisaged by Morton 
Kaplan (24) is characterized by the following essential rules: 
i-Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight; 
ii-Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase 
capabilities; 
Chapter I, p-10 
iii- Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national 
actor; 
iv-Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to 
assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of 
the system; 
v-Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational 
organizing principles; 
vi-Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-
enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some 
previously inessential actor within the essential actor 
classification. Treat all essential actors as accountable role 
partners. 
Such a system of balance of power, for Hobbes, would ensure 
that machinations of any one state, or one prince, for universal 
hegemony, do not succeed. In the operation of such a system, power-
politics would remain the operative dynamic of international 
relations, and would predominate until one system itself undergoes a 
fundamental change and becomes a supranational system in which 
the states create " a common power to keep them all in awe" (25). 
This Hobbesian state of war among the states (who are 
continually threatened by the spectre of cataclysmic death for massive 
nuclear weapons-systems) is sought to be contained by Article 2 (40) of 
the Charter of the U.N.O.: " All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". 
Stanley Hoffmann (26) gives a good analysis of Rousseau's 
conception of international relations as different from that of Hobbes 
in which he builds up the points of agreement between Rousseau and 
modern political realists: 
i-the non-existence of a general society of mankind; 
ii-the nation state system exacerbates conflict; 
iii-international commerce does not breed peace, and 
interdependence can easily lead to competition; 
iv-international law is either ineffective or irrelevant to 
international hostility; 
v-states are and will be unwilling to guarantee the peace through 
the establishment of international organizations. 
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Similarly, modern political realists disagree with Rousseau 's 
assertions on international politics: 
i-war is not essentially a social institution because war simply 
reflects a basic human drive for domination; 
iii-it is inevitable for a state to conduct a nationalistic foreign 
policy; 
iv-it is impossible for states to achieve autonomy, isolation and 
autarky. 
All this is so because, according to Rousseau, "the very 
intercourse of nations breed conflict (27) and, so, the balance of power, 
the threat or use of force, and power-politics will remain permanent 
features of international politics. 
Theories about Social Order, Force and International 
Relations 
There is an assertion that the type of social order does not 
matter; and that the decisive thing is the division of the world into 
separate units. The logic of separateness and competition makes 
military force an inherent element of the structure of international 
relations. This view is shared by Thucydides, Rousseau and Raymond 
Aron. This view holds that any class structure or economic system 
cannot provide, by itself, the stability and peace to the world because its 
(whatever) pacific qualities will be negated by the international system. 
Another related view, shared by Konrad Lorenz, Nietzsche and 
Spengler, sees modern society as aggravating the factors that lead to 
war, because society magnifies and exacerbates the aggressive 
tendencies of human nature, all its frictions and frustrations. Another 
view, shared by Montesqueu, Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte and 
Benjamin Constant, sees a fundamental opposition between military 
and feudal societies on the one hand and industrial societies, on the 
other. It believes that the industrial society, or industrialization of 
society, will gradually eliminate force, and war will become 
dysfunctional. Because industrial society is geared to production and 
commerce, it will tame society with the change of values, replacing the 
idea of conquest which is detrimental to the acquisition of wealth. 
Because of the special nature of international relations of industrial 
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societies, and because of the quest for material development, war has 
become non-functional. These transnational forces heighten the 
irrelevance of military force. 
This looks more an act of faith, as the course of history has not 
particularly upheld this view. Max Weber had thought that early 20th 
Century Germany and Japan were warlike because of the feudal 
remnants in their societies. One must note that some industrial 
societies have been quite bellicose: there are hardly any feudal 
remnants in the U.S.A. Thus, we have to go back to the nature of the 
international system itself.War does not have its own logic and it is to 
be seen as an instrument of policy in the conduct of international 
relations ; and the logic of force is that of politics. 
National security, as a field of inquiry, represents a continuing 
effort to place the expanded context of strategy and policy in 
international affairs within the intellectual framework. The subject 
matter concentrates on the presence of force as an instrument of policy 
and expands across a wide range of issues related to planning, building, 
sustaining, employing, controlling, limiting or reducing such force. 
The importance of these issues in contemporary international affairs 
has expanded the scope and substance of inquiry. National security 
narrows the focus of inquiry in international affairs. The subject matter 
is exclusive because it deals with force, and tends to address only one 
component of the international environment and only one of a wide 
range of approaches to that environment. The presence of force and its 
use remains an inescapable part of international environment, and 
power and force endure as instrument of policy. There is no reason 
why our concern with their study and comprehension should not be 
there. 
Fundamental questions regarding the role of force and military 
power in international relations can be summed up as : 
i-why do states need force and military power ? 
ii-in what ways can force and military power be used ? and 
iii- have nuclear weapons altered either the need for it or the 
manner in which force or military power can be utilized ? 
We have to start with a premise that, for national security in an 
anarchic world, and having no accepted and enforceable order, states 
rely on force and military power as the ultimate recourse in 
international politics. Robert Art indicates five basic factors that 
delineate the necessity of force in such a world (28): 
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i-states must fend for themselves; 
ii-states must provide for their physical security; 
iii-coricern for a state's short term position relative to others 
must take precedence over long term absolute gain for all; 
iv-all states operate in a position of strategic interdependence; 
and 
v-given those conditions, states find it difficult to be moral. 
From these factors, the use of force for purposes of defense, deterrence 
or compellance may be explored. 
Politics among nations is the politics of the ungoverned, because 
there is no government among states; and this politics takes place in an 
environment in which no single agency has a legitimate monopoly on 
the use of force. In the absence of a central authority above the level of 
states, having the power and authority to resolve the disputes that 
invariably arise among states, the politics among nations is anarchic. 
This anarchic realm, within which all states must act, gives rise to the 
need that every state has for force and military power. A state may set 
for itself any national goals but,for their attainment, it has to attain the 
capability and wherewithal. Neither a state can, over the long run, rely 
on the goodwill of other states nor can it be realistically sure about 
permanent friends or enemies. Other states cannot be counted to 
provide for the welfare of a state unless it is in the other's self-interest 
to do so and, therefore, each must supply the means for the attainment 
of proclaimed objectives. This anarchy compels the states to be self-
reliant.This self-reliance has to be most manifest in matters of national 
security. Since states vary in their resources and geo-political positions, 
and also because security is based on the perceptions of individuals 
determining security, it is rather difficult to determine whether a state 
is actually secure. Security would mean the degree of protection from 
attack that a state enjoys and, therefore, security concerns revolve 
around political-military matters and encompass both short and 
medium term. This security is the prerequisite for the attainment of 
the national goals that any state seeks. It is true that most of the states, 
most of the time, enjoy a degree of security. But not all states, all the 
time, feel perfectly secure. Thus, they must always be prepared for war. 
Since some states are prepared for war, others cannot feel secure unless 
they also prepare for war. The ever-present possibility that any state can 
always resort to force if it so chooses causes all to prepare for that 
eventuality; for, a successful diplomacy requires a credible threat to go 
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to war. Since each state has to provide for its own security, it has to 
concern itself with how it is doing relative to others, and a con\petition 
tantamount to the struggle for the survival of the fittest ensures. Such 
anarchic conditions of international relations constrain states, and 
statesmen, to be shortsighted and skeptical because the focus of 
attention must be on what others can do, not on what they say they 
intend to do. Emphasis on the capabilities, over the intentions of states, 
enhances the anarchic nature of international affairs and aggravates 
the problem for national security. 
Inspite of this anarchic nature, there is a position of strategic 
interdependence. The capability of a state to obtain its national goals is 
conditioned by similar capability of other states and, in this way,the 
strategy of each depends upon the strategies of others. In this game of 
strategies, there are no formal game-rules and no possibility of 
predicting the outcome; and the avoidance of defeat is the prize of 
winning. Since the cost of defeat may be the extinction of a state, 
interaction among states ranges from most-intensive rivalry to tacit 
collusion; and every state has to play the game merely to survive. In 
this situation, there can be no enforceable laws, and whatever exists in 
the form of international law is followed when useful to states and 
reflect the prevailing consensus among states about their common self-
interest Rights under this system of law would mean the freedom to 
choose whatever is deemed most effective to attain the national goals, 
and states would have a 'right' only to what they can achieve by their 
own efforts and capability. As a consequence, every state can make its 
own rules of the strategic game and has to be always prepared to do 
what it deems necessary for its interests, as perceived by itself. Each 
must be prepared to play according to rules set by the 'dirtiest' player. 
In this struggle for survival, in an anarchic international system, 
fending for itself requires a state to muster force and military power, 
which is required also for the physical security; and the calculations 
regarding relative positions make states consider power ratios. This 
ensures that force and military power must be integral to a state's 
conduct of its international relations. It is the necessity for all the states 
to be always prepared for war that characterizes the international 
politics as a state of war. The genuineness of a state's intentions is 
basically gauged by the degree of its credible military posture and 
without it a state's diplomacy, generally,lacks effectiveness. Behind the 
suave and gentlemanly postures of diplomats lies the brute military 
muscle that gives any meaning to the former. There is truth to the old 
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adage that the best way to keep the peace is first to prepare for war. Or, 
as Hobbes said, reputatior\ for power is power. 
The survival and prosperity of states in contemporary 
international relations is interdependent. Military power may not 
generate survival and prosperity but is an important ingredient for 
both. All the international interests of a state are affected by military 
force, its own and others'. The reason why states need force is that they 
cannot do without it. 
The answer to the question why war is endemic in international 
politics lies in the nature of international system. Specifically, it lies in 
the conflicts among autonomous and independent political units that 
are organized for their own protection and are not subordinate to a 
central political authority. In this anarchical system,the utility of force 
and armed coercion is much more than that of persuasion, 
negotiation,or adjudication. In this system,force is the final argument. 
Wars occur between political groups because there is nothing to stop 
them and, in international politics, the role of force is accentuated by 
the ability of states to mobilize mass loyalties and the great magnitude 
of force they can marshal. Kenneth Waltz here argues that 
"interdependence that locks national interests so closely together that 
separation is self-evidently destructive of all good things ,may increase 
the chances of peace. Short of that threshold, the new form of the old 
argument that war will not occur because it does not pay brings little 
comfort. If interdependence is growing at a pace that exceeds the 
development of central control, then interdependence may increase 
the occasions for war" (29). Even if we take a Utopian supposition that 
all states were purely defense-minded, there would still be need for 
force, because the very search for defense and security compels reliance 
upon military self help, which, in turn, fosters conflict and a 
competition for military power. Since the tangible and intangible 
conditions for national security go beyond the territorial boundaries of 
states, the competition based on military power becomes a certainty 
(30). 
Force is a common currency in international intercourse. "A 
nation's reputation for using force to support its vital interests ... is... 
important to it Especially when security depends so much on 
deterrence, the importance of preserving this reputation against a 
challenge will usually exceed by far the intrinsic importance of the 
immediate and tangible point of contention" (31). Force is essential to 
international politics since there is no other way for states to pursue 
what they regard as vital interests. The fact that many states with 
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conflicts of interest do not arm against each other or raise the prospect 
of war, does not argue against the integral relationship of force to 
international politics. As Thomas Hobbes had said, "War consisteth 
not in battle only, or the fact of fighting only, but in a tract of time, 
wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and, 
therefore, the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as 
it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth 
not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many 
days together, so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but 
in the known depositions thereto during all the time there is no 
assurance to the contrary" (32) 
A realistic analysis of political behaviour cannot assume that 
individuals have so common interests that obviate conflict of interest 
among states or the states' endeavours to support the individual 
interests through force. The need for force, in fact, emanates from 
perceptions of compelling functional needs, mostly from the states' 
need to rely basically on self-help to ensure the conditions of their 
survival and security. The argument has no validity that many forms 
of settling individual disputes, such as duelling and trial by ordeal, 
have become obsolete and similarly the use of force among states may 
become, someday, obsolete. This equates the forms of individual 
behaviour in secondary social relationships with the imperatives that 
confront men who act on behalf of political communities that are 
engaged in the competition for power. Duelling, as a method of settling 
conflict of interest, disappeared because the state assumed this function. 
But there is no forseeable institution to replace states in this respect and 
they have to settle their conflicts of interests in the form of a duelling 
among themselves. 
Diplomacy is bargaining; and, with enough military force, a 
country may not need to bargain. It can take what it wants to take and 
keep what it wants to keep. Whereas brute force may succeed when 
used, the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. 
Violence, at all level and including international relations, is most 
purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used. " 
The rational goal of the threat of violence", says H.L.Nieberg, " is the 
accommodation of interests, not the provocation of actual violence. 
Similarly, the rational goal of actual violence is demonstration of the 
will and capability of action, establishing a measure of the credibility of 
future threats, not the exhaustion of that capability in unlimited 
conflict" (33). There may have been some sense in the view, in the pre-
nuclear age, that war was an alternative to diplomacy but in the 
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contemporary environment any such distinction is so blurred and 
overlapping as to be meaningless. Far from bringing about the end of 
diplomacy, war has become part of diplomacy. Its telling example has 
been the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, in December 1972, when the 
Paris peace talks had become deadlocked. Military force was used by the 
U.S. to convey a message to North Vietnam and to put pressure on the 
North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris. The success of this tactic was 
proved when, within a month of this heavy bombing, a cease fire was 
agreed upon in Paris—the precise objective of earlier U.S. diplomacy. 
In the contemporary world, military power has been exploited without 
military force being used. The phenomenon of deterrence supports the 
view that modern military force tends to be threatened, as a tactic of 
diplomacy,rather than used in war. This is the difference between 
taking what one wants and persuading others to give it to the one. 
Militant threats—whether explicit or implicit—are made so that 
they will not have to be carried out. For this to happen, the threatened 
nation must believe that the threat will be, forthwith, executed if it 
does not comply. This threatened nation must believe that the 
adversary has the will and resources, both, to implement the threat; 
and only then the threat will have credibility and will be effective. If it 
is effective, the threat will not have to be carried out. The threatening 
nation generally prefers not to execute the threat and hopes to obtain 
the desired result without spending valuable military resources. Force 
is actually used only when threats have been made and have failed to 
elicit the desired behaviour or without the threats being used because 
they were thought to be useless. There can be no systematic 
generalization whether force will be used or threats will be issued 
because the decision depends on the circumstances of each particular 
situation. States use force both physically and peacefully. The first 
refers to its actual employment against the adversary; and the latter to 
an explicit threat to resort to force or to the implicit threat 
communicated simply by a state's having force available for use. 
Whereas the physical use of force means that the nation actually 
harms, destroys or cripples those possessions which another nation 
holds valuable, the peaceful use of force is employed explicitly or 
implicitly for the assistance it renders in the achievement of a goal, 
without doing any physical destruction to another nation's valued 
possessions. Thomas Schelhng (34) makes a distinction between ' 
brute force' and ' coercive power'. The former refers to the use of force 
against the adversary's military forces; the latter against its population. 
This distinction is made according to the objects against which military 
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power is used. This distinction is useful in explaining why nuclear 
weapons have brought a radical change in the use of force by states. 
Force can be used (physically and peacefully, both) against pure 
military targets, such as soldiers and weapon-systems; against social 
targets, such as population centres; against economic targets, such as 
industries. Either the pure military targets are first hit or, even if the 
other types of targets are hit, military targets are simultaneously 
attacked. Force is not used against the adversary's population or 
industrial centres unless the disparity in military power between two 
states is so marked that defence of homeland is no problem for the 
attacker; as was the case in the U.S. attack on Libya in 1988.Since threats 
are less dangerous, and cheaper, than attack, and are more equivocal in 
nature, they can be directed at any and simultaneously at all three types 
or can be left unspecified and ambiguous . No generalization is possible 
because there is no clear sequence for the peaceful use of force. 
If there is great disparity in strength between two adversary 
nations, the resort to physical force is less likely, and threats by the 
stronger against the weaker are more likely. No doubt, the stronger can 
easily defeat the weaker but has less need to resort to physical force as 
the threats to resort to force are quite credible and effective. If the 
disparities in military capabilities between two nations are wide, threats 
become less credible and less effective. A law of inverse proportions 
operates here: less the doubt about the relative strength and military 
capabilities between adversaries , the more effective is the threat. With 
the decrease of disparity in strength, there is an increase of doubt about 
the outcome in a test of arms, and, as a consequence, the utility of 
threats decreases. Small disparities in military capabilities between 
adversaries reduces the chance of peaceful use of force and enhances 
the possibilities of the actual use of physical force. The smaller the 
disparity, the greater the chances of defense by the weaker party; the 
greater the disparity, the smaller the chances of defense. 
The intensity with which a nation pursues an objective cannot 
be quantitatively measured; but this does not demean its importance. 
Actually, it further complicates the task of assessing whether and how 
force will be used. Robert Art has discussed (35) why, in spite of 
overwhelming superiority over North Vietnam, the U.S. was not able 
to impose its will on North Vietnam merely by threats to use force: the 
U.S had to attack because North Vietnam valued re-unification with 
South Vietnam more than the U.S. valued their continued separation; 
and, finally, the U.S. failed to impose its will, not because it lacked the 
military power, but because it did not deem the goal worthy of its cost. 
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The effects of the disparity in value placed on the goals by the two 
nations overrode the effects of the disparity in military strength. 
Purposes for the Use of Force : 
The goals and objects that states pursue range widely and vary 
considerably, from case to case. Even then four general categories may 
be attempted to sum up functions for which force is generally used: 
defense, deterrence, compellence and swaggering. 
When force is used for defensive purposes, it deploys military 
power either to ward off an attack or to minimize damage to oneself if 
attacked. For its own defense, a state deploys forces in place prior to an 
attack, uses forces after an attack has occurred to repel it, or strikes first 
if it believes that an attack upon it is imminent or inevitable. This 
defensive use of force involves both peaceful and physical 
employment. In this, even an offensive (first) strike can be defensive if 
an attack is imminent (and then the counter-measure is a pre-emptive 
strike) or inevitable (when the counter- measure is a preventive 
strike). These defensive countermeasures, to attack first, are 
undertaken if a state believes that others plan to attack it and that a 
delay in striking offensively would be against its own interests. 
Force is used in a deterrent way to threaten an adversary with 
damage unacceptable to him so as to prevent him from doing 
something, that he might otherwise do, adverse to our own interests. 
It is thus a threat of retaliation, to prevent something undesirable from 
happening. It is a peaceful use of force, as the threat is the essence of 
deterrence; because if the threat to use force had to be carried out and if 
the force had to be used, it would imply failure of deterrence. A 
deterrent threat is successful only if it has not to be carried out. But its 
success depends upon a state's ability to convince the adversary about 
its own will, and capability, to carry out the threat. Whereas the 
defensive use of force dissuades by convincing the adversary that he 
cannot conquer our military forces, the deterrent use of force dissuades 
by convincing the adversary that his own desired things / values will 
suffer damage if he initiates actions undesirable to us. 
The compellent use of force involves the employment of 
military power to stop the adversary from doing something he has 
already initiated or to force him to do something he has not yet done. 
Compellence, In Thomas Schelling's words (36) " involves initiating 
an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if opponent 
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responds" It can involve either the threat to take action if a state does 
not change its behaviour or the actual taking of action until the state 
changes its behaviour. Whereas the success of deterrence is measured 
by a threat that was not required to be implemented, the success of 
compellence is measured by how closely the adversary conforms to our 
stipulated desires. Schelling argues (37) that compellent actions tend to 
be vaguer in their objectives than deterrent threats and, for that reason, 
more difficult to attain. To be successful, compellent actions require a 
state to alter its behaviour in a manner visible to all in response to an 
equally visible forceful initiative taken by another state. 
'Swaggering' is the deployment of military power for purposes 
other than defense, deterrence or compellence; and force is not aimed 
directly at dissuading another state from attacking, nor at compelling it 
to do something specific, or at repelling attacks.lt involves the peaceful 
use of force and is expressed by displaying one's military might at 
military parades and military exercises and acquiring prestigious 
weapons. Its aim is to enhance the national pride and to look and feel 
more powerful and important, so as to be taken more seriously by 
others . It mixes the rational and irrational but is most comprehensive 
as it adds to the general image of the state. 
There is hardly any reason to believe that the process of creating 
and preserving states, by the use or threat of force, belongs to an earlier 
era and is not applicable to the contemporary international system. 
Israel became a state due to her military victories and Biafra could not 
become a state equally due to military causes. Bangladesh became an 
entity as the outcome of a military struggle, and Pakistan's geo-strategic 
position was vitally altered because of the same military struggle, in 
1971. 
The uses of military force in the present age may include: 
deterrence, defense and coercion; as a symbol of national prestige and 
enhancement of national prestige and the sanction for negotiations, 
warnings and threats to other states compelling some concessions from 
them; national development; demonstrations as a threat; blockade; 
rescue missions and operations short of open warfare; assistance to 
other states and support of friendly regimes; military interventions 
against unfriendly regimes; and the UN operations. Some conceivable 
uses of military force in international relations, during peace time, may 
also be suggested : Crisis management and deterrence from war; 
impact on the attitude of other states and loosening of their ties with 
one's enemies; support for other diplomatic efforts to assert and 
achieve state's interests, compelling other states to opt for desirable 
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behaviour; gains in influence through arms supplies and arms 
assistance; enhancement of national prestige and international 
authority by a demonstration of military force and capability and 
reputation of its use. There is a continuous influence on such 
fundamental factors like the structure of the international system, the 
cohesiveness of the opposing alliances, the freedom of action for each 
of such alliances, the developmental tendencies in the Third World, 
the long range foreign policy and military goals of regional and great 
powers. 
The Myth of the Obsolescence of Military Force in 
Contemporary International Relations 
To say that force is 'obsolete' in contemporary international 
relations is not necessarily to question its existence or the possibility of 
war, but to broadly analyze whether force can serve the functions of 
security, domination, status and influence (which it has done in the 
past). This aspect has vital implications not only for national policy but 
also for the nature of international politics. There is too much 
evidence of the pervasiveness of force and the multifarious functions 
it has served in international relations: " One simply cannot 
comprehend the rise, spread, and decline of ancient civilizations and 
peoples, or the creation, unification, expansion, and protection of 
modern nation-states, except in relation to force. The boundaries of 
states, the external holdings and rights, their internal strength or 
weakness, their influence or status, the harmony or discord of their 
relations—in short, the very identity of states—have been decisively 
shared by competition for military power and by the fortunes of war" 
(38). William McNeill has expounded the proposition that the whole 
astonishing explosion of modern Western civilization is linked with a 
distinctive bellicosity in its organized political life (39). Since force is 
persistent in international politics, we cannot avoid the problems of 
coping with it, whatever may be our opinions about the 
incompatibility of modern weapons with the system. 
The idea that war system has become obsolete,and an 
anachronism, believes that war lingers only because it provides some 
psychic satisfaction to those who perpetuate it. Walter Millis has 
explicitly presented the thesis that nuclear weapons have made war 
obsolete (40). Also, James Shotwell believed that rapid changes in 
military resources and the technology of destruction had made war as " 
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uncertain in its direction as in its intensity, or its spread. It is no longer 
a safe instrunxent for statesmanship under such circumstances; it is too 
dangerous to employ. It is no longer our ultima ratio because it has lost 
its raison d'etre. Victor and victim may suffer a common disaster In 
short, war which was once a directible instrument of policy has now 
changed its nature with a nature of modern society and ceases to be 
controllable in the hands of statesmen" (41). It is believed that nuclear 
weapons have created a situation that challenges the continuity of the 
traditional functions of military power in international politics. If the 
utility of war is greatly diminished, it is equally difficult for the threats 
of war to indefinitely perform the functions of war itself. This 
transformation has led some observers to believe that there has 
occurred a change in the functions of military power and that the 
whole system of power politics that depends on the prospect of war is 
obsolete: " A continuation of the present state of international affairs is 
bound sooner or later to produce a catastrophe in which most civilized 
values and all of the present warring value systems must perish 
War can no longer serve its greatest social function—that of ultima 
ratio in human affairs—for, it can no longer decide. It can render the 
first judgment of Solomon—to slaughter the disputed infant—but 
cannot render the second, which was to award it alive and whole to 
one or the other of the claimant " (42). 
Intellectuals are generally tempted by attitudes that appear 
radical and perceptive. Hence, there is a growing feeling that the utility 
of force has diminished, is diminishing and should, and will, diminish 
further. This skeptical view is wholly unjustified and the endeavour, 
in the following paragraphs, will be to attempt to prove that it is indeed 
so. 
The belief that military force has forfeited its place in 
international relations is based on the idea that in the modern 
industrialized society, there is no social acceptability for force; and that 
low utility diminishes acceptability, and low acceptability reduces 
utility by increasing its political costs. The basis of this argument is the 
belief that trade, commerce, investment etc. are activities that lead to 
success in contemporary international relations, that chief rational 
goals are economic and that force can hardly attain them because it is 
expensive, and is distasteful in a democratic society. This declining 
utility of force is also supposedly the result of changes in the 
instruments of conflict and,in particular, to the self-defeating nature of 
the nuclear power. The argument goes that the fear of the process of 
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escalation of nuclear power reaches further down to inhibit the use of 
even lesser force for even lesser ends and goals. 
At one time, even Morgenthau believed that, since the true 
interests of all states—namely, the peaceful enjoyment of material 
progress and the promotion of unhindered commerce—are identical 
and complimentary, power politics and war are senseless 
anachronisms (43). By the time both the superpowers had achieved a 
mutual deterrence and a capacity for Mutual Assured Destruction , in 
the early ' 
'Sixties, Millis held: " However difficult it may be to imagine a world 
without war, this task is now forced upon us. Two propositions are, I 
think, irrefutable: That a continuation of present state of international 
affairs is bound sooner or later to produce a catastrophe in which most 
civilized values and all the present warring value systems must perish; 
and that no strategic inventions, no new 'national security' policies, no 
juggling with weapon systems and armaments are likely to alter this 
prognostication" (44). While arguing about the uselessness of war, 
some still believed in the continuing efficacy of deterrence, and some 
excluded from the category of obsoleteness revolutionary wars and 
wars among less developed countries. Thus, Hannah Arendt argued 
that revolutionary wars, supplemented by the nuclear stalemate and 
the Cold War, may be about to replace interstate wars, which have 
become obsolete because they threaten total annihilation; and this 
imminent development was to take place without a radical 
transformation of international relations (45). 
It is believed that the use or threat of force by states is no longer 
that important or prevalent (or advisable, or even allowed) in 
contemporary international relations. The technological revolution in 
the field of nuclear weaponry is believed to be a cause for this decline 
because these weapons cannot be used as a means for political goals of 
the state. Since the arsenals balance each other out, they become 
irrelevant to the wider political relations between nuclear powers just 
as they are irrelevant to relations between nuclear and non-nuclear 
states. Also, supposedly, there has been a change in the nature of issues 
that are of concern to states in their relations. It is assumed that the 
issues are now those which cannot be resolved through the use or 
threat of force. It is argued that pervasive socio-economic changes have 
diminished the role of force and war because governments can no 
longer ensure domestic well-being by pursuing autonomous policies as 
the cooperation of other governments, and even non-governmental 
organizations, is necessary for this end. If some advantage is to be 
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gained in this cooperative relationship, use of force or coercive 
behaviour directed against other governments is not useful and is, in 
fact, counter productive. This argument is reinforced by the examples 
of western Europe and Japan, after the world war II, who concentrated 
their foreign policies on the pursuit of economic reconstruction and 
emerged as economic giants. 
This argument ignores the unique conditions which made this 
reconstruction and emergence possible. It was possible for western 
Europe and Japan to ignore security concerns, concentrating their 
energies on the pursuit of economic goals, largely because their security 
had become the concern of the U.S.A. If some states have been able to 
pursue policies concentrating on cooperative behaviour then it has not 
been because of the 'advanced' nature of their domestic structure but 
due to some geopolitical circumstances, which may not remain the 
same always. 
This, in itself, is debatable whether ' interdependence' in 
international relations has increased. Even if it has, it is no reason to be 
optimistic that the role of force has been reduced. If international 
relations are now more concerned with the allocation of vital and 
scarce resources, it does not mean that allocation and distribution of 
resources would be universally acceptable and through peaceful 
means. If states are more vulnerable now to actions of others then 
occasions for potential conflict have also increased. Support for this 
argument can be found from the international politics of oil. The 
region containing the world's largest concentration of oil—far from 
remaining an area in which pure economic forces operate—has 
become an area of strategic concern for the foreign policies of so many 
states. There may be endless scenarios in which military force might be 
used in this region. No doubt, for economic interchange, non-coercive 
cooperative behaviour is needed. Also, vulnerability and recognition 
of vulnerability also induces non-coercive cooperative behaviour. But 
such recognition and consciousness of vulnerability also produces a 
concern to minimise that vulnerability. Ability to minimise 
vulnerability varies from state to state and according to circumstances. 
But this urge and the commensurate actions are not very conducive for 
cooperative behaviour, in the long run. Interdependence in the field of 
vital natural resources creates situations in which the threat or use of 
force may be counter-productive. Situations may emerge in which 
force may appear more preferable than potential situations of 
deprivation of the resources. Even if it is accepted that the world is 
now characterized by a greater level of interdependence and that there 
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has been a shift from poHtical-security issues to socio-economic ones in 
the degree of priorities in international relations, it does not mean that 
the role of war has also declined. New occasions for it, and new issues 
and causes and pretexts for it may well be there. 
The ' interdependence theorists' believe that interests 
intertwined render force unusable, and that economic interests dictate 
that military power is no longer of use because it is no longer credible. 
Actually, force has been responsible for uniting many such economic 
entities. It was the U.S. military power that generated and sustained 
political conditions required for the intertwining of American, 
Japanese and west European economies. The west European and 
Japanese economies could flourish under the nuclear umbrella of the 
U S A , and it would have been odd for the U S A not to politically 
exploit this dependence. When military pre-eminence politically 
pervades the relations, force does not become irrelevant as a tool of 
policy. Efficacy of military power should not be confused with the will 
to use it and the perception of a state about the necessity and proper 
time to use it. Military power may not be useful for solving an 
economic problem which may not have a simple or single solution; 
but it does not mean it cannot be used. The efficacy of force endures. 
If war is, indeed, useless then how would international politics 
be conducted and how would conflicting interests be advanced or 
resolved ? Sure, some conflicts, rooted in military competition, might 
be eliminated by disarmament. But many other conflicts would 
remain: conflicts emanating from internal revolutions, competition 
for political allegiance, local rivalries, disputes over territories or 
resources and larger and more broad contests for hegemony or more 
conducive international or regional environment or for ideological 
supremacy. It is an unwarranted act of faith that states would 
unconditionally renounce all forms of force in coping with every such 
conflict of interest. 
Henry Kissinger has argued that a certain amount of insecurity is 
the inevitable corollary of sovereign independence (46). Howsoever the 
states may interpret the minimum conditions necessary for meeting 
their security requirements, they all devote enormous resources and 
time and manpower to promoting those conditions. As John Herz had 
said, the achievement and maintenance of national security is 
traditionally the chief external function of the state (47). 
The basic structure of international politics has remained 
fundamentally unchanged. The agenda of international politics may 
change from time to time; but there is still no centralized procedure for 
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authoritatively resolving the questions on the agenda of international 
politics. The anarchic nature of the international system has not 
changed. Since there is still no guarantee that resolutions of questions 
will be produced by peaceful methods, or that a resolution of some 
solution will be universally acceptable, the use of force still remains an 
implicit option. Since there can be no guarantee that this option will 
never be exercised by another, it has to remain an option for every 
state. It is, indeed, difficult to argue that the incidence of war, or the 
threat of war, as a tool of policy, is on decline. The use of force 
continues, as ever, to be a relevant factor in international relations. 
Coercive diplomacy is a viable instrument of national policy, a normal 
feature and pattern of international relations and, yet, it has not 
received sufficient academic attention. It amounts to coercing a country 
by demonstrating the quantity of force and highlighting the capability 
of, and intention to, use force. It may involve deployment of naval 
forces, using facilities in neighbouring countries or conducting military 
exercises in the region to demonstrate long range capability. This 
includes the deployment of warning systems in neighbouring 
countries, flights of reconnaissance aircraft or satellites or electronic 
interference with a country's defensive communication system. It also 
involves various patterns of arms transfers, and a fine and subtle way 
is to allow a neighbouring hostile country of the target nation to 
silently move towards nuclear weapon capability. A generalized 
coercive diplomacy is exercised in the Third World by the deployment 
of nuclear weapons in a manner so as to have the maximum impact 
on non-nuclear weapon countries. 
The contemporary trends in international relations indicate that, 
if anything, the role of force in such relations has increased. The 
decolonisation process resulted in the rapid increase in the number of 
states in the world. Direct political control of the pre-world war-II big 
powers gradually declined. Not only the superpowers were mostly 
concentrating on their mutual relationship, they were gradually losing 
grip over their alliance systems. All this resulted in the emergence of 
various and diverse new centres for political decision -making. This 
did not mean the end of conflict, but only some shift in the type of 
conflict. In the beginning of the decolonisation period, the emphasis 
and focus of conflict was on national liberation movements. The new 
groups had become conscious of their new identities and were 
demanding political expression for that identity. Since the political set-
up of the international system was not yet conducive to such demands, 
any changes could be achieved only by force. Moreover, pre-colonial 
Chapter I, p-27 
conflict patterns reasserted themselves. Whether at the regional or 
international level, states remain the ultimate decision-making 
authorities. And the growth of new centres of political autonomy in 
the Third World will produce new occasions for rivalry, with the 
potential for that rivalry to erupt into open conflict and war. 
It is believed that war has become obsolete not because of a 
change in the terms of calculation, not because it is no longer 
considered profitable, but because it is considered unthinkable, because 
of a change in thinking and mental set-up through the socio-cultural 
processes. But there is hardly ever any explanation of such cultural 
changes that make war unthinkable . There is only the explanation for 
a narrow phenomenon in which wars only of particular type may have 
become unprofitable, and not all; and definitely not the use of force 
short of war. 
It needs hardly to be emphasized that the mutual possession of 
weapons of mass destruction has not deterred the superpowers from 
competitive involvement in conflicts. The great power intervention 
has remained an element in international politics of many regions. 
The nuclear stalemate has not rendered the use of other military 
means obsolete. Indeed, recent developments in strategic thinking 
suggest that damage limitation techniques are possible and that a 
limited -nuclear war is not all that fearsome. Whereas earlier the belief 
was that quantitative or qualitative advantages in nuclear weapons 
cannot be used for political advantage, contemporary thinking is 
centered around the idea that a nuclear war can be waged in such a way 
as to achieve national policy goals through coercion. It is true that the 
possession of nuclear weapons has induced a high level of caution in 
the superpowers' dealings with each other. But these arsenals have not 
produced a decline in the use or threat of force, either by them or by 
other powers. Then, there have been numerous instances in which 
superpower nuclear arsenals proved to be irrelevant in the resolution 
of local conflicts. The U.S. failure in Vietnam and the Soviet failure in 
Afghanistan provide examples of a general condition in which small 
states may effectively resist superpower pressure and coercion. In 
many conflict situations, nuclear weapons become useless as 
instruments of policy as long as their use carries a risk of dangers 
disproportionate to anticipated gains. But non-availability of nuclear 
weapons for the resolution of conflict does not imply the absence of 
conflict or of the use of force in such a conflict. 
There is no force in the argument that nuclear weapons have 
made a war between the present superpowers unthinkable and that 
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use of force is on the wane because war in Europe has not occurred 
since the introduction of nuclear weapons. First of all, the utility of 
force should not be determined simply by the frequency with which it 
is used physically. Secondly, effect and cause should not be confused. 
The preparation and deployment for the use of military force, together 
with the fears of escalation to a general nuclear war, have kept the 
peace in Europe and between the two superpowers. The absence of war 
does not signify the irrelevance of military power. The estimates of 
relative military power keep it this way. 
The main shortcoming of the argument, that military force has 
become obsolete in international relations, lies in its failure to 
appreciate a subtle and varied role of military power short of war. Day 
to day experience actually demonstrates that the fearful prospect of war 
and policies for using, deterring, controlling, and disarming armed 
forces in the shadow of this prospect play a decisive role in 
international politics. In many ways, this role is now more pervasive 
and more comprehensive than in earlier periods of history when war 
was less dangerous. It may be true that now states dare not resort to war 
and, for this reason, international politics is bound to depend heavily 
upon the threat or prospect of war. It does not exclude the possibility of 
resorting to war as long as states depend on self help for their security. 
Even the emphasis on disarmament and arms control are indication of 
the preoccupation of international politics with military concerns. The 
belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will have far reaching 
implications for international politics belies the assertion that military 
power ( even if based on ' useless' weapons like nuclear weapons) 
is obsolete. In fact, few things can affect the prestige of a state more than 
its reputation for using armed force effectively, resolutely and 
prudently. Military power is still inseparable from issues of prestige, 
ideology, status and political influence. The magnitude and impact of 
modern day forces have enhanced the uses of military power short of 
war. Crises that actually test the national power, and that too under the 
shadow of war, are major modes of international politics. The art of 
coercion short of war is being developed and deliberately applied. The 
first pre-requisite of national security is now deterrence and it has 
become a sophisticated calculus of contemporary international politics. 
Political and military factors now suffuse each other in a way that 
makes a distinction (of earlier periods) irrelevant. 
Moreover, the record of the last decades does not support the 
assertion that the efficacy of military force is on the wane. The Chinese 
action in Vietnam, the British in the Falklands, the Soviet actions in 
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Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan, the U.S. actions in 
Grenada, Panan\a, El Salvador, Libya and the Persian Gulf, all have 
been predicated on the use of conventional military power. Similarly, 
conventional military power has remained an important instrument 
of foreign policy for the Third World countries: the liberation of 
Bangladesh, the India-Pakistan wars and the India-China war,Indian 
actions in Sri Lanka and Maldives, the Iran- Iraq war, Vietnam's wars 
with China and Cambodia, the wars between the two Yemen, the 
Ethiopian-Somalian war, the Libyan action in Chad, the Morrocan 
takeover of the Spanish Sahara, and many other such actions indicate 
that military power and foreign policy continue to be inexorably linked 
and the efficacy of force endures. The states with the greatest military 
strength have the greatest influence in international relations. Their 
status is the most unchallenged, their diplomacy the most successful, 
their actions the most respected and their threats most heeded. Military 
power does not have to be used to be useful; it is sometimes most 
useful when it is not used, and the hazards of modern war, far from 
changing this situation, have actually reinforced it. The fancied 
theories about the decline of the utility of force are not just corruption 
of thinking about international relations but are a distraction from its 
proper concerns. While it would be a mistake to assume that political 
influence is proportional to military strength, it would be an even 
bigger mistake to deny any connection between the two. 
Changes, if any, in the contemporary utility of military force 
reflect the changes in the effectiveness, form and style of the 
application of force. It is believed that in the contemporary 
international politics, the value of territorial conquest and acquisition 
of external sources of supply has diminished, as is the possibility of 
conducting successful wars because of the increased destructive 
potential of modern warfare. There has also evolved a shift from overt 
to covert uses of military force. It is also believed that, instead of being a 
means of altering the status quo forcibly, the military force has now 
become an instrument for the preservation of status quo.It is 
unfortunate that assumptions and pronouncements are made about 
military force and international relations by persons of apparent 
intelligence with a naive dogmatism of a type which is hardly 
discernable in any other area of social sciences. 
J.D.B. Miller has rightly summed up this debate thus (48) : 
" It is thus clear that the study of war—of how it comes about, of what 
consequences it has, of the likelihood that this or that state will 
triumph—is of major importance to an understanding of international 
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politics. Even those who reject war as an act of policy must be aware 
that such rejection is unlikely ever to be general throughout the 
international system; and they will have to see the world in grand 
strategic terms—in terms, that is, of how the grand strategy of each 
major power is likely to be formulated—if they are to retain contact 
with reality. It is an unfortunate fact that much study of international 
politics has proceeded on the assumption that global war was 
unthinkable, while other studies have assumed that it was 
unavoidable. Somewhere in between, in a genuine attempt to 
understand how war affects politics, and how politics affects war, lies 
the right path for those who would know the world as it is". 
Transformation of the Nature of Force in International 
Relations 
Many scholars hold the view that nuclear weapons have 
transformed international politics (49). This view is based on the 
capacity of nuclear weapons to inflict catastrophic damage, suddenly 
and at great distances, and the ability to destroy a nation without 
defeating its armed forces , whereas states are not able to offer 
protection to their citizens or of their territory; and on the superfluous 
destructive power available to the superpowers and the mutually 
nullifying effects of their military power. These scholars hold that 
nuclearization of international politics has resulted into the 
obsolescence of the classical system of power politics, the political 
obsolescence of military alliances and the equalization of the power of 
big and small states. 
Actually, since the beginning of this century, there has been 
growing tension between an increasingly intensive production and 
exploitation of military energy on the one hand and, on the other 
hand, a more uneven attempt to moderate and control the competition 
for power because of its growing volatility and destructive potential. 
This activity has been wrenched by an unprecedented explosion of 
technological innovation and mass production, which may be termed 
the expansion of material energy. At the same time, there have been 
unprecedented plans and efforts to control this material expansion by a 
systematic, organized ordering of production and use of energy. " For 
the very characteristics of modern ... civilization that have intensified 
conflicts among its members—rapid environmental change and the 
increased effect of one individual's, group's, or state's actions upon 
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another—have also, through a mixture of expediency and idealism, 
inspired attempts to restrain these conflicts for the common 
welfare"(50). The two decades preceding the First World War had 
witnessed the height of military laissez faire and glorification of the 
misapplication of Darwinian theory to the international struggle for 
power. This was being practiced in the pursuit of technical military 
strength by the general staffs of major European powers. But the 
consequences of that war provoked a massive reaction against the 
prevailing war system. While the governments that were interested in 
order were paralyzed into inaction due to this reaction, the aggressive 
states were free to exploit the uses of force short of war until another 
war could not be avoided. Now, the obstacle to an international order 
is not the aggravation of international tensions because of nuclear 
weapons—in fact, they have provided some stability and moderation 
of conflict—but that even a single breakdown of that order could be 
catastrophic. There is no escape from the unpalatable fact that the 
prospect of such a catastrophe is the indispensable basis of an 
unprecedented order. 
As mentioned above, a couple of decades before the First World 
War, military power had undergone a transformation and the main 
impetus for it had come not just from the expansion in the destructive 
power available but also from socio-political changes. There had been 
an acceleration of technological innovation, mass production and 
applied sciences; and these developments were interacting with a 
state's mobilization and exploitation of mass enthusiasm for military 
purposes, its peacetime conscription of manpower, and the coordinated 
utilization of all human, economic and technological resources under 
professional military staffs. The beginnings of modern military power 
lie in the erosion of various constrains upon warfare under the impact 
of a rational and utilitarian approach to force in international politics, 
to the injection of national and/or ideological fervour into state policy, 
to the technological and specialized nature of military management, 
and to the depersonalization of warfare in which the inflictors of 
destruction are remote from their victims. In the chronological 
sequence, the sources of the expansion of military power, and of its 
impact upon international politics, can be summed up as the 
rationalization, centralization, popularization, professionalization, and 
modernization of military power. 
Clausewitz had emphasized on the controlling effects of the ends 
of war over its dimensions. But he overlooked the effect of the 
destructive capacity of armed forces, and had not anticipated the 
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comparable effect that the professionalization and modernization of 
military power would exert on international politics. About the 
political significance of the interaction between the ends and means of 
war, Clausewitz had this to say: 
The greater and more powerful the motives for war, the more 
they affect the whole existence of the nations involved, and the 
more violent the tensions which precedes war, so much the 
more closely will war conform to its abstract conception. The 
more it will be concerned with the destruction of the enemy, the 
more closely the military aim and the political object coincide, 
and the more purely military, and the less political, war seems to 
be. But the weaker the motives and the tensions, the less will the 
natural tendency of the military element, the tendency to 
violence, coincide with the directives of policy; the more, 
therefore, must war be diverted from its natural tendency, the 
greater is the difference between the political object and the aim 
of an ideal war and the more does war seem to become 
political(51). 
In the last century, Bismarck had tried to undermine the 
prevailing politics of force by designing a complicated network of 
peacetime defensive alliances which were designed to protect 
Germany's already superior position with a stalemate between 
opposing combinations of power. He consolidated a pattern of balanced 
antagonisms in which crisis diplomacy was subordinated to the 
imperatives of organizing military power in peace time (52). But 
these alliances provided the political frameworks within which 
military commitments were consolidated, and this consolidation, in 
turn, tightened the alliances. In this way,the alliances with which 
Bismarck had intended to fragment military power became a means of 
aggravating military power. This was the beginning of the peacetime 
development of arms as a primary force in international politics. 
After the holocaust of the First World War, liberal opinion was 
of the view that military alliances were responsible for that war and 
that it was possible to eliminate war by eschewing alliances and arms 
race in favour of a disarmament and a universal league of nations. As 
a result, there was a general failure on the part of these states to 
successfully compete with more offensive states (Germany, Italy, Japan) 
in exploiting the new utility of force short of war. The defensive 
nations (~ subsequent Allied powers) had not concerted their military 
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power just when their security, and the international order, had 
demanded a united military effort to deter the expansion of Germany. 
There were some political and psychological developments which were 
responsible for this: strong inhibitions against war, the fear of 
revolution (on the pattern of the Russian revolution), the growth of 
liberal pacific movements, the increased costs of conquering territory as 
a result of the growing nationalist sentiments. At the same time, 
parallel to these, were other developments which enhanced the utility 
of force short of war and which were adroitly used by the offensive 
states: better and extensive communications between the governments 
and between governments and their armed forces, larger forces capable 
of suddenly striking, imperatives of preparing for war in advance of an 
imminent war, the importance and impact of mobilization plans and 
strategic doctrine, weapons competitions, the power and mobility of the 
modern battleship, and the idea as well as weapons of strategic 
bombing which was oriented toward the direct punitive civilian 
damage. All this enhanced the threat value of armed forces on a 
continuing basis in peacetime. These new developments were adroitly 
exploited by the pre World War -II expansionist powers, particularly 
Germany under Hitler. 
Wheeler-Bennett and A.J.P. Taylor have discussed Hitler's 
brilliant exploitation of the weaknesses and divisions of potential 
opponents by which he gradually rearmed Germany and, by piecemeal 
aggression, improvised an expansion which was, almost, bloodless 
(53). The basis of his success was his shrewed intuition about the 
unwillingness of other governments to use force and his capitalization 
on the general revulsion toward a general war, to confront the 
democratic states with a series of limited aggressions, none of which 
seemed worth resisting at the price of general war. He alternated his 
menacing and conciliatory gestures and placed the burden of 
undertaking another war on states that were materially and 
psychologically not prepared for it. His tactical skill was in disarming 
and isolating the opposition with the prospect of war: techniques of 
conveying the threat of war and testing the nerve and will of potential 
opponents; military pageantry; calculated private conversations and 
inspired rumours about Germany's military intentions and capabilities; 
troop concentrations and maneuvers; exaggerated claims of military 
strength; ultimatums and political demands; and alternately or 
simultaneously rattling the sword and waving the olive branch (These 
policies and tactics are discussed in detail by E.M.Robertson in Hitler's 
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Pre-War Policy and Military Plan 2933-2939-,Longman Green:London, 
1963). 
The success of these policies marked a failure of military 
deterrence. It failed because Britain and France failed to form a firm 
military alliance to convince Germany that aggression would be met by 
united resistance. In this way, the Age of Deterrence began with a 
failure; but this failure proved that the pre-requisite of order was the 
conspicuous will, backed by the capacity, to make war. The organization 
of such countervailing power requires a peacetime defensive alliance 
and a steady competition in arms, without which the states interested 
in order lack the pre-requisites of deterrence and the effective 
peacetime management of force. The effective regulation of military 
power cannot spring from a simply anti-militarism; it demands 
continual studied attention to the development, control and use of 
force. 
It may be pertinent to make a distinction between the impact of 
military force on the contemporary international situation including 
crises, conflicts, regional and local balances of power and, on the other 
hand, the continuous impact on fundamental factors that have a long-
term effect on the general course of developments in international 
relations. Such factors include the structure of the international 
system, the cohesiveness of the different blocs and the choices of 
actions for each of them, the concepts of the long-range foreign policies 
and military doctrines of more powerful countries of the world and the 
developments in the Third World. Assessments of these 
developments may differ as regards the impact of military force on 
world events and the utility of military force in contemporary world— 
positive or negative, increasing or decreasing, substantial or negligible. 
The point of convergence may be the assertion that military force, 
independently of whether its role has increased or decreased, remains 
an indispensable instrument of national interest. The main reason for 
the continuing utility, and revival of this utility, of military force is 
that several of the reasons for resorting to military violence in inter-
state relations that were regarded as not proper, for nearly two decades 
after the Second World War, have regained their significance. During 
the energy crisis of the mid-Seventies, the economic rationale for the 
use of military force was rediscovered: the access of the western powers 
to natural resources (for instance, oil fields) became endangered and 
the idea gained ground that such resources may be defended or even 
seized by military means. With this, the earlier hope vanished that the 
growing inter-dependence of all the states would put an end to the 
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competition for resources with the use of mihtary force. The North-
South interaction now resembles a struggle and the growing demands 
by the developing countries for financial and industrial-technical 
assistance, and the protectionist policies of the developed countries, 
have resulted in an increase in tension and in the possibilities of using 
military force. 
Three situations emerged after the Second World War. First, 
power in international relations became bipolar, with two 
superpowers possessing the capacity to significantly influence events 
globally; and regarding their national interests, including those that 
might be defended potentially with force , as global in nature. Second, 
the UN Charter was universally accepted, by which states renounced 
war as an instrument of policy. The result has been not a positive 
condition of peace but an era in which force continues to be applied 
under various guises. This situation of Violent Peace (this is the title of 
a book by Carl and Shelly Mydans, written in 1968) blurs the traditional 
distinctions between war and peace. Third, through atomic power, 
mankind created a means of self-destruction and thereby altered the 
basic rules for defence and war. The superpowers can no longer afford 
to confront one another in ways that could lead to violence and thus 
nuclear war; and fear of atomic exchange governs the behaviour of 
superpowers towards each other. But there is a paradox also. There are 
parts of the world where interests of nuclear powers are not vital—and, 
therefore, not worth fighting over—and confrontation is possible and 
permissible there because it does not raise a spectre of a nuclear 
holocaust . 
The destructive potential of nuclear weapons is no assurance 
that the deterrent value of measures undertaken to achieve some 
objective will be any less. The conviction that a relation exists between 
the measures threatened and the interests for which a threat is made 
remain unchanged. There is always the possibility that any overt resort 
to force may eventually lead to the introduction of nuclear weapons, 
and once nuclear weapons are employed it may prove difficult to limit 
their use. In this scenario, interests at stake have to be made to appear 
commensurate to the consequences that might follow a failure of the 
threat. In this way, once failure is to result in general nuclear conflict, 
every conflict of interest over which force is threatened is interpreted 
as posing a critical issue of security and survival. When survival is the 
issue, specific conflicts of interests are invested with a significance they 
would not otherwise have. While urging his fellow Athenians to reject 
Sparta's ultimatum, Pericles says: 
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Let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle 
if we refuse to revoke the Megarian decree. It is a point they 
make much of, and say that war need not take place if we revoke 
this decree; but, if we do go to war, let there be no kind of 
suspicion in your hearts that the war was over a small matter. 
For you this trifle is both the assurance and the proof of your 
determination. If you give in, you will immediately be 
confronted with some greater demand, since they will think that 
you only gave way on this point through fear" (54). 
For a contemporary version of this idea, we may easily substitute the 
Megarian decree with the ' surrender of West Berlin' and then Pericles' 
speech seems analogous to that of President Kennedy of the U S A in 
1961: " West Berlin is more than a show case of liberty, a symbol, an isle 
of freedom in a communist sea .... above all it has now become, as 
never before, the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal 
point where our solemn commitments.... and Soviet ambitions now 
meet in basic confrontation.... If we do not meet our commitments to 
Berlin, where will we later stand ? If we are not true to our word there, 
all that we have achieved will mean nothing" (55). 
What quantum of force is militarily necessary depends not just 
upon the purposes for which a war is fought but the actual 
circumstances in which a war is fought. The vital changes in the means 
of destruction only result in aggravating men's fears of what others are 
capable of doing. An expression of the principle of proportionality, in 
the context of people's wars, was provided by the then defense minister 
of China, Lin Bao : " We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice 
and suffering on the people. But the destruction, sacrifice and suffering 
will be much greater if no resistance is offered to imperialist armed 
aggression and the people become willing slaves. The sacrifice of a 
small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for 
whole nations, whole countries and even the whole of mankind; 
temporary suffering is repaid by lasting or even perpetual peace and 
happiness" (56). 
Regarding this determination of the quantum of force to be used, 
it has to be kept in mind that the calculations that inhibit the great 
powers in their mutual relations need not inhibit them in their 
relations with the smaller nations. The principle of proportionality 
expresses the ' logic of justification' and is compatible with almost 
every substantive justification of force. If war is not justified, it is 
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because the values sacrificed by war outweigh the values war may 
preserve. If certain acts in war are not justified it is because the 
consequences of such acts are disproportionate to whatever good they 
intended to secure. The difficulty of justifying force is dependent upon 
the destruction resulting from its use. Whatever the purposes sought 
through force, they cannot be delinked from the level of destruction 
attending the use of force. 
Whenever a use of military force has been regarded as advisable, 
states have invented a justification for it. For instance, the right of self-
defence has been extended to include ' self- help' in defending ' vital 
interests' which are supposed to ensure the survival of a state. 
Whereas military force still has to be adequate and appropriate in its 
purposes, what is even more required is the skill in its application. 
The Vietnam war is the classical example of how a superpower, with 
the capability to destroy the world, could not subdue a rice-based, 
bicycle-powered small country—not because there was any inherent 
defect in the military instrument itself, but due to the incompetent way 
in which military power was used. American lack of success in 
Vietnam was not the result of using military force but in using it at a 
pace and level that the North Vietnamese found tolerable. Similarly, 
where force was ineptly used by Britain in Suez in 1956, it was 
successfully used by her in the Falklands in 1982; or whereas force was 
naturally there in the India-Pakistan war of 1965, its use by India, in 
1971, was much more competent, shrewd, and successful. Similarly, 
unsuccessful interventions (Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.) do not 
minimize the role of military force. It would be erroneous to deduce 
from some failures any general proposition about the ' diminished' 
utility of military force. The fact that many international transactions 
take place without any military coercion does not mean that 
diplomatic, economic and other instruments of foreign policy are a 
universal and comprehensive substitute for military force, or that 
military force cannot often override all other means . 
It is the state's security, independence and survival that continue 
to provide the main justification of force in international 
relations.Although the idea of deterrence is as old as the history of 
human conflict, the functions that strategists of nuclear deterrence are 
expected to serve are unique. The scope and intensity of the 
expectations from nuclear deterrent strategies are much wider and 
much higher. The issues arising from the possible use of nuclear 
weapons are vitally different from any other strategic deterrent of the 
past. There is a willingness to endorse a deterrent strategy but a 
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reluctance to face the consequences of the thernnonuclear war; and 
while there is a readiness to employ the threat of thermonuclear 
violence to preserve national interests, there is an insistence that 
thermonuclear war must destroy the ends for which it is presumably 
waged. Behind the idea of massive retaliation was the belief that the 
measures threatened would never have to be carried out. Also, 
however disproportionate the measures threatened by massive 
retaliation, these measures were still to be taken only in response to an 
aggressive act. With the development of theories justifying the mutual 
assured destruction, in case of a thermonuclear war, a belief developed 
that such a war would never occur as it would ensure a mutual suicide 
and would destroy the values for the protection of which that war was 
being contemplated. Walter Lippmann wrote, in the early Sixties: " 
Only a moral idiot with a suicidal mania would press the button for a 
nuclear war. Yet we have learnt that, while a nuclear war would be 
lunacy, it is an ever present possibility. Why ? Because, however 
lunatic it might be to commit suicide, a nation can be provoked and 
exasperated to the point of lunacy where its nervous system cannot 
endure inaction, where only violence can relieve its feelings". (57). 
Lippmann reiterated this stand, a year later, writing in this journal: " 
While nuclear war would be suicidal lunacy, it is an ever present 
possibility. Nuclear war will not be prevented by fear of nuclear war. 
For, however lunatic it might be to commit suicide, a great power, if it 
is cornered, if all the exits are barred, if it is forced to choose between 
suicide and unconditional surrender, is quite likely to go to war". 
Even if we accept the view that any nuclear war is necessarily 
'suicidal lunacy', it clearly does not follow that no important change in 
the status quo can be brought about by the threat of force. On the 
contrary, important changes in the status quo may be affected by the 
threat of force precisely because ' nuclear war means mutual suicide'. 
Deterrence is effective because there are interests over which states are 
willing, if necessary, to use force. 
It would be erroneous to assume that nuclear weapons have 
obviated states' needs for military force. No doubt, some significant 
changes have been brought about in the nature of international politics 
because of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the anarchic 
environment of inter-state action has not been drastically transformed. 
The necessity for self-help for the states is still there; nuclear weapons 
only enabling some states to help themselves better. Military power 
remains integral to the conduct of foreign policy. What has actually 
been altered is the way in which nuclear weapon states use their 
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military power to achieve their goals. Robert J.Art has described this 
phenomenon thus : " For those (nuclear weapon states) nuclear 
weapons have downgraded the function of defense, ruled out physical 
nuclear compellence, enhanced deterrence and nuclear swaggering, 
and left unclear the utility of peaceful nuclear compellence. It would be 
a mistake to ascribe all the changes in the ways nuclear states have used 
their military power simply to nuclear weapons. The changes wrought 
have been due as much to who has had them as it has been to what the 
weapons are physically capable of doing Nuclear weapons have not 
eliminated the need for nuclear states to deploy non nuclear forces, nor 
have they diminished for most non nuclear states the utility that 
conventional forces have for attaining their foreign policy goals vis-a-
vis one another. In short, one can be equally impressed by the enduring 
realities of international politics and by the changes nuclear weapons 
have wrought" (59). 
The great destructive potential of nuclear weapons has not 
diminished their political utility, though there are powerful restraints 
on the physical uses of nuclear weapons. The superpowers intend to 
avoid actions that may strengthen the incentives of other states to 
acquire nuclear weapons. The 1972-SALT is its example where both the 
superpowers agree to act in ways so as to exclude the outbreak of 
nuclear war between them and between either of the parties and other 
countries. This desire to prevent nuclear war has an anti-proliferation 
intent, also. The superpowers do not want that the advantages they 
themselves derive from the possession of nuclear weapons may be 
diminished by the erosion of this power through proliferation. 
Presently, one's nuclear power is checked and balanced by the other's. 
This makes the nuclear weapons subject to the same laws of 
international politics as are conventional weapons—that is, only when 
power checks the power the use of force is restrained, and that only 
relative power counts in international relations. 
Nuclear weapons have not much use for outright compellence 
and have never been tested for their defensive value. They are either 
suited for swaggering or for deterring attacks. The bulk of the defense 
budgets of superpowers still goes for extensive deployment of 
conventional forces. Moreover, the Soviet possession of nuclear 
weapons did not give it a victory in Afghanistan nor did it stop the 
virtual erosion of its control over eastern Europe. The U.S. possession 
of nuclear weapons did not enable it to check the OPEC, or to win in 
Vietnam, or to prevail in the Middle East or even in South America. In 
cases where compellence was emphatically desired, the nuclear weapon 
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States have reverted to conventional force and to the conventional 
laws of its use in international relations: earlier Soviet actions in 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Afghanistan, and the U.S.actions 
in South East Asia, and against Libya and Panama. 
Since it is relatively easy for a nuclear weapon power to deter 
attacks on its homeland, it has a greater degree of security than others. 
Definitely, there is a decisive advantage to be secure in a world where 
others are insecure. It means that the nuclear weapon power is not to 
be overburdened with national security concerns and, unlike other 
states, can divert more national resources and energies to other tasks, 
but, at the same time, such a state can bargain for or wrest political-
military-economic concessions from other states. Precisely because 
nuclear deterrence supplies a high degree of security to a nuclear 
weapon power certain political advantages are created to be 
diplomatically exploited, which include the option to divert resources 
for other pursuits, a greater margin of safety for diplomatic 
maneuvering, and an opportunity to bargain nuclear protection with 
that which such a state may want from others. Between deterrence and 
outright compellence lies a fertile field for subtle and behind-the-scene 
political use of nuclear weapons as a force in international relations. 
The nature and role of military force in contemporary 
international relations have been thus described by Michael Howard: " 
International order is based ... on recognition of disagreement... The 
conduct of international relations must therefore always be a delicate 
adjustment of power to power Military power, the capacity to use 
violence for the protection, enforcement or extension of authority, 
remains an instrument with which no state has yet found it possible 
completely to dispense Military force is neither a purely 
destabilizing factor on the international scene; neither it is the basic 
factor of international order. Military force should be regarded simply 
as an intrinsic feature of international relations." (60). 
To sum up, even if some states perceive military force as less 
instrumental they consider that they must possess it, and increase it, 
since there are ' others' who regard it as still usable and viable. No state 
has renounced the open or physical use of military force, even nuclear 
weapons. Comments to the effect that it would not be feasible to use 
nuclear weapons are usually qualified by an acceptance of the feasibility 
and utility of wars short of total. For the present, force remains the 
ultima ratio on a broad range of international issues. The real debate 
must not be whether military force still has utility, but what are the 
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most essential manifestations of this utility in the changed 
circumstances of the present. 
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II 
War in International Relations 
Cry "Havoc", and let slip the dogs of war 
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, 111,1 
War may be comprehended,through the study of international 
relations, at two distinct levels. The study may start with the 
assumption that, since individual states resort to war, wars may be 
studied by the analysis of state's behaviour and actions, their decision-
making processes and various influences on those decisions, the beliefs 
about national interests and their foreign policy goals. The study of 
wars,on the other hand,may take into account the international 
environment, the balance of power among alliances, the influences 
and power projections between states,the effectiveness of international 
organizations and the interdependence of states. But, to a greater 
degree,any comprehensive study of war has to be concerned with states 
and with societies of states.As Dina Zinnes believes(l), the primary 
interest of students of international relations is the hostile behaviour 
of states, and the study of war is a part of the study of international 
relations. When Carl Friedrich said (2) that "it is not usually recognized 
by people who discourse upon war and peace that any general theory of 
war implies a general view of history,...(and) nor have they always 
been aware of the fact that you cannot usually discuss the problems of 
how to maintain peace if you have no theory of war", he was echoing 
what Liddell-Hart had declared forty years earlier that if you want 
peace, understand war. But,unfortunately, it has been assumed, over 
the ages, that war is a disagreeable phenomenon to be studied in order 
45 
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to be avoided. Actually, it is much more easier to avoid it if one was 
prepared for it. 
It was the lack of a proper relationship between political 
leadership and the military that caused the German defeat in the 
Second World War. The political leadership was trying to achieve 
unlimited goals by limited means. It imposed its will on the military 
leadership, and believed that military success would solve political 
problems. There have been analyses that separate war activities and 
peace activities and they have arrived at some unrealistic conclusions. 
For instance, Midlarsky says "We cannot understand war as a failure of 
normal power(political)relations,such that force (coercion) in the form 
of political violence, results. War is then not a 'continuation of 
political relations' but their termination in the onset of extreme 
coercion. Rather than a continuous political process, there occurs a 
discrete change from power to force" (3). When violence is a 
conspicuous element in the structure of politics, it is questionable to 
separate the two. 
War is indispensable as an instrument among inter-state 
relations.lt is one of the means for resolving differences between states. 
And since it operates in an international context, the stakes of war may 
be the life and death of states. 
Nature and Functions of War: 
There is a functional and a phenomenological approach to the 
concept of warfare. The functional approach focuses on the social 
function of war as an armed conflict between two states, or two 
alliances of states, to achieve some political objectives. The 
phenomenological approach focuses on the conduct of warfare and its 
results. In Clausewitzian terms, this approach focuses on armed 
violence pushed to utmost bounds. War is the extension of power, 
basically an armed struggle for political aims. Since power provides an 
advantage in the struggle for self-preservation, warfare would involve 
the imposition of one's will on the others and the enhancement in 
one's own power; and this is the main motive of collective behaviour 
of men and states. For Clausewitz, politics meant the activity of state in 
general and state was the representative of all interests of the entire 
society against the interests of another state. The armed struggle for the 
maintenance and enhancement of these interests is war. For a proper 
study of the nature of war, the phenomenological approach should be 
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supplemented by functional approach in which war is treated as a 
political act.War is not an isolated act but is subordinate to a 
determined policy, and is, what Clausewitz had believed. Chameleon-
like in character. 
War is an organized armed struggle, waged by armed units, for 
political aims, and is a continuation of the policies of states through 
military violence. To qualify as war, an armed conflict must be a social 
action pursued for political aims, mainly by means of armed violence. 
The concept of war includes the socio-political nature of the various 
conceivable types of war, their causation, the conditions in which they 
occur and the way they start, the strategies used in them, their military 
character including the weapons used or not used and their socio-
political-military consequences. War is composed of violence, chance, 
play of probabilities and political aims.The defining characteristics of 
war are its political aims, the nature of participants, the weapons 
used,the character of their use, geographical scope and size of military 
operations, intensity and duration. An extension of the range of 
political actions that are covered by the concept of war would include 
military actions of states against one another and would include civil 
wars, interventions by big powers in other states, and other military 
actions that are part of the global rivalry of antagonistic blocs and 
alliances. 
On the Clausewitzian lines, Nieberg believes that " war breaks 
out when, instead of threatening violence, which is a conspicuous 
instrument of national policy, the states take risk of using it. War is, 
therefore, a continuation of national policy" (4). A similar definition is 
provided by Sokol, that " War, or the application of armed force in 
international relations, is a part of the measures or instruments which 
a nation can use in the pursuit of its policies and for achievement of its 
objectives... Only national objectives of paramount importance can 
excuse the unleashing of violence and the sacrifices of national assets 
which any war creates" (5). For another scholar, " War may be strictly 
defined as organized fighting between at least two politically 
independent nations in pursuit of goals... It is the nation that contends 
for world goals(security, autonomy, territory, prestige, allies and 
ideology) not individuals or races or continents or sub-units of a 
nation. War is made and unmade by the nation, and only the nation 
has this prerogative" (6). War is an extension of national policy in 
other forms and through different means and is undertaken when no 
alternative course of action is available, and it permits the 
achievement of a desired goal. It is a political act by which states, unable 
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to adjust a dispute regarding their obligations, rights or interests, resort 
to armed force to decide which is the stronger and may therefore 
impose its will on the other. H.M.Kaplan gives a political explanation 
of war: " If war may be defined as an armed contest between two or 
more sovereign institutions employing organized military force in the 
pursuit of specific ends, the significant term in the definition is 
organized. ....This organization of the contending armed forces extends 
back behind the battle lines and tends in modern wars to embrace all 
civilian activities, such as the industrial, productive, and commercial, 
and also the social interests and individual attitudes" (7). Quincy 
Wright describes war as a legal condition which equally permits two or 
more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force (8). However, 
the Encyclopaedia Americana offers a better explanation of war : 
"War is the last resort in the settlement of disputes, the employment of 
physical force to do what diplomacy, threats etc have failed to do. Its 
result is either the subjugation of one side to the dictates of the other, 
their destruction, or a compromise. It is waged either to take something 
from the enemy, to prevent their doing or gaining something, to 
disrupt or maintain a balance of power or the status quo, as a means of 
protection, or for revenge for an injury, real or supposed" (9). Among 
the sociological explanations, the most comprehensive is provided by 
Quincy Wright, who regards war " from the standpoint of each 
belligerent as an extreme intensification of military activity, 
psychological tension, legal power, and social integration... From the 
standpoint of all belligerents as a simultaneous conflict of armed forces, 
popular feelings, judicial dogmas, and national cultures so nearly equal 
as to lead to an extreme intensification of each" (10). In this synthetic 
explanation, psychological and cultural aspects are added to the 
political-legal, but the economic aspects are still missing. 
The definition of war as 'a method or means of settling 
international disputes' may be a way of justifying war as a legal 
institution, but it has certain logical defects. War no longer adequately 
serves this judicial function. Also,war, as now organized and carried 
out, destroys the object in conflict instead of awarding it to one or the 
other of the contestants and may also destroy one or both parties to the 
dispute. It certainly renders both less capable of enjoying the 'reward'. 
The international environment itself is dynamic and, over the 
years, the ideas, conventions, influences, norms of conduct, the 
alliance structures, institutions etc of one age are replaced by those of 
the other age, and they may be radically different from each other. And 
these changes and transformations affect the nature, character, and 
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probability of wars and the issues over which wars may be fought, their 
ii\spiring objectives ar\d the perceptions about their usefulness and 
legitimacy, in the new age. Change in the nature of war is the result not 
only of political and social change but obviously of technological and 
economic movements also, and of the interaction between all of these. 
Physical developments are, however, the most obvious and perhaps 
the most important factors in making wars differ from each other 
historically. Thus, the nature of war in different ages has not remained 
the same and it is not possible to offer any one explanation about the 
nature of war or to the reason why states have gone to war, over the 
ages. A proper study of war can be made only through the study of the 
dynamic international environment of the period when the war 
occurs. 
Several factors, after the Second World War, affected the nature 
and scope of war strategy. The development of alliance systems, 
dominated by the superpowers, led to the evolution of strategies of 
alliances in peace time aiming not only to deter war but also, in case of 
a war, to engage in coalition wars. Since such an inter-systemic war, 
with nuclear weapons, was not much likely, strategy developed to 
peacetime conditions and its main function became to prevent wars. 
This period also witnessed several national liberation struggles and 
this caused the emergence of strategies of revolutionary wars of 
different aims and characteristics. It was realized that the use of non-
military means, involving the use of all the means of state power, was 
necessary for national security. On the one hand, this broadened the 
scope of strategy but, on the other hand, it narrowed the scope of 
military strategy. Once the strategy was no longer related only to armed 
struggle it became concerned with the conduct of war as a whole. 
Consequently, war became a combination of military and political 
actions—diplomatic, economic, ideological, technical and scientific 
activities connected with the military actions for the political aims of 
war; and strategy came to mean an internal combination of political, 
economic, propagandist and military actions (11). 
Clausewitz and Jomini had believed that strategy included 
statesmanship or war politics, that is, the conduct of war, both by 
military and non-military means. One set of such an strategy would 
concern an overall strategy that integrates political, techno-scientific, 
economic, psychological, and military elements; and the other would 
concern military strategy as a method of using armed methods, or war. 
The broader concept of strategy involves the overall management of a 
war on all fronts and by all means and methods; and the narrower 
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concept means the direction of armed forces. The former involves state 
strategy and the latter involves military strategy as part of the state 
strategy. This phenomenon is understandable in view of the fact that 
now in war not only particular objects but entire geographical regions 
would become targets. Political and military strategy are of the same 
order and are components of overall strategy. Strategy would thus 
mean the use of all the resources and potentialities of a state on the 
basis of the global situation and waged for the attainment of political 
aims, at the proper time and place. This broadening of the concept of 
strategy affected the nature of the concept of war itself. War was no 
longer inevitable for the achievement of political objectives. A 
successful strategy, by the use of other means, may achieve the 
objectives better than direct fighting. After the Second World War, 
strategy has been used more to prevent a direct confrontation between 
armed forces and its aim has become to deter war and, in case of the 
failure of deterrence, to damage/ destroy the enemy's war potential— 
again, so as to remove the necessity of fighting by military means. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, one motive for 
states for resorting to war has been nationalism. Not only people 
started struggling to achieve national independence, but the people 
who were dispersed in several states or were subject to different alien 
rulers demanded unification. Such aspirations of the people were 
supported by some other states. With the increase in national feelings, 
competition among states was intensified, and nationalism led to an 
intense competition among states for status and influence in the 
international community. This desire for status and influence 
encouraged arms race and intensified resentment among the 
dissatisfied. It is interesting to note that this desire to have and 
maintain a status in the international community was shared by the 
big powers who had fought the First World War. Austria believed that 
her status as a big power would be adversely affected if she failed to take 
punitive action against Serbia. Russia beheved if she abandoned her 
mission of protecting the Slav people (of Serbia), she would have to 
take a secondary position in the international society. Britain believed 
that if she allowed herself to be treated as if she were of no account, it 
would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country. And Germany 
wanted a Weltmacht, an influence in world affairs, which she believed 
was due to her. This desire for status remained a major factor in 
stimulating the Italian, German and Japanese search for power before 
the Second World War. 
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Discussing the modern nationalisnr, in this context, Michael 
Howard believes that it was invariably characterized by militarism: " 
Self- identification as a Nation implies almost by definition alienation 
from other communities, and the most memorable incidents in the 
group-memory consisted in conflict with and triumph over other 
communities. France was Marengo, Austerlitz and Jena: military 
triumph set the seal on the new-found national consciousness. Britain 
was Trafalgar—but it had been a nation for four hundred years, since 
those earlier battles Crecy and Agincourt. Russia was the triumph of 
1812. Germany was Gravelotte and Sedan. Italy was Garibaldi and the 
Thousand.... Could a Nation,in any true sense of the word, really be 
born without war ?" (12). 
The modern war is actually unconventional in means and ends 
as compared with the traditional concept of war.Julian Lider has 
discussed the arguments which assert that the nature of modern war is 
radically different from the traditional war's: " If a thermonuclear war 
were to break out, it would be quite unlike any traditionally conceived 
war not only because of its uselessness as a political instrument, but 
also because it would be a process of mutual destruction without any 
combat. ...Paradoxically enough, in the other extreme, a revolutionary 
war, its main military variant being protracted war, the main aim is to 
undermine the opponent's military economic and political potential, 
not to destroy his armed forces In spite of these apparent differences, 
both are similar in the sense that they de facto aim at unlimited aims. 
In the old paradigm, war was fought by clearly defined national 
military forces in a number of battles in order to destroy enemy's 
armed forces and thereby to settle a dispute over a specific political 
issue" (13). Technological modernization has always affected the form 
of warfare but not anything else in the nature of warfare. The 
development of the destructive power of weapons has not affected the 
occurrence of war itself, but just the way in which wars have been 
fought. For instance, the development,and even use,of nuclear 
weapons in 1945, has not prevented subsequent waging of war, even 
against the nuclear weapon states. It means that weapons are actually 
used appropriate to the purposes of the war. Far from invalidating the 
Clausewitzian assertion that war is a continuation and instrument of 
policy, the unlikelihood of full-scale nuclear war, in fact, confirms it, 
because such a war is unlikely for the precise reason that it could not 
serve any political purpose. Since nothing would be achieved by a total 
destruction of the total war, to initiate a nuclear war would not 
constitute any rational action.Because the armed struggle has now 
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become a process of technical destruction, a dilution has resulted in the 
role of nnilitary strategy. The fate of war is no longer completely 
dependent on the direct destruction of the enemy's forces. The aim of a 
war is to destroy the enemy's entire military potential, including his 
armed forces, and the human and material substance of the enemy. 
This potential includes the heavy industry, trans-shipping ports, 
military logistical bases, military bases in the rear, communication 
centers etc. The essence of war is the destruction of material values so 
as to directly undercut the vital roots of the enemy. According to 
Krumpelt, " The driving forces in classical war are quite different from 
those in thermonuclear war. In the former, main elements are talents 
of strategies and the commanding abilities of lower commanders, the 
military virtues of soldiers—particularly military ethics, courage, 
steadfastness and sacrifice—as well as the military abilities of officers 
and men. These psychological and moral factors play no role in 
thermonuclear war. The machine is subordinated to laws of technology 
but human character and spiritual values are not" (14). 
In the beginning of the nuclear age it was believed that the 
future wars will not be decided over a long period but will be of very 
short duration, perhaps of hours. It was believed that there will be no 
time to wait until one phase is over before starting the next phase. 
However, now it is believed that there may be prolonged military 
operations because the strategic nuclear forces are not that vulnerable 
as they were earlier supposed to be. Since both the sides would fear 
retaliation, they would be reluctant to use their entire nuclear 
potential. This would make a future nuclear war a protracted one. 
What has changed about war is the way in which the military 
aim of warfare(—,victory)may be achieved. This does not mean that 
the aim of war as such has changed, which continues to be the 
imposition of one's will on another, achieving it by every possible 
means, including the military means. It may not involve just the 
armed forces of one state against the other, because the destruction of 
enemy's war potential is now more important than the destruction of 
his armed forces. The modern developed military technology is 
dependent on the feedback which comes from the rear of the battlefield 
and the destruction of this feedback would mean the neutralization of 
military and strategic forces. Whereas all attempts are required to 
mobilize all political, economic, psychological resources of one's own 
under the political authority, it is imperative to plan, in peace time, 
how to destroy the normal functioning of the social life in the enemy 
society, in case of a war. A well-planned peacetime strategy is a pre-
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requisite for a successful war-time strategy. Also,the aim of military 
action against enemy forces has undergone a change. Whereas earlier it 
was needed to felicitate the advance towards, and occupation of, enemy 
territory, now it is required to destroy the enemy capacity to recover, 
retaliate or to continue the war. This has resulted in a shift of focus 
from tactical maneuvers to strategic operations. Further, political 
objectives may be attained by an unorthodox use of military force. This 
would involve the threat of nuclear destruction tendered to the 
enemy, thereby achieving his capitulation without an open use of the 
military force. It means it is possible to impose one's will on the other, 
and achieve aims of the war, without destroying the other's war 
potential, what to say about occupying his territory, and without even 
defeating his armed forces. This means compelling the adversary to 
make concessions without actually fighting. This signifies a change in 
the method of using armed forces for the achievement of political aims 
in the inter-state relations. In spite of this change in the method of its 
use, there is no change in the function of warfare which constitutes as 
an instrument for the pursuit of political aims. 
A war may not proceed as expected and many developments, not 
foreseen, may happen. During the course of war the political objectives 
themselves may change and, then, for the attainment of these goals, 
the available military means may no longer be sufficient. Even if the 
military means are sufficient, the political objectives may appear 
unrealistic in the sense that when they are attained the state may not be 
in a better position than it was before the war and the losses may 
appear to be disproportionate to the goals; and, for that reason, the state 
may decide to change the objectives. Or,for that matter, the military 
means for achieving the political objectives may themselves prove 
ineffective. 
Why nations go to war actually is determined by their level of 
satisfaction with the status quo. For instance, before the Second World 
War, the Allied powers were satisfied with the status quo and were 
anxious to avoid war through any appeasement; and the axis powers 
were dissatisfied with the status quo and were willing to take the steps 
they knew would lead to war. No two states will react in identical ways 
to similar events or threats. It is erroneous to attempt such 
generalisations that "states' go to war to change the international 
system through territorial, political and economic expansion, or to win 
economic control of the regions. States have diverse motives, 
characteristics, national interest perceptions, foreign policy goals, which 
are all dynamic. If it is wrong to believe that men are aggressive, or 
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peace-loving, by nature, it is equally wrong to believe that states are 
aggressive or peace-loving. There is part of truth in each of the 
following statements, made from time to time, but none of them singly 
explains why states go to war: 
1-If the government of a state is controlled by the military, that 
state is likely to be more aggressive as a reaction to perceived 
threats (But the military government under Ziaul Haq was not 
that aggressive as the military government under Ayub Khan, in 
Pakistan !) 
2-States controlled by a single person who exercises absolute 
power (like Bismarck,Hitler,Stalin) resort more to war 
3-States who have tasted victory once in a war, go to war again 
and again. 
4-Conversely also, states who have suffered defeat and 
humiliation want to make good their losses, through war. 
5-States born out of violence or states with revolutionary 
governments are more inclined to war. 
Competition and conflict among states is determined by the 
aspirations, perceptions and conceptions of states and the probability of 
success in altering the status quo to one's satisfaction. The character and 
objectives of war are actually determined by these perceptions in each 
state; and these characters and objectives make war an unacceptable, 
and even a necessary, course of action. 
To explain a war, the level and intensity of the use of weapons is 
to be examined in terms of the purposes the war was intended to 
achieve and the options/ alternatives that were considered before the 
war. It is particularly crucial to evaluate what alternative courses of 
action existed in an adversarial situation among states. Since the 
political objective of war has to dominate the military objective, 
i.e.,winning the war, it is important to win under certain particular 
conditions and achieving certain particular kind of peace that best suits 
own interests. If war is treated as an instrument for some ends, then it 
can be explained in the context of both ends and means, that is, political 
goals and military methods adopted to achieve them and how far and 
how effectively were they successful. Howsoever total a war may 
appear, it assumes some minimal form of order to be restored or 
modified after the violence is over; and this makes the war a political 
contest. A war is irrational only if this political objective is lost sight of. 
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or is,or cannot be, achieved. Then war becomes merely senseless 
violence. 
A Deliberate and Planned Act: 
Whatever the motives and causes of war, its initiation is a 
deliberate and planned act, and its conduct is always controlled. There 
is never any 'accidental' war. One may be surprised by the nature or 
result or intensity or ferocity or duration of a war, but no war is ever 
begun by mistake or without any political purpose.When war breaks 
out, there is always a deliberate intention of at least one party that war 
should take place. A state may miscalculate the consequences or the 
outcome, but when it goes to war it knows where it is going. When the 
decision is taken, it is deliberate and intentional, intended to promote 
particular interests and objectives. States regard war as a means to use 
in their interests or to promote and defend their interests. In the face of 
varied options, they make a deliberate decision that war is the best or 
the only available means by which the interests can be secured. This 
deliberate and conscious choice means that states have accepted that, 
whatever the risks and costs, the overall benefits expected to be 
achieved are of such nature and importance that these risks are worth 
incurring. 
Wars do not break out just because of some sentimental reasons 
or irrational motives but are based on rational and deliberate decisions. 
Jessie Bernard believes that wars are "highly rational, purposive, 
deliberate, used coldly, even without hatred, a calculated choice based 
on policy or strategy(15).The decision to go to war has usually been 
made, as history shows, upon careful deliberation of the usefulness of 
war as an instrument and can largely be understood as such. Wars are 
preceded by long preparations and started after carefully calculated 
decisions.For example, as Michael Howard observes, the Second World 
War developed out of the whole process of socio-political internal 
developments that preceded the war: "The societies were educated in 
the nationalist spirit and in social Darwinian ideas, the upper classes 
sought in army and war profits and prestige, the liquidation of the 
sharpened armed struggle; armed forces rearmed, and trained for war, 
were expecting it impatiently. At the same time, political events 
preceding war might be considered as fortuitous, and the search of great 
nations for revision of the balance of power could be settled without 
war.( 16). 
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Thus, war is a deliberately continued conflict and is amenable to 
historical explanation.War is the continuation of the long-term policy 
of a state and is the instrument by which the long-term goals of the 
state are pursued. Non-military means may not also suffice to achieve 
vital political goals and, therefore, use of armed violence is consciously 
well-planned much ahead. Various political activities, diplomatic-
economic- propagandist etc., are undertaken as preparations for a war. 
The decision to go to war is taken much later on and largely depends 
on the actual resources that have been mobilized and are available, and 
on the analysis of the risks-costs and benefits of different alternatives 
available. In this way, war follows from the political events that 
precede the outbreak of war. States, as a matter of policy, increase their 
military potential and are ready to resort to war if the prospects for a 
better situation are there, and there is always an ever present risk that 
war will break out. Since a war is fought to obtain political goals, the 
choice of goals influences the course of war and political considerations 
determine the content of military strategy to be applied. Political aims 
determine the general or limited nature of war, protracted or short 
duration of war, the decision to opt for offensive or defensive tactics 
and even the choices for decisive strikes and blows. The nuclear 
dimension of war has only enhanced the political preponderance of 
strategy because military goals in peacetime and wartime are now 
integral parts of overall political goals, and military strategy is only a 
part of a coordinated political activity. 
The intention to wage war is not accidental though the 
interaction of forces or the outcome and effects of war may be 
miscalculated. Under certain circumstances, normal military 
preparations in themselves increase the probability of war, as had 
happened at the time of Indian military exercises,Brasstacks. Such 
misperceptions may easily lead to a situation in which the outbreak of 
war appears to be unavoidable. The unpremediated events may 
produce the belief that one is in immediate danger and that the only 
safety lies in immediate action through war. 
Causes, Motives and Issues : 
Causes of war can be studied by analyzing whether or not certain 
patterns in social behaviour regularly recur and what conclusions can 
be drawn from such recurrence, and whether there is a causal 
relationship. 
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The concept of the causes of war includes the roots, sources and 
conditions of war. The roots of war are there in social conditions which 
make war a social phenomenon endemic in human conflict. Sources of 
war vary from age to age depending on socio-political conflicts. Each 
period of history has different conditions that favour or hinder the 
outbreak and conduct of war. Each particular war has its own direct 
causes. All the roots and sources and conditions in fact constitute a 
system of causes of war. War has, in fact, no single cause and there is 
no single explanation for the inter-state conflicts. It implies the absence 
of a cause which may be common for all wars. Over the years, several 
traditional causes of war have diminished in importance and 
frequency and others have become more important. Though war 
reflects political conflict between states, there may be economic, 
psychological or other causes for it; but they have to be transformed 
into political conflict for a war to start. Even if indirect economic causes 
may be there, a war among states is always political. An arms race may 
increase political tensions between states and that may become a 
political cause of war; but armaments in themselves are not a cause of 
war because they represent only military preparations, and are the 
means. And means cannot be called the causes. 
The reasons for which states have gone to war have been 
described as rational, customary, ideological, idealist, psychological, 
maintaining balance of power, defending allies, defending commercial 
interests, etc. But, according to Blainey, all war aims are " simply 
varieties of power. The variety of nationalism, the will to spread an 
ideology, the protection of kinsmen in an adjacent land, the desire for 
more territory,... all these represent power in different wrappings. The 
conflicting aims of rival nations are always conflicts of power" (17). If 
one accepts—and historical record does bear it out—Raymond Aron's 
explanation that " the stakes of war are the existence, the creation or 
the elimination of states" (18), then one can find enough historical 
evidence to the fact that states fight to acquire, to maintain, or to 
enhance and increase their capacity to act as independent actors in the 
international system. It may appear that states have gone to war, 
occasionally, for peculiar reasons, which may not at the time appear to 
be rational or logical; but, in general, states go to war because they act 
rational, and going to war appears to them a logical and rational act, 
and because they believe that dangers can be dealt with effectively 
before they become immediate; because they believe they can lose their 
position unless they fight for it, and because they believe it is necessary 
to go to war to maintain and to enhance their power, and to act so 
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while it was still possible. The domestic tensions, the military and 
industrial complex, the ideological and fundamentalist or nationalist 
fervour may fuel the conflict, but the war in itself begins with reasoned 
and rational calculations in which the states involved believe they can 
achieve more by going to war then by not going to war. 
Conflicts among states result from conflicting claims and 
interests and perceptions. In the international power calculus, another 
factor that determines the nature of international conflict is the 
development of weapon technology and, the consequent, arms race. 
But an arms race is not the end of war. It is only an attempt to match 
power for power. It is only a means to achieve, or maintain, a 
favourable balance of power as was the matrimonial politics of the 
Hapsburg or the Mughal Empire. The apprehension of the threat that 
motivates states to war has not changed: it might come from 
furtherance of territory, or of allies, or of warships, or of the number of 
forces, or of missile systems. But all of them represent the means 
which states use to maintain, protect and enhance their power. The 
underlying objective has not changed over the time. 
In this way, international relations are governed by the power as 
capacity to act, and the desire to acquire and exercise it is the core of 
international politics in which war proves an effective means to secure 
or retain it. A powerful state wants to compel others to pattern their 
behaviour after its own desires and this power is used to 
influence/regulate the behaviour of others by gradual transformation 
of the adversary's intentions, by stimulating a revolution from above, 
by stimulating a revolution from below, or by war. Whereas Karl 
Deutsch (19) describes it as the ability to prevail in conflict and to 
overcome obstacles, Morgenthau believes that "all nations actively 
engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance— 
that is, equality—of power, but at superiority of power on their own 
behalf. And since no nation can foresee how large its miscalculations 
will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of 
power attainable under the circumstances " (20). 
There are a few determinants of expected and potential gains 
that encourage the states to resort to war and they include the 
perceived threat, perceptions of own military strength and capabilities 
and estimates of potential gains. The determinants that deter other 
states from resorting to war include perceptions of military strength of 
the opponent, estimates of war costs, strength of international 
institutions and order against war, effectiveness of international public 
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order, the degree of dependence on those states who do not share the 
views of the state in question about going to war. 
States articulate their desired goals as the national interest, 
which is a generalized abstraction reflecting a state's basic wants. 
National interest that revolves around national security is survival of 
the state with a degree, that is acceptable, of political independence, 
territorial integrity, basic institutions, values and national prestige and 
honour. War is an instrument for the achievement, maintenance and 
enhancement of this national interest. The conflict of national interest 
has been the most traditional cause of war. This conflict may manifest 
itself in a drive for power, for security, for defence of independence and 
sovereignty, for altering the status quo in own favour, for access to raw 
materials or the drive to make strategic gains. All the political aims of 
this conflict reflect the causes of war in each age. The present age 
reflects the transformation of the various force alignments and the 
development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The 
force alignments include the phenomenon of liberation struggles and 
conflicts for raw materials in the Third World; sand the weapons of 
mass destruction also include the fast and far-reaching delivery 
systems. This conflict has also led major global powers to strive for 
political-economic concessions and to encourage the Third World 
conflicts and wars so as to improve own strategic position. 
When a state attacks another, obviously there is an aggressive 
motive. But it goes beyond that. When this aggression is undertaken 
to obtain some territorial gains, then the motives are expansionist. 
Motives of states are actually their foreign policy aims. We have to 
study intentions of states so as to understand war, because the war is a 
rational and logical activity which is not accidental and is always 
intended. The states may, sometimes, not intend to go to war but this 
intention would be different from the intentions to get something that 
released the forces and created the circumstances which ultimately 
resulted in war. It is the motives of the state in its foreign policy 
dealings that lead a state into war against others. A general motive, 
which is common to all the states, is the desire to achieve national 
interests and to acquire, maintain, and enhance national power. There 
may be specific motives which may be relevant to particular states at 
particular times, such as recovery of Sudetenland, or the West Bank or 
the Falklands. If the motives, whether general or specific, are 
competitive and can be achieved only by the one at the expense of the 
other, then conflict would result. It is such incompatible goals that lead 
states to war: "While one nation attempts to achieve its goals, it must 
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watch and resist another nation competing with it, and it may 
occasionally need to block the achievements of still another nation. 
Thus a context of rivalry surrounds nations as a normal and perennial 
condition of power politics. .. If this context is the general condition of 
power politics, then war may be seen as a particular aspect of that 
process" (21). Some issues are important to some states because they are 
perceived to be particularly important at a particular time. States resort 
to war if there is incompatibility between what each of then wants and 
the differences cannot be resolved by other means, available at the 
time. So, it is important to comprehend the nature of the wants which 
states perceive important enough to fight for. There may be some 
wants which may be common for all, or most of the states, and some 
particular wants which may be felt by particular states at particular 
times. In all these cases, the wants have to be incompatible, perceived 
important enough and the matter may not be resolved through other 
means, before the states resort to war. 
It is not always easy to answer the question: What do states fight 
about and what are the issues that prompt states to war ? The issues 
that may appear significant to one side in a war may be different for the 
other. Even if there is a single issue which may appear significant to 
both the sides in a war, there may have been rivalries and differences, 
over the years, constituting long-range causes of a war. Even the 
common issues have varied over time: in the late Middle Ages, there 
were questions of dynastic rights, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries religious questions were dominant; whereas questions of 
national unification were there between the French Revolution up to 
the First World War, the question of ideological competition, of 
national liberation and questions of resources have been uppermost in 
the present period. One generalization which, according to Blainey, can 
be made with a degree of confidence is that the aims of war are "simply 
varieties of power. The variety of nationalism, the will to spread an 
ideology, the protection of kinsmen in an adjacent land, the desire for 
more territory or commerce, the avenging of a defeat or insult, the 
craving for greater national strength or independence, the wish to 
impress or cement alliances—all these represent power in different 
wrappings. The conflict aims of rival nations are always conflicts of 
power" (22). 
Over the ages, the issues over which wars have been fought 
have not undergone much change, and they have included conflicts of 
national interest and rivalries for status and power. Few wars,if any, 
are fought over one specific issue; few wars, if any, can be identified as 
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the result of particular actions or particular circumstances of particular 
persons. Usually, there are a number of issues involved, which vary in 
their degree of importance, short and long-termed, relating to general 
principles and to immediate interests. Actually, what is important is 
the perception of the states concerned, what they thought they were 
fighting for and what both the sides believed the issues to be. The 
perceptions and issues may undergo a change over the period the war 
is fought, but the issues of a war are believed to be those which the 
states thought to be so when they decided to go to war. For the issue to 
be the cause of a war, it need not have an intrinsic importance but 
should be seen to be important to the states concerned: "Whether 
Dutch ships dipped their flags to English(or vice versa), whether the 
Chinese responsible for the death of an English sailor were adequately 
punished, whether the German Kaiser had been discourteous to the 
French ambassador or not were of very little material importance to 
the rulers of the countries that made them a casus belli, still less to the 
mass of their people. They were thought worth war by those who 
wielded power because they were symbolic: they became questions of 
national pride, and were believed to have important implications for 
the relative status of the two powers concerned" (23). 
Motives by themselves do not cause the war. War occurs only 
when a state believes that it is not possible to achieve the objectives 
and goals that it desires by other means. When the desired object 
cannot be obtained in any other way, war remains the logical option for 
the states. This makes war only a means and not an end. 
The acquisition of a throne, the maintenance of a dynasty, the 
desire to protect or expand a religious faith, promoting national power 
through acquisition of territories, the quest for national independence 
and nation building, the desire to expand a political ideology and to 
instal particular governments in other countries, and the quest for the 
control of vital natural resources in other lands—all these, over a 
period of time, have been motives and incentives that have led states 
to war. In this,the steps that one state believes necessary for the 
attainment of its objectives may appear to threaten the motives and 
security of the other.Some issues have been given as indirect causes of 
war, such as nationalism, innate aggression, economic systems, the 
arms race, inequalities of wealth, differences of race,language or 
religion, population pressures,etc (24); and some issues constitute direct 
causes of war, such as quest for possession of territory, desire for 
extension of political control, desire to preserve balance of power or to 
promote ideological objectives, attempts at trade monopolisation and 
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Other economic gains for strategic advantages,including for reasons of 
security,etc (25).Both these types of issues constitute contradictions that 
lead to wars such as emanating from territorial disputes, economic 
rivalries, ideological conflicts, the arms race, revolts against national 
suppression, revolts against poverty, unwarranted revolts,!.e. armed 
uprisings against injustices which could otherwise be redressed by a 
more rational policy, etc (26). 
In the contemporary international relations, states have resorted 
to war, in some cases, to coerce an opponent. This was the object of the 
British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956. In some cases,the motive 
has been retaliatory, like Vietnam's action against Cambodia in 1978, to 
retaliate against Cambodian incursions, and then Chinese action 
against Vietnam, in 1979, to 'teach Vietnam a lesson' for her 
intervention in Cambodia. In cases of coercion and retaliation both, the 
state initiating the action feels justified in using force to prevent some 
particular action of the other side. The degree of provocation and that 
of the counter-action need not always be proportionate. Many 
contemporary wars have resulted from the concern of some states 
about internal developments in other countries. Arms, training and 
other assistance are provided to groups within a state from outside, as 
in Punjab , Kashmir and Nagaland, in India, Biafra in Nigeria, or to 
many freedom-fighters in southern Africa. There have also been active 
intervention by forces of one state in the struggle for independence in 
another, like the Indian action in Bangladesh and the Turkish action in 
Cyprus. There is support given by some states to groups in other states 
which have, with them, some ideological affinity. This was there in the 
intervention by Britain, France, the USA, Japan etc in the Russian civil 
war, or in the interventions to overthrow the governments in 
Cuba,Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama, in the assistance to 
Nicaraguan and Angolan rebels, and in the Vietnamese and Afghan 
wars. Direct military action has sometimes been taken by a state as an 
intervention in other state to support a particular cause,as the Indian 
action in Sri Lanka, Israeli action in Lebanon, South African actions in 
Angola and Mozambique, and Libyan actions in Chad. States have also 
undertaken military action in order to overthrow a particular 
government, of a particular person, in some other state, as in the case 
of the British-French-Israeli attempt against Naser's Egypt, the US 
action against Noreiga in Panama, against Castro in Cuba, against 
Qaddafi in Libya, Tanzanian action against Amin's Uganda, and 
Iranian-Iraqi actions against each other in the ten years' war. The 
superpowers have mostly intervened and used military force in 
Chapter II, p-63 
different regions primarily to prevent an opponent from obtaining 
some strategic gains as a result of political developments, and thus 
actions have been undertaken in Eastern Europe, Central America, the 
Far East Asia, South East Asia and Central Asia. These actions reflect 
the desire to preserve the strategic interests that the superpowers enjoy 
in these areas. 
Whereas the medium powers and less powerful states have 
shown more interest in challenging and trying to alter the status quo, 
since 1945, the superpowers, mainly for defensive purposes, have 
developed a tacit understanding and collusion in maintaining the 
existing situation. The latter prefer the status quo in their 
neighbourhood and have been willing to militarily intervene to 
maintain or restore it. Each of them has tolerated military action taken 
by the other towards this end; and this mechanism has maintained 
peace between them. On the other hand, medium powers are 
interested in changing the existing conditions to their favour. 
Everybody is hostile to the status quo in the Middle East, and the Arabs 
tried to alter it in 1948, 1965, 1973 and Israel in 1956,1978 and 1982. 
North Vietnam challenged the status quo established by the Geneva 
settlement of 1954. Both Iran and Iraq wanted to alter the status quo of 
their adversarial relationship, to their advantage. Political change 
within a state has been a fairly common motive of wars and military 
action since 1945, changing the aspirations of states. Concern about the 
internal system of government in other countries has led to 
interventions in various ways. When security considerations are 
perceived to be affected by internal developments in another state, 
forcible intervention has been resorted to by states. 
Economic interests, conditions and motives have also driven 
states to wars. Norman Angell (27),in the beginning of this century had 
contended that mainly economic reasons caused wars; but he 
concluded that since war,in industrial age, could not be profitable, it 
will not survive as a lasting means to resolve disputes. The 
determination of a people to raise national living standards or to 
protect existing standards, population pressures and food shortages, 
and financial capitalism have been some of the causes which scholars 
have traced for wars (28). It is maintained that the pressure of the 
capitalist economy toward economic expansion and military pressure 
abroad to safeguard the former is the root cause of modern war, 
together with the vulnerability of the public to manipulation on 
national security issues. National interest is identified, in this context, 
with economic opportunities outside the national frontiers. On all of 
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these issues, when there are conflicting economic interests which states 
endeavour to advance or safeguard, war is Hkely to occur. Also, wars 
offer an opportunity—and, for this reason are resorted to—for 
redirecting domestic economic conflicts and systemic inconsistencies 
which get an outlet through war. Such inconsistencies often result into 
internal wars but, otherwise also, powerful economic groups who have 
influence on the decision-making of the state profit in different ways by 
wars. The Marxist-Leninist approach, discussed later on, believes that 
war has its roots in the division of society into economic classes and 
that war is one of the means by which dominating classes implement 
their policies of domination. 
A state may perceive a threat to itself in a situation or may resent 
some action of another state as a challenge to itself and all of this may 
act upon some long-held unrealized desire, thus promoting a state to 
take the decision to go to war. Along with this, a factor that greatly 
influences the decision to go to war is the perception about one's 
own capability, invulnerability and about the chances for success 
and the likely consequences of one's actions. States may not 
necessarily have the precise idea of the perceived gains before a war is 
initiated and there may be some vague ideas about national objectives, 
and the precise 'war aims' may emerge much later on. Whether the 
goals and aims, for which a war was initiated, were achieved, or even 
could be achieved, determines the cost-benefit profitability of war. The 
actual decision to initiate a war is conditioned by the perception about 
these goals, perceptions about the success, and perceptions about the 
consequences. 
There is no consistency in states' behaviour about the issues 
over which they go to war. Issues seen important in one age become 
irrelevant in another. But, in each age, such issues are determined by 
concerns which are considered vital by states in that age; and these 
concerns constitute the motives of states. 
Classification of Wars : 
The classification of war may be grouped into two categories and 
approaches that (a) focus on the socio-political content of war, the 
nature of the participants and the character of the causes, aims and 
issues of war, and (b) focus on external features such as the techno-
military aspects, the weapons used, the manner of their use (total, 
limited, direct or indirect), the geographical scope of military 
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operations (global, regional, local) etc. On the basis of international 
configuration of forces, wars may be categorized as inter-systemic, 
involving the global antagonistic blocs, and the inter-state local wars 
which also include the revolutionary wars. Whereas earlier wars could 
be categorized according to their aims, the geographical scope of 
operations or their duration, now, with the introduction of nuclear 
weapons, wars may be thermonuclear, limited atomic and limited 
conventional. This categorization is based on the weapons used or to be 
used in the war. Though it is believed that a particular weapon would 
dominate a particular type of war, it is always possible that a weapon of 
higher level may be used in a war, for instance small tactical nuclear 
weapons in a protracted conventional war which may not escalate into 
a nuclear war, even of a limited variety. An irregular conventional 
guerilla or covert war would be part of the limited conventional war. 
There is a long list of classifications (29) which categorize wars 
according to their causes and the issues involved. Mainly, any one 
single cause is emphasized, the one which appears to be the main one 
but, at times, multi-causal explanations have also been given. Wars 
may be studied on the basis of factors (such as political-
economic,religious, psychological etc) that affect the state behaviour; or 
they may be studied on the basis of ideological differences such as 
between nationalities, religions, classes and political ideologies. There 
are a number of tension producing factors that emanate from 
perceptions of one or the other side, affecting the state behaviour, and 
they include the arms race, population pressure, differences of religion 
or race, unequal distribution of resources or wealth. On these bases, 
Hedley Bull (30) believes that wars may have one of such aims as to 
enforce international law and order, to maintain the balance of power 
or to secure a just change. On the basis of issues, he distinguishes 
between wars for some economic gains, wars to ensure national 
security and wars to enhance or achieve ideological objectives. 
Similarly, on the basis of the issues in war, Rapoport distinguishes (31) 
between wars for territory, for extension of political control, for trade 
monopolies and for strategic advantages in future wars. In another 
work (32), he has talked about the cataclysmic and strategic models, in 
which the former war is a catastrophe, spontaneous event that is 
independent of human will, and the latter is a conscious political act. 
His political philosophy of war views war as a rational instrument of 
national policy, eschatological philosophy views it as part of a grand 
design and the cataclysmic part views war as a catastrophe befalling 
some nation or even the entire humanity. 
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Quincy Wright, in his classical A Study of War (33) makes a 
category of 'legal' wars and includes in it civil, imperial and 
international wars. His interstate wars are balance of power wars, 
defensive wars and imperial wars, in which the latter signifies the aim 
of a state to conquer another state and include it as part of an 'empire'. 
And for Andre Beufre (34), a distinguishing characteristic of wars is the 
form of fighting on the basis of character of weapons, intensity and 
duration and, on this basis, he categorizes wars as primitive, classical, 
colonial and mixed. 
Raymond Aron, Alastair Buchan and Herman Kahn (35) have 
classified wars on the basis of how they might begin; 
Aron distinguishes between intended and unintended wars. The 
former include: (i)- a war in which a strong state attacks a small nuclear 
weapon state, so as to destroy the latter's deterrent force (an example, in 
some ways under this category, might have been the war following the 
Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor); (ii)-a pre-emptive war by some 
small nuclear power state against another small nuclear power state 
(and a possible war between India and Pakistan, at some time in future, 
may fall under this category); and (iii)-a war between the two 
superpowers, if the balance of terror is broken due to some scientific-
technological breakthrough (like something spectacular happening 
under the SDI programme). The unintended wars may start 
accidentally, or due to to a misunderstanding and mis-perception of 
intentions of the parties concerned, or by escalating from a local 
conflict, or because of some irrational action. It is difficult to say 
whether a probable war following the shooting down of a civilian 
passenger plane would have been treated as due to misunderstanding 
or due to irrational action. Aron has also made a categorization of 
inter-state wars, which he treats as 'perfect wars' and which are wars 
between political units whose existence and legitimacy are recognized 
by each other; imperfect or super-state wars which are wars for 
elimination of certain belligerents, thereby forming a unit on a higher 
level; and the infra-state wars are either for the maintenance or 
'decomposition' of a political unit. He treats civil war as one in which 
only one side is recognized by the international community.Aron 
further uses a division based on the nature of the protagonists in war 
and the nature of weapons applied in war. The former includes feudal 
wars, dynastic wars, national wars and colonial wars, and the latter 
includes nuclear, limited and conventional wars. 
Alastair Buchan, as mentioned above, has also analyzed wars 
according to the way they might be initiated—by accident, by 
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premeditated attack, by pre-emptive action or evolving from local 
conflicts.And like Aron, Herman Kahn discusses intentional and 
unintentional wars. By inadvertent war, he means one occurring 
unintentionally as a result of some error, that may be either human or 
mechanical, a false alarm or a behaviour unauthorized by the political 
authority. This would be different from a war by miscalculation which 
might result from a miscalculation on the part of decision-makers or 
their misunderstanding of events and developments. Whereas a war 
by calculation would be the one when a state opts for war from among 
various courses of actions, a catalytic war is the one when a third state, 
for its own reasons, might deliberately precipitate a war between two 
major powers, so that the latter may destroy each other thereby 
improving the relative position of the third state. 
Singer and Small (36) discuss inter-state and 'extra-systemic' wars 
and subdivide the latter into colonial, imperial and internationalized 
civil wars. Whereas the last is the one in which the established 
government fights against an adversary situated within the territory of 
another state who intervenes on behalf of such insurgent, an 'extra-
systemic' war is a conflict in which a state fights against a political 
entity which is not yet a qualified member of the inter-state system. 
The war for Bangladesh may be termed an internationalized civil war, 
and the wars of the SWAPO against South Africa and of the PLO 
against Israel may be cited as examples of extra-systemic wars. 
McCloughry (37) distinguishes between four kinds of war, which he 
calls four categories of war: total, limited, local and cold— in which the 
'total' is a conflict without any limits in nature or even in geographical 
scope and weapons used, the limited is characterized by non-use of 
weapons of mass destruction though the geographic scope is unlimited 
and the local war is limited both in geographical scope and in types of 
weapons used, whereas in the Cold War the use of armed force as a 
means of foreign policy is not open. Maxwell Taylor (38) presents a 
classification which is based on a diverse criteria. He believes that on 
the basis of their ultimate purpose, wars may be total or limited. Some 
wars, like strategic, nuclear, tactical nuclear, conventional and 
subversive, may be grouped according to the weapons and tactics 
employed. Wars may also be grouped according to the effects they 
produce on the balance of global power. 
Leon Goure made a distinction between the Western 
classification of war, into general, limited and counter-insurgency, and 
the Soviet classification based on the political objectives of the states at 
war (39). But David Hughes, in an article published in the late 'Sixties, 
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criticized the 'overuse' of the classification of general war, limited war. 
Cold War, which he considered outmoded. But most of the western 
classifications are variants of a three-category typology consisting of 
total, limited and local wars. The local war was the one with the use of 
conventional weapons and the total war, in such classifications, was 
considered to be the one with an unlimited use of nuclear weapons. 
Limited war was the one with a limited use of nuclear weapons and it 
involved the use of strategic, long range, weapons and was to be 
voluntarily and deliberately limited as regard the total damage 
threatened, planned and executed and the kinds of targets threatened, 
planned and attacked. This involved graduated retaliation and was a 
slow motion war, involving the delivery of several successive attacks 
with a limited use of nuclear strategic weapons. Each of such 
successive attacks would be made so as to convince the enemy that one 
does not intend to start a total war but is ready to use nuclear weapons 
and that the enemy should now stop fighting. Since only parts, not 
whole, of enemy's retaliatory capacity is destroyed this is called a 
controlled strategic war of military attrition or limited counterforce war 
(41). Robert Randell (42) talks of 'multilateral' wars which are in the 
forms of several combinations of external wars coupled with internal 
war situations. A single internal or external war would involve two 
adversaries, and more than two adversaries would constitute a 
complex internal or external war. Randell classifies wars according to 
their level of violence and the type of weapons used, and this category 
comprises of nuclear, limited and general conventional wars; and 
according to the purposes and aims of wars, and this category comprises 
of imperial expansionist, colonial, religious, national liberation wars. 
And, finally, Julian Lider (43) has discussed a complex typology of wars 
based on the concept of 'structural violence' and Johan Galtung's idea 
of the war caused by inequalities and asymmetries between and within 
states, in the relationships of dominance and dependence both in the 
international system and within particular states. There are different 
criteria used: the division of wars into interstate and internal wars is 
combined with the distinction between so-called central nations and 
peripheral nations; the division between nations of the two competing 
camps and wars within each of these camps (imperial wars within a 
camp); external or interstate wars and internal or civil wars; liberation 
or subversive wars and internationalized class wars. All the types 
proposed by Galtung, in fact, represent four basic categories of 
interstate, internal, armed interventions and internationalized wars. 
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A classification of wars may be attempted on the criteria of 
weapons used. The basic division would be between nuclear and 
conventional, which may be extended to include, for both nuclear and 
conventional, unlimited and limited wars. Further extension for both 
unlimited and limited would be general, global and total. The nuclear 
war may be thermonuclear, or general nuclear war, tactical nuclear war 
using smaller nuclear devices, and limited nuclear war. These versions 
are also known as strategic nuclear war, tactical nuclear war and 
limited nuclear war. It is believed that it is possible to fight a strategic 
limited war with a limited, graduated and controlled use of strategic 
nuclear weapons. An inter-systemic war is an armed conflict between 
rival political blocs. Its political goals are unlimited and are based on an 
ideology. It is a total war because its ideological character will 
encompass all fields of life. It will not aspire for just some economic 
advantages or territorial gains, but the total domination of one system 
and the total destruction of the other system. For such unlimited goals, 
the means applied will also be unlimited and this war will be in the 
form of a thermonuclear war at the global scale. This war will involve 
not just military operations but intense rivalry in weapons and energy 
production, in science and technology and various areas of economic 
activity. The political aspects of this war were symbolised by the Cold 
War that started after the Second World War and which was fought 
on political, ideological and economic fronts. Its aim was also to 
compel the adversary to capitulate, without a direct use of the armed 
force, achieving the same results as a real(hot) war but without using 
the armed violence as a means. Its objective was to impose one's own 
political and economic system on the adversary. It involved not just 
the economic and technological rivalry but military threats, quasi-
military methods, intimidation and deterrence, besides the limited 
application of force in the form of a local hot war of a conventional 
type. Since both the superpowers realize that a total war would mean 
the annihilation of both sides, there operates a balance of terror 
between them and, therefore, a total war is supposedly not feasible. 
However, the relative balance of power is rather delicate. Any major 
breakthrough in weapon-technology or defense system may alter this 
balance. Not only is there a possibility of a limited war escalating into a 
total war but the aims and intentions of one side may be misjudged by 
the other. A paradox is that a total war is hardly likely to result in a 
total, convincing, victory. A victory in such a war will hardly result in 
peace. It may so happen that a state which is victorious may be in a 
worse condition than it was before the war because of the total 
Chapter II, p-70 
depletion of all the resources that were required for the total war. The 
case of Britain after the Second World War exemplifies this, at the 
level of conventional war. 
During the course of a war, its character may change, thus 
affecting its type also. From the war of a pure type it may emerge into a 
war of complex causes and types. Both the Korean and Vietnam wars 
started as civil wars between the two parts of a divided country, 
developed into defensive wars of the southern parts against the north, 
and then, with the involvement of big and superpowers, became local 
wars between the two antagonistic blocs. A civil war may soon become 
a mixture of civil war and against foreign intervention in the civil war. 
During a war, the position of states may change in international 
setting, thus affecting the character and type of the war. 
The traditional studies of war had ignored civil wars, 
revolutions and other such conflicts having a combatant without a 
sovereign status. It was only after the Second World War,when it was 
believed that the object of armed forces is to protect the state against 
enemies both domestic and foreign,that internal war came to be 
included as a part of the categories of war. 
The revolutionary or subversive war gives primacy to political 
objectives while linking it with military means. It may be just an 
armed form of domestic group/class struggle in the form of an uprising 
and a civil war, or it may be a local and unlimited inter-state war where 
a subversive group is supported by another state. The revolutionary 
wars are characterized by their socio-political essence. In the Third 
World, it has an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-feudal character. 
Partisan warfare may be treated as a part of the revolutionary warfare 
and it is waged in support of the (inter-state) revolutionary warfare. It 
is the military form of the anti-colonial or revolutionary war. 
Revolutionary war has three phases of crystallization, organization, 
and militarization: the first consists of the mobilization of the 
population for desired aims and objectives,the aim being the launching 
of political-psychological warfare and preparation of underground 
organisational work; the second, creation of an apparatus for political 
and military struggle, the aim being the paralyzation of the enemy's 
counteraction and achieving the political-psychological aims and,the 
third, consists of the struggle over a wide spectrum of political and 
partisan warfare and its course depends on the gains achieved in the 
initial periods. The last, encompassing the war itself, would involve 
armed attacks, diversionary tactics and sabotage performed by small 
armed groups; the establishment of a network of bases and points of 
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resistance and military action of an increasing scale; and then a big 
offensive resulting in the seizure of some territory, or the cities, 
and,finally, the seizure of the centres of power. The entire armed 
struggle proceeds from the periphery towards the centre, the strategic 
aims are realised in successive phases and the enemy is compelled to 
fight under unfavourable conditions. Protracted war is a political war 
whose end is the overthrow of the existing political system. The use of 
terrorism in this warfare is related to the need to gain international 
recognition as a negotiating body. For reasons of state, other countries, 
instead of getting engaged in anti-colonial or limited wars, supply 
arms, money and equipment to terrorist or guerrilla groups and 
organisations and this encouragement is intended to create a diversion 
or to embroil the country involved in a struggle that weakens or 
compromises it internationally. Mostly, such conflicts become proxy 
wars between two states or alliances. There is always the probability 
that the intervening state, as in Vietnam or in Sri Lanka, may become a 
participant in civil war 
The Marxist-Leninist Approach : 
The Marxist -Leninist approach to war treats it as a social 
phenomenon and a conflict between or among social groups, a political 
conflict between classes in order to achieve definite political goals. As a 
continuation of policy, each war is seen as a clash in its essence. It is 
stolknovenie (armed fighting) between states, or coalition of states, or 
between antagonistic classes in the state(civil war) for the achievement 
of their political goals. There are contradictions and conflicts between 
classes and between nations led by classes, and when such 
contradictions and conflicts increase, they are resolved through war. 
War represents the high point of social conflict as well as the method 
by which this conflict is resolved. It is seen as a continuation and 
instrument of policy, by violent means. Since imperialism is taken to 
be the main source of war in modern age, war has a transitory 
character. 
This Marxist-Leninist approach treats politics as an activity of 
organised social groups directed towards other social groups and 
expressing their mutual relations. The different classes that compose 
the society express their relations through politics that reflects their 
relative economics; and they aspire, and fight over, for political power 
to protect and project their interests. As a Soviet scholar sees it. 
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"politics expresses relations between different classes and their 
organisations and establishments that represent their interests, of 
which the state with all its agencies is the main one" (44). The state is 
considered an organization of the possessing class for its protection 
against the non-possessing class, and it uses the political power for the 
protection of the existing economic system and for the suppression of 
the resistance of its class antagonisms. Extensions of the international 
politics of the state, beyond its territorial boundaries, is considered 
foreign politics. Civil war is considered the most acute form of class 
struggle when a series of economic and political clashes which 
repeatedly occur, gather momentum, spread, become more intense, 
and are transformed into an acute and armed conflict. 
Since policy is related to class interests, and war is a continuation 
of policy, war is an instrument of class policy and all wars are class 
wars. The aims and objectives of war are determined by the interests of 
class represented in the policy of the classes governing the state. Class 
interests are obvious and easy to discern in some wars and difficult in 
some. The ruling classes of a state use the political structure and 
machinery of the state to enhance their interests beyond the borders of 
their state. In an earlier period, the ruling classes of different states 
competed for colonies and empires, and now the international class 
struggle is in the form of conflict between the capitalist and socialist 
systems. There is always the possibility that such conflict will not 
remain within peaceful bounds and that war may start. If peaceful 
means fail, war is a legitimate instrument for the achievement of goals 
and,therefore, all states have to be prepared for it. Victory is not just 
success on the battlefield but should be related to political objectives for 
which war was started. Marxism-Leninism believes that war is politics 
of a special form in which other forms are also used, and that war is 
one of the stages in an ongoing political conflict. 
Marxism-Leninism believes that all wars,in some way, fit into 
the designs of imperialism and are links in the chain of a world-wide 
struggle between the antagonistic systems of imperialism and 
socialism. Each war is an intrinsic part of the imperialist designs for 
world domination and, if an immediate gain is not perceptible, it may 
be for generating conditions for a new world war. Analysis of war 
cannot be confined to the particular states engaged in the war but has to 
relate to the international system as a whole. The origins of modern 
war lie in the operations of the law of unevenness and spasmodic 
nature of the political-economic developments in capitalist countries. 
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in the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system and in the 
struggle of the imperialists for world domination. 
In 1916, in Imperialism:the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin 
had explained international conflict in terms of imperialist rivalries 
brought about by the decline of capitalism in domestic economies. 
Further extending Lenin's analysis, Soviet ideologists foresee the 
decline of capitalism, producing increased aggressiveness on the part of 
the Western countries. They believe that the current international 
conflicts and arms race are the result of capitalism's aggressive attempts 
to maintain and preserve their pernicious system by force. The basic 
economic sources of war are rooted in the deepening conflict between 
the modern productive forces and the economic political system of 
imperialism: " As a result of the social antagonisms inherent in 
capitalism and the operation of the law of the uneven, leap-like 
economic and political development of the capitaHst country under 
imperialism, the contradictions between the bourgeosie states 
aggravate to the utmost, and this leads to a division of the capitalist 
world into hostile coalitions, and to wars between them" (45). 
Lenin believed that war is a continuation of politics, and politics 
also continues during war. During war,the class struggle and class-
nature of social conflict do not cease. Lenin declared that the nature of 
the political aim has a decisive influence on the conduct of war (46). 
Indeed, the political aim determines the just or unjust nature of war, 
and this influences strategy in a radical manner, since in one case the 
strategy is supported by a whole-hearted endorsement of the war aims 
by the population, and in the other case these aims cannot be shared by 
the people. Because of the intensification of the class struggle, the goals 
of modern warfare are not confined to the adversary's armed forces. 
The aim now would be a total destruction of the politico-economic 
potential of the adversary. This has resulted into the politicisation of 
strategic goals. 
The basic question in any analysis and evaluation of war must be 
the question as to what is the class character of a particular war, what 
classes are fighting it and for what goals and what classes are managing 
and directing it. Every war is inextricably linked up with that political 
order out of which it flows. This concept of war,thus, differs from the 
traditional Western concept which believes that the entire country and 
all the people conduct war and that it is a conflict of one armed people 
with another. In the Soviet concept,the acute class nature of the war 
would predetermine the extreme decisiveness of the political and 
military aims of both the sides. The Marxists believe that the response 
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of the working class, in a capitalist country, will depend upon the 
nature of war. If the war is aggressive, they intensify the class struggle; 
if it is defensive, they increase their productive contribution to the war 
effort. Also, the centre of gravity of an armed conflict is transformed 
from " the zone of contact between the adversaries, as was the case in 
past wars, into the depth of the enemy's location, including the most 
remote regions. As a result, the war will require an unprecedented 
spatial scope" (47). 
A modern Soviet author Tyushkevich believes (48) that wars 
may be grouped, on the basis of the 'trinity' concept of their nature, into 
general, particular and individual, in which each war is caused by three 
kinds of causes, which reflect the activity of the socio-political forces 
which are interested in war: general causes that are rooted in the 
political-economic conflicts characteristic of class antagonisms, 
particular causes which are specific to the given socio-economic 
formation, and individual causes that are generated by specific 
objectives and factors. This classification may be further broadened and 
five main kinds of war may be analyzed, in Marxist-Leninist 
terminology: the main causes which are present in all wars of a 
particular age; the essential causes related to particular types of war; the 
final causes that lead to the outbreak of a particular war; the direct 
causes that reflect the circumstances directly affecting the outbreak of 
war; and the reason for war. All of them are inter-related. There may be 
some accidental causes which act as a pretext for war and they include 
such factors as the personality of decision-makers, mistakes in 
misinterpreting the conflict situation and certain financial crises. But 
political requisites, such as aggravation of contradictions and expansion 
of the class-national struggles are at the base of other causes. It is the 
conflict which leads to crisis and which, in turn, leads to war; but this 
movement is not automatic and is governed by the policies and 
responses at each level. Finally, Marxism- Leninism believes (49) that 
wars of national liberation are a category between international and 
internal wars, since the colonial power is an external state but the 
political regime, established by it, and against which the oppressed 
classes struggle, is composed of domestic reactionary forces. In such 
cases, there are attempts by the ruling classes to redirect the 
dissatisfaction within the country by unleashing an external war or by 
just stepping up preparations for a war. This may convert a civil war 
into an international war; or a third party may intervene in a civil war, 
transforming it into an inter-state war. On the other hand, an 
international war may so weaken the position of the government that 
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an internal war may result, as had happened in Russia during the First 
World War and the October Revolution. 
Many things about a war become clear by analyzing the way the 
decision to go to war was undertaken. It explains the various factors 
and considerations influencing such a decision, alternatives available, 
power potential/ projection ratios and the expectations of states 
concerning the outcome of the war. An important factor about the 
decision to go to war is the timing of the decision—sudden on the spur 
responding to a particular crisis, or well-planned in advance waiting 
only for the appropriate time. If the war decision of a state was short-
termed and sudden,resulting from a perceived crisis, it would still be 
possible for the other state to contain and regulate the crisis through 
appropriate signals of crisis management. This had happened when the 
Pakistani apprehensions regarding Indian military exercises, Brasstacks, 
were allayed through proper crisis-management techniques from the 
Indian side. But if the decision to go to war was well-planned, then war 
-preventive or war-containment measures from other states would 
hardly have any effect on those who decided to go to war, come what 
may. Such decisions may be based on the desire of a state to exploit a 
particular situation or a careful calculation may have been made of 
possible costs and gains. The parties to a war, or even one side, may 
have carefully planned everything, anticipating and calculating many 
factors, or they, or even one side, may have been a victim of 
misunderstandings, miscalculations and circumstances, without 
intending to go to war. There may be instances where war was decided 
upon and planned much in advance and then the state waited for 
some reasonable justification to start a war. We may put even the First 
World War in this category, when the war was desired for some 
reasons and was planned for some reasons but was started for an 
entirely different reason. 
There can always be a miscalculation in taking the decision to go 
to war. The very fact that one state is defeated proves miscalculations 
in its war-planning, war preparations and war fighting. No state would 
go to war believing in the certainty of defeat. One state may not, in fact, 
be planning a war but the other may perceive so and this 
miscalculation of the other's intentions may lead to war. 
Miscalculation may be there if a decision is undertaken about some act 
which the other might see as provocative or prejudicial to its interests 
though the state taking this decision might have believed in the 
legitimacy of its stand. This was there in the Cuban missile crisis of 
1962 and the Falklands war of 1982. Similar miscalculations may be 
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there about the perceived reactions of the other side to a particular 
action, Uke the Pakistani miscalculations about Kashmir. 
Even if decisions for war are (perhaps) more scrutinized in 
democratic societies than in others, there is no concrete evidence that 
democratic states are any less prone to go to war. Democratic nature of 
a state hardly affects its propensity to war. Britain, France and the USA 
—who are democratic societies, have been as much engaged in wars 
and armed interventions as the USSR and China, who, from the 
western norms, are not. The US Congress took vital decisions 
regarding Vietnam on the basis of misleading information, about the 
Bay of Tonkin, provided by the Administration. Such decisions, even 
in a democracy and in spite of an enlightened and informed public 
opinion, are affected by extraneous considerations. As Evan Luard has 
pointed out, " The 'military-industrial establishment' which has a 
direct interest in the continued increase of military spending, has 
found innumerable means (as even President Eisenhower who had 
once belonged to it, complained at the time of his retirement) for 
influencing policy-making (50). 
States have been involved in wars which, in the beginning, were 
not of immediate concern to them, and their eventual entanglement 
resulted from their gradual involvement. Its best example is the US 
entanglement in Vietnam, when advisers were sent in 1961, US forces 
were sent in 1965, and bombing raids against the North Vietnam 
started in 1967. Similarly, the Soviet Union got eventually entangled in 
Afghanistan in the same fashion—from advisers to a full-fledged 
embroilment. India had also experienced a similar entanglement in Sri 
Lanka. Such an involvement is not the result of a well-planned, 
calculated and single decision, but a number of subsequent decisions 
over a period of time lead to greater and greater involvement. All of 
these decisions are deliberate and rational, resulting from gradual 
change in circumstances. In all such cases, the ultimate cost far exceeds 
any gains, but it is difficult to foresee this when the decision(s) is 
undertaken. Whatever may have been the reason, and howsoever 
gradual it may have been, when the decision was taken the intention 
to go to war was very clear. 
ChapterJI,p-77 
References, Chapter II 
''•./SI 
1-Dina A. Zinnes, "The Expression and Perception n 
Prewar Crisis", in David J.Singer, Quantitative International Politics: 
Insights and Evidence, (Free Press,London: 1968), p 85 
2-C.J.Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Harvard: 1949),p 54 
3-M.I,Midlarsky, On War: Political Violence in International System, 
(Free Press: 1975), p 1-2 
4-H.L.Nieberg "Uses of Violence", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
December 1963, p 43 
5-Anthony E.Sokol, Sea Power in the Nuclear Age(Wash.DC: 1961),pl3-
14 
6- Henry Barbera, Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War 
(Lexington: 1973) p 1 
7-H.Morton Kaplan, "Of War and Peace", Social Research, vi: 
September 1939, p 378-9 
8-Quincy Wright, A Study of War,vol.11 (Chicago: 1942) p 698 
9- Encyclopaedia Americana, XXVIII, p 257 
10- Quin cy Wright, op.cit., p 698 
11-Julian Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure and Problems 
(Gower: 1981),ch.l & 5 
12-Michael Howard, The Causes of War (Massachusetts: 1983),p26-7 
13-Julian Lider, Military Theory, (St.Martin's,New York: 1983),p 67 
14-Ihno Krumpelt, quoted in Julian Lider, Essays on West German 
Military Thought, Research Report,SIIA Stockholm: 1984, p 60 
15-Jessie Bernard & Raymond Aron, The Nature of Conflict: Studies of 
the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions (UNESCO Press: 
1957),p 40 
16-Michael Howard, Studies in War and Peace (London: 1970), p 99 
17-Ibid, p 149 
18- Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International 
Relations (London: 1966),p 7 
19- Karl W.Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Prentice-
Hall: 1968),p 19 
20- Hans J .Morgenthau , Politics Among Nations (New York: 
1967),ch.l4 
21- Henry Barbera, op. cit., p 1 
22- Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (MacmilIan,London: 1973)pl49 
23-Evan Luard, War in International Society,iNew Haven: 1986),pl28 
24-Norman Z.Alcock, The War Disease (Oakville: 1972),ch 2 
Chapter II, p-78 
25-Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics, (Macmillan: 1977), ch 8 
26-James E.Dougherty, How To Think About Arms Control And 
Disarmament, (New York: 1973), ch 2 
27-Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of 
Military Power to National Advantage (Putman,New York: 1910) 
28-Victor H.Wallace, Path to Peace (1957),p 41; ai\d Richard J.Barnett, 
Roots of War: The Men and the Institutions Behind US 
Policy (Fengum:1972 
29-Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: 1942); L.L.Bernard, War 
and Its Causes (New York: 1944); Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War 
(Macmillan: 1971); Norman Z.Alcock, The War Disease (Oakville: 
1972); Martin A.Nettleship, War: Its Causes and Correlates (Mouton: 
1975). 
30-Hedley Bull, op. cit., ch 8 
31- Anatol Rapoport, Conflict in Modern Environment (Penguin: 
1974)p55 
32-Anatol Rapoport,"Systemic and Strategic Conflict", in Richard Falk 
and Saul Mendlowitz(ed) Toward a Theory of War PreventioniNew 
York: 1966) 
33-Quincy Wright, A Study of War ,(Chicago: 1965), ch vi, 
34- Andre Beufre, The Revolutionary War (Seewald: 1975), p 15 
35-Raymond Aron, op. cit., p 153; Alastair Buchan, War in Modern 
Society (New York: 1968), ch v; Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War 
(Princeton: 1960), ch II 
36- David J.Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War 1816-1965 — 
A Statistical Handbook (New York: 1972) 
37-E.J.Kingston McCloughny Global Strategy (London: 1957), p 17-19 
38- Maxwell D. Taylor, Precarious Security (New York: 1976),p 51-2 
39-Leon Goure, quoted by Robert Dickson Crane (ed) Soviet Nuclear 
Strategy: A Critical AppraisaliGeorgetown University: Washington: 
1963)p 27 
40-David Hughes, "Contingency Planning: A New Perspective", US 
Naval Institute Proceedings, (November 1968), p 28 
41-Lynn Etheridge Davis " Limited Nuclear Options", Adelphi Papers, 
No.121 ISS,London: 1975-76 
42-Robert Randell, The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and 
the Structure of Peace Settlements, (New York: 1973), p 1-5 
43- Julian Lider, Military Theory (St.Martin's,New York: 1983) p 75 
44-A.Sergeyev "Bourgeois Pseudo Science About the Future", 
International Affairs (Moscow: 2,1972), p 83 
Chapter II, p-79 
45- "Economic Foundations of War", reprinted from "Marxism-
Leninism on War and Army", quoted in Melvin Small and J.David 
Singer, International War: An Anthology (Homewood: 1985), p 167 
46-V.D.Soklovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (Crane Russak, New York: 
1968) pl6 
47-Ibid, p 210 
48- S.Ty\is]xkevic,Marxism-Leninism on War and Army,(Kozlov: 
1972)chxii p3 
49-Ibid, ch 2 
50-Evan Luard, War in International Society, op.cit., p 224 
Ill 
strategy and Strategic Studies 
Si vis Pacem, Para Bellum 
(Who wants peace, should prepare for war) 
Just as for Thucydides strategy would have meant the art of the 
general (strategos), Clausewitz had defined strategy as the art of 
employment of battle as a means to gain the object of war; explaining it 
as a plan of war, regulating the battle and designing the different 
courses of campaigns. Whereas Clausewitz had believed in the strategy 
as the art and theory of concerting battles for the purpose of victory, 
Liddell-Hart believed that it was an overall design for competitive 
struggle between powers. Contrasted with this,almost classical, 
explanation of strategy is the contemporary one of Andre Beaufre: 
"Strategy is the abstract interplay which....springs from the clash 
between two opposing wills. It is the art which enables a man,no 
matter what the techniques employed,to master the problems set by 
any clash of wills and as a result to employ the techniques available 
with maximum efficiency. It is therefore the art of the dialectic of force 
or,more precisely,the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using 
force to resolve their dispute" (1). But Strategy is not just the art of 
preparing for armed conflicts in which nations,when involved,plan 
the use of their resources and deployment of their forces to achieve 
that for which they went to war. Hedley Bull defines it a the technique 
80 
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of "exploiting military force so as to attain given objects of policy" (2); 
and for Gray,it is "the relationship between military power and 
political purpose" (3).In a more broad, sense, it is a rational assessment 
and determination of a nation's interests and priorities and of the ways 
in which those objectives may be achieved. 
Based on the above,classical and modern,concepts of strategy,we 
may explain it as a plan of action designed in order to achieve some 
end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its 
accomplishment. This explanation is not limited to a war situation nor 
even limited to military application; and this condition is necessary for 
the concept of strategy as an intellectual discipline. It also enforces a 
dichotomous thinking—both the purpose and the system of measures 
to achieve it must be included in the thoughts of the strategist. 
Appraisal is a two-way process;and analysis must be applied to both the 
parts(--purpose and plan), and one can see many situations in which 
the analysis of the two would be quite different.Although the 
contemporary explanation of strategy does embrace the art of the 
general as traditionally conceived, its primary concern is not just 
victory but the deterrence of a war. This is not surprising for a 
generation which faces the prospects of general extinction through the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons getting out of hand. 
In its military sense, strategy is the preparation, movement and 
use of the military means available in war;use of instruments of war 
for attaining the goals of war;not only the art and mastery of leading an 
army and directing a war but also the science or teaching of this art and 
mastery. It is the art of directing war and leading military 
operations,which have a decisive impact on the outcome of war;the art 
and knowledge of using most effectively the power potential of a state 
to destroy the power potential of another state as distinguished from 
the direction of operations and tactics. This explanation is purely 
military and includes no non-military means and methods, nor 
mentions strategic activity during peacetime. Since armed forces mean 
military force of a state and since war means inter-state war,this 
explanation covers only externally-oriented state strategy. 
Strategy is concerned not merely with war and battles but with 
the application or maintenance of force so that it contributes most 
effectively to the achievement of political objectives (4). Strategy is 
about war, and the conduct of military campaigns, but is also about the 
ways in which military power may be used to achieve political 
objectives.Waging war is only one of the ways in which military power 
can be used to implement political goals. It is for this reason that 
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Strategy is much wider than the study of wars and mihtary campaigns 
(5). If strategy is taken to aim at the survival of the homeland under 
tolerable and improving conditions of life and at the furtherance of 
causes in which motives of self-preservation and altruism are 
intermixed, and because "military action is considered being wasteful, 
dangerous and unpredictable in outcome,then strategy may be 
explained as geared to deter hostile action in crisis and to define the 
situation at other times so that crises are avoided without undue 
surrender of advantage The basic problem of military strategy is 
therefore inevitably one of deploying limited effort to best advantage" 
(6). 
The concept of strategy includes the formulation of the doctrine 
itself,particularly the formulation of strategy to be applied as 
deterrence, in peace time, and also the plans for the development of 
force posture and the procurement, acquisition,development and 
deployment of weapon systems. It covers the entire theoretical and 
practical activities of the state in the military field. It consists of policies 
and actions relating to the provision and use of those necessary 
military resources designed to secure the protection and promotion of 
the national interests of a state. It consists in establishing national aims, 
particularly those which require the possession of military force; 
establishing general outlines for the use of military force,both direct 
and indirect; providing resources,know how and capability; 
developing the necessary posture; and providing the armed force 
necessary for the achievement of national aims. It examines the 
political-military environment of the state and the military challenges 
faced by it and then formulates policy-options regarding measures to 
be undertaken; and it chalks out the estimates and availability of 
resources for the implementation of the policy-option, and the plans 
and operations for acquisition of weapons and preparation of 
forces.Assessment of security requirements and that of the resources 
available is one of the primary function of strategy. 
The inclusion of political and economic means of state power in 
the strategic means and the extension of the range of methods used for 
prevailing in a war-producing conflict has somewhat blurred the 
boundaries of strategy. Michael Howard uses the term to mean the 
employment of military force—functional and purposeful violence— 
to achieve the objectives of policy (7). Lawrence Freedman uses it to 
stress both the political aims in using military means and the functions 
of military force as the means of attaining pohtical aims (8). In these 
explanations, it remains unclear whether strategy is confined to the 
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time of war or extended to mean the use of military force for attaining 
political aims in peacetime also. Whereas Howard,above, has used the 
term in the narrow sense, Freedman has used it in the broader sense. 
Strategic thinkers maintain that Clausewitz's ideas may be used 
as a base for contemporary strategic analysis. However, his concept of 
strategy was confined to the use of military means and there were no 
non-military targets in his list of 'center of gravity' in the enemy's 
strength which must be attacked in order to win the war. He did not 
believe that any strategic contribution could make tactical 
confrontation unnecessary or that direct fighting could be avoided by 
some other means of strategy. However, contemporary strategy is 
aimed at preventing the direct confrontation of armed forces,aiming to 
hit,if deterrence failed,the enemy's war potential so as to eliminate the 
necessity of fighting tactical engagements Moreover, a nuclear war 
makes possible the total destruction of the enemy's will to resist 
without the destruction of its armed forces; and this development is 
contrary to Clausewitz's idea of destroying the enemy's forces as a 
condition of victory and acknowledging battle as the best means to 
achieve this. Modern nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have 
invalidated the prediction of Clausewitz that all the forces and 
resources could not be combined in a way to make possible an effective 
simultaneous action. Clausewitz neglected the decisive impact of 
technological developments on military art. In this light, it is difficult 
to hold that he had described war as consisting of one decisive act but at 
the same time improbable because of the constraints inherent in the 
very nature of the resources available for war. In fact, such a war,using 
nuclear weapons,is now possible. Nuclear weapons have,in a way, not 
only restored but even enhanced the leading role of strategy. The initial 
decision to go to war is now even more important as this would be 
combined political-military decision, as is the determination of initial 
targets and the determination of making strategic strikes. Similarly, it 
has made possible the extension of strategy into peacetime in which 
the strategies of deterrence and of preparation for a possible war are 
vital. 
Strategy covers both theory and practice,and expresses the 
knowledge of the regularities and rules governing the conduct of wars 
and constitutes a system of principles or techniques common to all 
wars. It may be confined to the theoretical foundation of contemporary 
wars, or still more confined to theoretical bases of an individual 
national military policy. Both these aspects of strategy would cover 
elements of military planning covering the political objectives of a war. 
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the military goals in a war, the patterns of operations and the methods 
of developing appropriate forces for achieving military and political 
goals. 
Since the actions of superpowers concern almost all states and 
the international system as a whole, their strategies have become global 
strategies. These take the forms of direct threat and the strategy of 
indirect pressure. In pursuance of the former,they desist from altering 
the status quo in spheres of vital concern to each other; and the latter 
aims at extending one's own influence by actions that are not a 
challenge important enough for the other side to resort to war (e.g.,by 
political-economic measures, by military aid,by proxy wars,etc.). 
Strategy is both national and international in character. Since it 
is the strategy of a state and of its political doctrine and national 
character, it is national. Political doctrine implies aims and objectives 
pursued by the state and its national interests, which may be different 
for each state. National culture,which shapes the national strategy,is 
derived from historical experience of a state,its perceptions and 
stereotypes and images of self and other states,as developed through 
the ages. Because of different historical experience and due to a 
different political doctrine and national culture, it is difficult for a 
state,while formulating its national strategy, to understand the 
interests,values,perceptions and actions of others. Since strategy is 
based on interests,aims,goals of a state,in accordance with national 
resources and capabilities of utilizing them,and because national 
economy,political structure,and organizational abilities are geared to 
formulate it, in the light of historical experiences of a state, it has to be 
national in character. Strategy is international in the sense that political 
ideas which shape it are based on certain national values which are 
common to most of the states. Certain common elements constitute 
the common essence of socio-economic and political systems in the 
world. Such national systems struggle with each other to develop their 
power so as to effectively develop their individual interests. In Strategy 
and Ethnocentrism, Ken Booth notes (9) that the nation state and its 
government are the chief protagonist in international relations and 
that international relations represent the struggle for power which 
determines the major clashes of interest,and that conflicts and war are 
necessary and normal in this struggle. A national strategy, in 
international context, has to deal with the most effective use of the 
available means,which is its true scope,leaving moral propriety of 
actions to be pondered over by philosophers. When a country does not 
count much in international affairs and military power alignments in 
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international arena,it emphasizes more the national character of its 
strategy and the independent nature of its foreign policy. Analysts see 
its international character as the actual use of military force in the 
struggle for power and national interests, while the internal character 
is taken to mean achieving national support for the aims of foreign 
and military policy and building up the military power of the state. 
Strategy is,thus,a combination of all the social factors, and has both 
national and international connotations, and is directly affected by 
strategies of the adversaries. 
Determining Factors : 
It is difficult to codify and systematize all the factors which 
determine strategy,but a few basic ones may be attempted: 
social basis, socio-cultural system, psychological make-up of the 
national character,perceptions of self and about other states,economic 
system and economic resources; political apparatus and structure of the 
state,views and policies of the bureaucratic apparatus and of 
organizations representing professional interests; political objectives of 
state and its international position,including international 
commitments; nature,interests and potentialities of armed forces; 
theories and philosophies of international relations and military 
thought accepted in the country. 
Out of these, the non-military factors were not given much 
attention,till recently. Liddell-Hart, and those whose writings he had 
affected in this century, displayed little recognition of the political-
economic and social dimensions of conflict. They saw strategy 
predominantly in military operational terms,without evolving it 
towards a comprehensive national security policy. Traditionally, 
military security policy was almost always the primary concern of both 
statesmen and commentators, but in the modern world economic 
considerations and welfare values are of increasing importance. Such 
socio-economic factors are not the only determinants of strategy but 
there is a correspondence between overall development and a 
capability of withstanding an attack. Similarly, the cultural set-up of a 
state affects its view of the enemy's interests, intentions and 
capabilities, and affects one's own choice of strategy. To borrow the title 
of Ken Booth's book, ethnocentrism (10) —which means the tendency 
to see one's own nation as a center of universe,to prefer one's own way 
of life to all others,to suspect all others of aggressive tendencies and to 
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perceive all other parties' intentions and actions in terms of one's own 
system of values—always affects strategy negatively. 
Michael Howard in his discussion of the forgotten dimensions 
of strategy (11) argues that of the four dimensions of strategy— 
operational,logistical,social and technological—the neglect of some of 
them leads to fatal setbacks and defeats. In the post World War-II 
period,the developed countries have suffered setbacks,while dealing 
with revolut ionary movements and wars of national 
liberation,because they had overlooked the social dimension of 
strategy. The contemporary strategic theories which rely solely on 
technological dimensions of strategy,or on technological capabilities of 
nuclear arsenals,are insufficient to deal with contemporary 
conflicts,particularly in the Third World. It is necessary to study the 
socio-political basis of war and strategy while elaborating the theory of 
strategy. Different regions of the world which may, in future, become 
areas of conflict should be focus of attention of strategic planning, and 
their socio-political-economic-psychological and cultural features 
should be studied while formulating the national strategy, in 
peacetime. It is for this reason that area studies are necessary in 
international relations and strategic studies. 
Strategy has suffered when it has been treated,along with 
national security, as a purely military problem. As Clausewitz had 
realized, a strategic issue cannot be totally comprehended only by a 
purely military evaluation. Napoleon's failure was not just because of 
military factors; he had not taken into consideration the political 
possibility that his aggressive policies might unite the entire Europe 
against him. The U.S. military involvement in Vietnam was seemed 
to be justified on the basis of certain political beliefs,which turned out 
to be not correct.Before the 1973 Middle East war, the Israelis believed 
that Egypt would not attack; and essentially this military calculation 
was correct. But this analysis had not considered the political necessity 
for Egypt to go to war and the political benefits that were to be achieved, 
even by an unsuccessful campaign. 
Before Napoleon, strategy had not developed as an area of 
intellectual inquiry. The brilliance of Napoleonic campaigns made the 
thinkers to discuss strategy in a scientific way. Clausewitz believed that 
Napoleon's success was due to a consistent link between political and 
military aims,his understanding of the enemy's weaknesses, and his 
exploitation of the morale and will power of his forces, rather than any 
scientific laws. Jomini, however, maintained that there were clear 
principles of war which could be discerned from Napoleon's 
Chapter III, p-87 
campaigns. The latter part of the Nineteenth century was characterized 
by the rapid development of technology, which increased the mobility 
and lethality of military forces. All this led to the development of new 
ways of thinking,particularly about sea and land warfare. The doctrines 
of fire and mobility were introduced to land warfare, and the sea 
warfare adopted the doctrine of the command of sea. These 
developments led Admiral Alfred Mahan to analyze sea power as 
based on six factors: geographical location, physical configuration, 
extent of territory, character of government, size and character of 
population, and national character and attitudes. The First World War 
had its own strategic problems which led to the development of new 
strategic doctrines. The problem was how to break the land-defence and 
to maintain or break the sea-communication lines; and the solutions 
were the development of armoured warfare on land and the 
submarine warfare at sea. Then,between the two world wars, fear of the 
effects of strategic sir bombings increased the willingness of the British 
government to appease Hitler. The major technological and doctrinal 
advances during,and as a result of,the Second World War led to the 
development of modern strategic air power and naval air power. Major 
advances in electronics,guidance systems,command and control 
facilities and long range warning systems helped to create a structure of 
strategic power. After the Second World War, another development 
which had a profound impact on strategic thinking was the power of 
political means to counter military force, in revolutionary and national 
liberation warfare and the use of political basis of support for military 
commitments. At the same time,the concept of limited warfare 
became significant,which sees the possibility of a major powers' 
combat,direct or indirect, at an intensive level, but in a confined area. 
Types of Strategies: 
The success in systematizing our knowledge about strategies, in 
empirical and logical -analytical ways, has made it possible to attempt 
some typologies of strategy. To classify strategies into general 
groups,different criteria may be used: 
(a) Strategy may be grouped on the basis of using military force 
in peace or war. The peace strategy encompasses all the indirect uses of 
military force to attain political aims without war, and this would 
include the strategy of deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the other 
strategy for the attainment of political goals would be one of war. 
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(b) Another grouping may b e attempted on the basis of the types 
of war. There would be an intermixing if no distinction is made 
between wars classified on the basis of their socio-political content and 
wars classified on the basis of their military characteristics . Strategy of 
an overall war,between the western and the eastern alliances, would be 
different from the strategy of a limited war between the two opposing 
blocs, as also distinct from the strategy of a local inter-state war. There 
has to be an unconventional strategy to encompass revolutionary and 
counter-revolutionary warfare. In this type of warfare,there is a close 
intermixing of military and political strategy. Also,it is a strategy for 
protracted fighting, divided into three strategic stages—the strategic 
defensive or conspiratorial stage, the strategic stalemate or equilibrium 
stage, and the strategic counter-offensive(12). Some writers have 
discussed the strategy of counter-insurgency to deal with the above 
(13). Anyhow, it appears that because of the continuing political-social 
and economic grievances,and the outside support, these strategies will 
remain an important factor of intra and inter-state relations in the 
forseeable future. 
(c) Direct and indirect strategies are classified on the basis of the 
general method of warfare. Unlike the direct strategy,in which the aim 
is to seek out the enemy's main forces and try to destroy them by a 
decisive battle, in indirect strategy first conditions are created to drive 
the enemy into unfavourable situations before he is attacked and 
defeated. According to Liddell-Hart (14), the phase of non-fighting and 
weakening the enemy by indirect, and non-military methods 
(political,economic,moral,psychological) and manoeuvres is longer 
and is given much more attention than the battle, which resembles a 
short final strike. Though in both the direct and indirect strategies,the 
aim is military victory, in an indirect one it may be achieved by using 
methods other than battle. As a variant of indirect strategy, another 
one may be the strategy of protracted conflict. Lenin and Mao 
developed this strategy, which aims at weakening the enemy politically 
and morally and at postponing the decisive attack until the latter is 
possible. This is useful because the initial inequality in forces between 
the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries can be bridged by 
intense political and psychological preparations. 
(d) Strategy may also be classified on the basis of the dimensions 
of war,or the environment in which the hostilities occur and they 
would include maritime, air and land strategies. Maritime and space 
strategies would mean using the sea or the space to exploit geography 
to own advantage and to deny its advantage to the enemy. 
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A method of discussing warfare in the abstract is by isolation of 
certain 'principles of war'. This type of analytic device is a method often 
favoured by both military personnel and by writers.There are several 
'principles' depending on whose listings one happens to have at hand. 
Most lists contain such components as the 'principle of objective', the 
'principle of the offensive', the 'principle of concentration',and so on. 
And,as men become wiser, these lists are improved upon. The 
qualification is to the effect that the wise commander must know when 
and how to apply the principles and also when and how to violate 
them.There is hardly any study of how the principles are used to 
generate a strategy. The principles are, in fact, an attempt to rationalize 
and categorize common sense. 
Broadening of the Concept: 
Generally,the development of strategic theory has been due to 
the perceived threats to national values: For Thucydides, it was the fear 
of the disunity of the Greeks in face of the Persian Empire; and, for 
Machiavelli, it was the turbulent disunity of Italian states against the 
interventions of European Empires; Clausewitz sought to face the 
intellectual challenge of the permanent political and military 
revolution brought about in Europe by Napoleon, and Liddell Hart's 
theory of the 'indirect approach'(similar to the contemporary theory of 
limited war) was based on the experience of the First World War. 
Similarly, modern interest in the theory of strategy started with the 
introduction of nuclear weapons,after the Second World War,and was 
centered around the question whether a nuclear war can be fought in a 
way that would ensure the survival of civilization,or whether any 
political goal would justify using nuclear weapons. If Clausewitz had 
written On war in the face of the Napoleonic revolutions, Herman 
Kahn had to write On Thermonuclear War in the face of the 
revolution of nuclear weapons. Clausewitz's idea that war was the 
continuation of diplomacy by other means was echoed in the modern 
ideas of Thomas Schelling that the threat of nuclear war or nuclear acts 
of hostility is the distinctive method of continuing diplomacy by other 
means (15). 
The rapid technological developments after the Second World 
War greatly broadened the concept of strategy. Not just the 
introduction of nuclear weapons in international relations but the 
subsequent thermonuclear warheads and ICBMs made the old style 
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inter-systemic, nuclear,war unlikely. This impelled strategy from just 
wartime to peacetime conditions also,making its function consist in 
preventing wars. This factor was strengthened by the emergence of 
powerful alliances, dominated by superpowers, which aimed at 
peacetime alliance strategies not just for coalition wars but also 
strategies for deterring wars. Coupled with these developments,and 
beginning at near about the same time,were national-liberation 
struggles which resulted in various revolutionary warfare and 
insurgency movements. To incorporate these developments, 
corresponding strategies also emerged. It was no longer possible to 
suffice with a single standard streitegy but numerous strsitegies were 
required for various types of wars. A range of national,allied and 
combination of strategies were required to cope with such diverse 
situations. 
In these changed circumstances, it was necessary to distinguish 
between strategies of states with global, regional, and local potentials. 
States were restricted in their strategic options commensurate with 
their potentialities; and states with limited options were forced to 
incorporate many artificial concepts in their strategies. In the scenarios 
of limited military capabilities,or even limited military options,it was 
no longer possible to consider only military strategy as affecting the 
national security. An overall state strategy involving the use of all the 
means and resources of state power were required, involving the use of 
non-military power. This resulted in not just narrowing the scope and 
utility of military strategy, and in obliterating the boundary between 
the political and military strategies, but also in the broadening of the 
scope and meaning of strategy: "Strategic thinking at present time is no 
longer exclusively concerned with the efficient conduct of war.... How 
to gain the object in war remains a central preoccupation of 
contemporary strategic thinking, but it is no longer the only one or 
necessarily the most important. Attention has shifted away from war as 
an instrument of policy toward the threat of war, and studies of actual 
violence have given place to analyses of 'deterrence'—or, as we call it 
when it is practiced by our opponents rather than ourselves, 
'blackmail'."(16). 
Among the western military theoreticians ( 17) the tendency 
developed to extend the concept of strategy,beyond the use of armed 
violence to cover the entire spectrum of international relations, 
including the politico-economic-technical-ideological means of foreign 
policy. Strategy was now regarded as the art of using the totality of state 
power for national goals, transforming it from one of warfare to that of 
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war because war was considered a combination of military and 
political actions.Strategy now meant an internal combination of 
political, economic, propagandist, psychological,t echno-scientific and 
military actions.There are focal points of tension and points of 
secondary importance. But the nature of modern weapons requires a 
global strategy since the conduct of war would include the non-military 
means also;and the non-combatants and entire geographic areas would 
be the targets of a nuclear attack, and military operations An overall 
strategy would mean the use of all forces of state power, or of an 
alliance of states, for the needs of national interests, ranging from 
tension to actual war, by every means in accordance with national 
policy.This would also include, in the scope of strategy, military 
activities in peacetime,such as the use of military force as a means of 
supporting foreign policy goals, particularly to deter the adversary from 
resorting to war,and for crisis management. Thus the broader concept 
of strategy would mean the overall use of force and the narrower 
concept would mean the direction of armed forces in war. Whereas the 
former would be state strategy,the latter would be a part of the overall 
state strategy. 
The extension of the scope of strategy led to the evolution of the 
concept of a grand strategy, covering the entire spectrum of state 
strategy, all of its policy options,with all the ends and means including 
the strategies of war and peace,with its political, economic, financial, 
commercial, psychological, technological and military aspects. Strategy 
is the use of all means and potentialities of a state, taking account of the 
overall situation and the commensurate use of time,space and 
intensity, for the attainment of the goals of policy. If this concept is 
interpreted rather narrowly, then the overall strategy would mean the 
use of the entire power of the state for the purpose of state security. On 
the other hand,an overall strategy would mean the pursuit of all state 
goals. Military strategy would,thus,mean the use of armed forces in the 
framework of overall strategy. 
Since total threat must be answered by a total defence, strategy 
must be total, as well. Strategy of flexible response includes all fields of 
state activity. Since strategy,in this sense,covers peacetime, and since 
policy covers all the activities of the state for the attainment of its 
political aims, there would be a primacy of political strategy over 
military strategy. Since policy would be serving the purposes of 
strategic planning, military strategy would formulate policies which 
affect all fields of state policies. This concept of strategy is the expression 
for security-maintenance and survival of a country, a mutually-
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dependent group of states or an entire area, in accordance with its 
requirements. This explanation of strategy would sum up the 
definition of strategy as the use of all the resources and potentialities of 
the given state or alliance on the basis of the global situation and waged 
for the attainment of political aims, in the appropriate time and place 
and with appropriate intensity. 
Scientific Nature ? 
Whereas a science is a branch of study in which knowledge is 
ordered systematically in accordance with general laws which include 
valid methods for discovery of new knowledge, an art is a skill derived 
from knowledge and practice and can exist independently of any body 
of general law. 
Strategy is much more than a mastery of scientific principles. It is 
a skilled direction of military action. It is not always possible in 
formulating a strategy to analytically deal with all the factors, as it also 
involves comprehension of diverse factors affecting any 
situation,intelligence, intuition, experience, morale etc. Strategy is an 
art rather than a science. A commander in the battlefield has no time to 
ponder through an array of formal alternatives or cannot go through a 
handbook of strategic laws to decide what to do in any situation. He has 
to use his intuition and his intelligence from experience to devise his 
own strategy. 
However, according to Hedley Bull (18), the intellectual 
resources now being devoted to the study of strategy are without 
precedent, and this has resulted in a literature of higher technical 
quality and a discussion of a higher standard of sophistication than 
have existed before. He pleads in this(1968)essay for acceptance of the 
scientific status of strategy which,he believes,constitutes a speculative 
and sophisticated discipline of high technical quality. 
Since the events leading to war and the ways and behaviour of 
states engaged in wars have been repeated again and again it is believed 
that war actions and events may be predicted, and this predictability is 
assumed by many strategic thinkers (19) as a sufficient reason to hold 
the view that strategy and its studies are full fledged science. Three 
approaches may be discerned regarding this: a^ strategy cannot become 
a science, bj^it may be called in some respects as a science,and c >it 
constitutes a science though its status is nascent. 
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Since the conduct of warfare is not amenable to scientific 
research, the view is not much wide that strategy and its studies are a 
science. Professional strategists have insisted on the scientific nature of 
it,may be to enhance the importance and prestige of their profession. 
They acknowledge that intuition,experience,abilities and various other 
intangible qualities of the commander make strategy an art, yet the 
desire is there to give strategy a scientific flavour. This is done by 
insisting that the aim of 'strategic science' is to study the nature of war 
and the links between the cause and effect or between the aims and 
means in war. If strategic relationships are assessed in this way, it will 
be possible to provide an instrument for coping with specific strategic 
problems. It may not be possible to develop unconditionally valid 
propositions as various uncertainties and individual characteristics 
have their impact on the course of any specific war. Even then,it is 
possible to establish premises for assessment and provide positive 
principles for creative application in specific cases. If this is possible in 
foreign policy,it is possible in strategy-formulation and study, or even 
more so. The data on which foreign policy and strategy formulation are 
based do not involve interpretation as much as other social sciences do. 
This may be compared with national economic planning. Like 
strategy,it also is based on the principle of economy of effort—attaining 
a given goal with means as small as possible; and both involve 
complex planning operations. As a means of politics, strategy has 
developed both theory and practice, and it would be erroneous to 
regard it as a deductive discipline which only can draw conclusions 
from the given principles. Strategic problems cannot be solved merely 
by intuition and experience of isolated experts. For instance, peace in 
politics cannot be studies adequately without a knowledge of strategic 
conditions. 
The reservations in accepting strategy or its study as a science 
emanate from the nature of war as the main focus and subject of this 
discipline. War is not rational in totality but is also based on a creative 
approach and several irrational premises. It is difficult to recognize war 
but easy to master it as an art. If a nuclear war cannot be fought or won 
in the traditional way,it is difficult to develop a theory,or a strategy,for 
such a war. There are various constraints on the independent character 
of research in this discipline. The use of military means is one of the 
instruments in a combined political-economic-military and ideological 
action. Also,there has been a rapid expansion of the potential dangers 
to national security. It may no longer be possible to pursue and achieve, 
by military force alone, the aims of the traditional security 
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policy,!.e.,the preservation and maintenance of population and the 
social order and the state. 
While developing the so-called laws of war, many strategists 
confused the scientific product (logically sound propositions, valid 
over time) with the scientific process (systematic treatment of 
evidence), thereby neglecting to follow scientific methods.Whereas 
scientific analysis requires critical evaluation, strategic analyses fails in 
this regard, first, due to a barrier of secrecy and,second, because of 
political considerations. Although the need for confidentiality is 
obvious and is conceded, it prevents a critical evaluation of strategic 
suppositions and policies and makes it difficult for alternatives to 
emerge. There are elite groups that have a stake in the formulation of 
strategic policy, and they would not like to have their own position 
undermined by potentially critical propositions. Critical evaluation of 
policies is,therefore, discouraged simply be denying access to relevant 
information. This problem has been aggravated due to the highly 
specialized nature of several disciplines that affect strategy. Policy 
makers have to rely upon expert advice; but these experts favour 
solutions with which they themselves are familiar or those which 
would further enhance their position. 
It is possible that in future strategy may acquire a scientific 
status.Inspite of the narrow material and intellectual basis of research, 
lack of many scientific institutions in this field and inspite of heavy 
dependence on borrowed concepts from other disciplines, the subject 
has it in its nature to evolve towards scientific form. In modern 
international relations, common strategies are established through a 
competition and compromise between various national inputs. It 
becomes necessary for a country to develop its own national strategic 
theory and studies; and this requirement will gradually move the 
discipline more towards a coordinated, regulated and scientific study. 
This discussion about the scientific nature, or otherwise, of 
strategy and its studies had started with Hedley Bull's 1968 essay, quoted 
above. Thirteen years afterwards, Hedley Bull resolved this issue thus: 
" Strategy is the art or science of shaping military means so as to 
promote the ends of policy; it is an art or science of means, more 
particularly of military means". (20). It appears that he treats the 
theoretical part of strategy as a science and the applied part as an art. 
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As An Intellectual Discipline : 
The persistent notion that strategy is something that should 
remain secret may be one reason why it has been so consistently 
avoided as an intellectual field and discipline. There is no reason to 
infer that the patterns of thought influencing the military mind should 
be avoided as outside any thinking man's province. This is more likely 
to result into a degeneration and a strategic mediocrity. The more 
people know and understand such things the more will be a 
democracy in strategic decisions ." War is too important to be left to 
the generals" is not just an aphorism. 
Even before the Second World War, one writer had lamented 
that "war stimulates invention but the army resists it" (21).Military 
application of technological change and ideas has always been slow. 
Military community has always been hostile to innovations that 
challenge traditional roles and missions. Innovations undercut the 
status and authority of the current elite, whose position is dependent 
upon their expertise in familiar ideas and methods. It is always possible 
that outside evaluation may expose organizational,structural and 
personnel weaknesses and mistakes. Strategic analysts have challenged 
the professional orthodoxy, but their influence is curtailed due to the 
positions they occupy either on the fringes of the military 
establishment, or outside it. But,with the dominance of science and 
technology in determining strategies,civilian strategists now are no 
longer confined to the fringes of policy-making establishments. They 
have no vested interest in preserving the status quo of traditional 
military arrangements and providing rationales for them; instead they 
have interest in innovation. It is the civilian strategist who has 
brought about changes in strategic perspectives, challenging the 
established maxims. 
Strategic studies implies a consideration of the role of force in 
international politics. The subject is founded on the premise that 
military power continues to perform a variety of functions in 
international relations and remains an important instrument of state 
policy. This underlying assumption is fundamental to strategic studies. 
An analysis of this assumption might begin with a description of the 
scope of strategic studies itself, and the problems faced by it. 
The expanding scope of strategic studies has been the result of 
the expansion of strategy itself and of the concept of national security. 
The latter encompasses all the vital interests of the nation,both in 
peace and war,including the socio-economic and political domestic 
system. The extension of the potential threats to national security had 
the obvious implications for the scope of strategic studies. Security 
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policy has assumed the roles of the defence of the territorial integrity of 
the state, the preservation of the substance of population and the 
maintenance of the state and of social order. Whereas earlier, all of 
these aims could be pursued by military force, by preventing the enemy 
from occupying the country, in the nuclear age and because of various 
indirect strategies, the means and methods of security policy have 
become complex. Defence of the territory is now possible through a 
combination of means available with an alliance; the preservation of 
population is possible through deterrence; and, the maintenance of 
state order is possible through combined political-economic-
psychological and military means. The extended scope focuses on the 
use of military force in peacetime, with strategies of deterrence as the 
principal new element, as well as methods of using force to achieve 
aims short of war, like in crisis management. The socio-political 
analysis of war and military force has also been added to the scope, 
besides the theory of military policy and analyses of specific aspects of it. 
Such theory would also include planning of military operations and 
planning and procurement of adequate weapons.The strategy of 
winning war is complemented by the strategy of effective military 
pressure as well as the strategy of preventing war. The interest of 
strategic studies in internal violence and upheavals is based on the 
assumption that these are actually influenced by conflicts in interstate 
relations and are connected with external interventions,which are an 
external threat to national security. Strategic studies would cover the 
consideration of the control of all the resources of a nation, or an 
alliance of nations, in order to effectively secure and promote vital 
interests against actual or potential enemies. This would be an overall 
plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion to support foreign 
policy by all the means. It may be treated as the study of the use of the 
entire state power for attaining the totality of its political goals. The 
scope has thus expanded to cover all aspects of the use of force for 
political purposes. 
Strategic Studies do not mean just the various ideas about the 
use of military force and various alternatives to strategic scenarios, but 
also a rationalization and discussion and evaluation and even criticism 
of the current strategic policy. It seeks the best possible strategy for the 
existing military force of the country. 
Strategic studies are identified by the focus on military strategy, 
wherein the ends are the political objectives of states, the means are 
military and the field of conflict is the international system. Louis 
J.Hall defines strategic studies as "the branch of political studies 
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concerned with the political implications of the war-making capacity 
available to nations" (22). It is the study of the use or threat of force,or 
the instruments of force, in political relations within and between 
states and the way in which the instruments of force affect these 
relations. 
Four basic approaches to the concept of strategic studies may be 
attempted: 
a)_The concept which equates strategic studies with military theory 
examines the nature and effects of war and preparations for it. It 
includes general theories of the causes of war, particular characteristics 
of war and broad studies of military strategy and operations. It has been 
pointed out (23) that whereas some aspects have been adequately 
studied, such as arms control, strategic stability, use of force and 
escalation, crisis management, military coercive potential and the 
decision making process, some other aspects have not been given 
proper attention, and they include the causes of war, role of armaments 
in history, the dynamics of military rivalry, civil-military relations, 
defence economics and military sociology. 
b)_The study of the use of military force constitutes the second 
approach, which analyzes the ways in which military force may be 
used, in peace and war, in direct or indirect ways, in open or covert 
operations, and even the non-use of military force in international 
affairs. This approach focuses on such aspects as different alternate 
strategies in various types of war, variants of warfare, strategic 
doctrines, military policy and military art actually in operation. 
c)_National defense/security policy is the focus of study in the third 
approach,which deals with a wide range of problems regarding the 
defence of national interest. This approach studies the military doctrine 
which provides the theoretical framework of defense policy. 
d)_ There is a very abstract approach which is based on the concept of 
strategy as a method of applying the means to achieve in any field of 
conflict This 'conflict resolution' approach believes that what is 
required for strategic thinking is a social situation in which there is a 
clash of interest and of will. 
A more sophisticated approach to strategic studies is the effort to 
prepare prospective strategists for their work by a deliberate broadening 
of their horizons in study of social matters that have an inevitable 
close relationship to military action. It includes studies in such fields as 
political factors impinging on military strategy, economic factors, social 
factors, and so on. 
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Any explanation of the content of the subject has to consider the 
peace time applications of strategic thinking. Robert Osgood has 
suggested that "military strategy must now be understood as nothing 
less than the overall plan for utilising the capacity for armed 
coercion—in conjunction with the economiC/diplomatic,and 
psychological instruments of power—to support foreign policy most 
effectively by overt,covert and tacit means (24). And,for Henry 
Kissinger, it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into 
policy (25) 
In The Twenty Years Crisis,written immediately after the Second 
World War, E.H.Carr sums up the relationship between strategy and 
international relations: " If every prospective writer on international 
affairs in the last twenty years had taken a compulsory course in 
elementary strategy, reams of nonsense would have remained 
unwritten ". (26). Barry Buzan has given an organic linkage between 
strategic studies and international relations: " The embedded character 
of Strategic Studies within International Relations is similar to that of a 
major organ within a living body. One can study the heart and 
circulatory system as a distinct subject,and there are advantages of 
specialization to be gained from doing so. But many other parts of the 
body impinge on the heart and circulatory system in important 
ways....Just as one cannot understand the whole organism without 
understanding the heart and circulatory system, neither can one 
understand the purpose and function of the heart and circulatory 
system without seeing them in the context of the complete body. 
Strategic Studies is similarly a vital component of the larger whole of 
International Relations. It has elements that make it distinct, but it is 
connected in myriad ways that severely limit the extent to which the 
two can be disconnected without risking potentially fatal 
misunderstanding. International Relations without Strategic Studies 
would seriously misrepresent the major realities in play between states. 
Strategic Studies detached from International Relations would be in 
constant danger of seeing only the conflict element in relations 
between states and taking it as a whole reality " (27). 
Strategic Studies and International Relations: 
It is not very easy to draw a boundary between strategic studies 
and international relations. We cannot distinguish between the two in 
relation to diverse events like the raising or crumbling of the Berlin 
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wall ,the formation or loosening of military alliances or the U.S. action 
in Panama. A simplistic way to distinguish the two would be the use of 
force as the basis of study for strategic studies, and international 
relations covering a broad spectrum which includes political-
economic-social-cultural-legal-military interactions. In this way, 
strategic studies would be a sub-field specializing in one aspect of a 
larger whole, which is international relations. But this view is too 
simplistic. It is not possible to study wars, or the uses of force, without 
going into the broader subject matter of international relations. 
Similarly, subjects like alliances and crisis management can be 
included both in strategic studies and international relations. Military 
alliances are subject matter of strategic studies because they are based on 
the potentiality of the use of force; but,at the same time, they reflect 
common political interests between states, and fall within the domain 
of international relations. Military technology would clearly belong to 
strategic studies. Matters relating to the instruments of force would 
similarly belong to strategic studies. This professional expertise about 
the instruments of force and their effect on political relations between 
states highlights the relationship between strategic studies and 
international relations. 
With the widening of the scope of strategic studies, and due to 
close links between strategic policy and foreign policy, it is possible that 
strategic studies may not remain an independent scientific discipline 
and become a part of international relations. In Theories of Peace and 
Security, Garnett observes (28) that the widening of the concept of 
strategy which, in certain interpretations tends to incorporate and 
coordinate political-economic-military instruments of politics, creates a 
danger of making it impossible to distinguish strategic studies from the 
study of foreign policy-making, and even more from the wider subject 
of international relations. While acknowledging that strategic studies is 
the study of the development, threat,use or dismantling of military 
force, A.J.R.Groom, writing about British thinking on this issue (29) 
believes that strategy is concerned with part of international relations 
processes because it deals with the power-sphere and management of 
international system. 
It may be possible to attempt some explanations which may 
require the location of strategic studies within the field of international 
relations. Some definitions give emphasis to the pattern of thought in 
the analysis. If we take the definition of Andre Beufre, given earlier, 
then strategic thinking is distinguished from other kinds of thinking by 
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a particular way of looking at conflict which can be applied to a social 
situation not having anything to do with international relations. 
The issues that form the focus of strategic studies are those 
which are an integral part of international relations also: they may be 
general issues like causes of alliances or of war and sources of 
cooperation and the security effects of economic interdependence, or 
may be policy-oriented like threats to particular countries; they may be 
theoretical studies on the causes of conflict in international system or 
may be issues like the nature and perception of threats and efforts to 
resolve conflicts; or they may be problem oriented such as arms 
control, disarmament, deterrence, determinants of security policies of 
some particular state, socio-economic-psychological responses to 
military dilemmas, or historical studies of all these issues. 
Actually,problems of international relations do provide the context for 
strategic thinking, and strategic analysis would be meaningless without 
a background study of international relations. As Raymond Aron 
points out, "strategic thought draws its inspiration in each country 
or rather at each moment in history, from the problems which events 
themselves post "(30).A strategist has to use military power in the 
national interest; but what that national interest is—that has to be 
decided by the national leadership in the context of wider international 
relations.In international relations,the prime purpose to be realized 
has become to keep under control the potentially unlimited capacity for 
military destruction. The practical purpose of strategic studies is then 
not that of successfully conducting wars but of preventing it or limiting 
it if it occurs nevertheless. The study of international relations after the 
First World War was normative, of the world as it should be,rather 
than of the world as it was; and this study was not designed to produce 
a realistic understanding of international relations. This study 
understandably left out strategic studies from its scope. It was after the 
Second World War that the objective became to understand 
international relations as they really are, to understand the factors that 
determine the shape of the world as it is; and the role of military power 
has had to be recognized. This belated turn to realism is still 
overshadowed by the fact that, amazingly and deplorably, there are a 
few still who are in the mental framework of the period following the 
First World War. 
The anarchical nature of international system, discussed above, 
makes the technological imperative significant for international 
relations. Even the political economy side of international relations 
have to give significant attention to these aspects just like the strategic 
Chapter HI, p-101 
aspects. Thus, strategic studies and international relations cannot 
sustain their debates detached from each other,as that would be suicidal 
for the understanding of the both. 
Theory Building: 
It may be difficult, though not impossible, to attempt a theory-
building in strategic studies. A theory means a set of integrated 
explanatory statements that may be expressed in the form of 
hypotheses whose validity may be tested by experimentation. It is 
different from a theorem which may be proved merely by means of a 
chain of logical reasoning. When the theory is found,after testing, to 
provide explanations that are indeed satisfactory, then it is no longer a 
theory,but becomes laws. Since we do have laws of balance of power, 
arms competition, or the laws of deterrence, theory building in strategic 
studies does not seem that difficult. In a systematic way, strategic theory 
is speculative and generalized. But strategic theory is also based on 
empirical hypotheses which can be supported by evidence. Strategic 
theory building is likely to succeed if it makes accurate appraisal of such 
factors as technological capabilities,socio-political processes, sources of 
military power etc. Strategic empirical theory looks for patterns in the 
behaviour of political actors. This aspect of strategic theory is rather 
weak because of the lack of a proper data base; there has been no 
nuclear war, and there are not many nuclear arms races. The 
normative strategic theory deals with the alternative futures to be 
attained within different time-frames. This is the weakest aspect of 
strategic theory as it deals with questions of values, coloured by 
individual ethical—moral values of strategists. Unfortunately,this 
approach is most common in the writings in the field of international 
relations and also strategic studies. Policy science aspect of strategic 
theory frames and executes strategic policy for the nation. Robert 
Rothstein has discussed (31) the role of policy science in the context of 
performing functions that the client is unlikely to perform for itself. In 
strategic policy science, strategist may be value-neutral and may be able 
to explain the relationship between means and desired ends, by 
offering contingent advice or contingent predictions. There may be a 
speculative aspect also of strategic theory. This involves systems of 
generalizations containing their own logical validation. It is not 
possible to prove or disprove the validity of arguments in this theory. 
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Its example is Herman Kahn's famous work On Escalation: Metaphors 
and Scenarios. 
Since national survival may very v^ell depend on the ability to 
deter or win wars, the value of formulating enduring principles of 
strategic success are obvious.Explaining how a state can ensure this 
strategic success is the function of the strategic theory. 
Strategic policies also, like strategic theories, do not have very 
clear starting or finishing points in time. Since policy framers require 
options, such freedom of choice of military means to achieve objectives 
is often given a doctrinal importance. For instance, deterrence 
survives as much on uncertainty and calculated ambiguity as on 
indecision of policy makers. Declaration of policy and capability of 
policy have to have linkages to maintain a credibility. When Winston 
Churchill,in his first speech after becoming the Prime Minister of 
Britain, said " our policy is to wage war", nobody in the world doubted 
these intentions.When the Sri Lankan leaders,in election speeches,said 
that their policy was to throw out the Indian forces, no one believed 
them. Policy does not reflect merely the aspirations, regardless of the 
ability to perform. There is distinction between defense 
policy,operational policy and defense posture, and it is erroneous to 
club all of them into 'policy'. Whereas "we keep our nuclear option 
open" represents a policy, "we intend to maintain a defense posture 
that is second to none" represents aspirations and desire.No doubt 
there is a close relationship between all these. Defense policy represents 
what objectives the defense forces are intended to achieve;doctrine 
explains how these forces are to be used while implementing policy; 
and, defense posture represents the availability of actual forces and the 
range of available options. It is still difficult to improve upon the three 
decades' old statement of Halperin that "defense policy comprises 
capability, declarations,and actions" (32). In other words, policy would 
involve what is said,what is available, and what is done. Even more 
important in strategic policy framing is the ability to identify what is 
and what is not the policy of the adversary, and what is just a 
declaratory policy or merely aspiration. 
More than foreign policy, strategic studies is conditioned by the 
needs of the policy-planning and the military-technological 
innovations. Policy planning may not necessarily be optimization but 
may be geared only towards satisfying whoever needs to be satisfied.In 
this context, the best strategic option would be that which is good 
enough,or which appears to work. It is not necessary that all the 
technological innovations may be reflected in strategic policy; but 
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technological innovation is a necessary catalytic factor for strategic 
inquiry and policy relevance, if not for policy making. The assimilation 
of new technologies has not been a novel problem for strategic 
thinking which has adjusted itself to these developments. Moreover, 
the technological developments that have really affected strategic 
structure and policy-framing have not been that many, since the 
Second World War. Such developments have been the development 
of nuclear weapons, the perfecting of the long -range ballistic missile, 
the precision-guidance techniques for conventional and nuclear 
weapons and the directed energy weapons. Many of the other 
technologies only facilitate the earlier strategic theories but mostly 
technological changes eventually produce congruent theoretical and 
policy changes. Weapon designers are moved by perceptions of 
technical possibility and by commercial and political interest. It is the 
function of strategic theory to help policy makers towards planning 
proper employment of new technologies and to make military force 
serve the ends of foreign policy. 
It would not be out of place to mention here that strategic studies 
have been most catalyzed by the dissatisfaction of individual strategists. 
Much of the work in strategic studies reflects the dissatisfaction of 
authors with the strategic policy-planning of the time and place: Henry 
Kissinger,Albert Wohlstetter and Thomas Schelling in the U S A , 
Hedley Bull and Michael Howard in the U.K., Fritz Fischer and 
Adelbert Weinstein in West Germany, Julian Lider in Sweden, and 
K.Subrahmanyam in India have been most prolific when not satisfied 
with the current strategic policy-planning. This is also true of the 
institutions. In the U.S.A.,the Rand Corporation,the Brookings and the 
Hoover Institutions, in the U.K. the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, in Sweden the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, in 
West Germany the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Ebenhausen, and 
in India the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis have led to the 
awareness and appreciation of the importance and relevance of the 
subject, but not necessarily acting on the same wave-lengths as those of 
the powers that be. This has been possible because, apart from other 
factors , there has been no longer any monopoly of the armed forces 
over the study of strategy. The basic creative thinking in this field has 
been done in the research institutions, and not in staff colleges of the 
armed forces. 
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Point-Counterpoint: 
Hedley Bull, in his "Strategic Studies and Its Critics" (33), 
examined some criticism against strategic studies, finding them not 
only excessive but intemperate and based on erroneous assumptions 
such as: 
a)-they leave morality out of account 
b)-they take for granted the existence of military force 
c)-they make unreal assumptions about international politics 
d)-they are pseudo-scientific in their methods 
"The notion that virtue in international relations lies simply in 
avoiding risk of war and never in assuming it, always in self-
abnegation and never in self-assertion, only in obeying the rules a 
world community might legislate if it existed and never in pursuing 
the different moral guides that are appropriate in a situation in which 
it does not—such a notion is of course untenable" (34). According to 
Anatole Rapoport and Philip Green (35), strategistsdike Herman Kahn) 
are abstractionists, oriented around operations research, game theory, 
systems analysis, simulation, diverse scenarios and such specialist 
techniques are bogus when arriving at strategic decisions. Rapoport 
claims that the strategists have brought the world to the brink of 
disaster by fostering a conflict-oriented view of international relations 
and by proposing an international environment in which war is 
becoming psychologically acceptable. Rapoport also claims that 
strategists are fascinated by violence ! As Colin Gray answers," one 
might just as well maintain that doctors are fascinated by disease or 
that more fundamental religious functionaries are fascinated by 
sin" (36). Rapoport accuses the strategists of a zero-sum thinking and for 
seeing what they want to see in human nature and for over-
simplification. It would be better to answer in the words of Karl 
Deutsch: "Blind prejudice, bigoted fanaticism, and crusading self-
righteousness have often operated under the style of intuition and of 
conscience" (37). Criticism of strategic studies actually confuses 
medicine with disease. It is asserted that the effect of the endeavours of 
strategists has been the establishment of an international insecurity 
system which has in it the risks of war and the cost of arms races. 
Scholarly fallacy is one of the worst: where is the guarantee that if 
strategic scholars were to offer a perfectly workable solution for 
establishing peace and security, wars would not occur ? Strategic studies 
may make the difference between a wise and foolish policy decision. 
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Even just a possibility of doing this is sufficient justification in view of 
the enormity of the costs of failure. We need not assume that states 
will always do their worst; but we have to prepare for the possibility 
that they may. As, according to Thucydides, the Athenian 
representatives explained the driving motives behind international 
behaviour: " Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men leads 
us to conclude that it is a general necessary law of nature to rule where 
one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first 
to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and 
we shall leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us " (38). 
Another criticism, based on simplistic and naive understanding 
of the subject, is that strategy itself will lose touch with politico-military 
reality and that strategic studies is over-intellectualised, an idle pursuit 
of the affluent societies, surrounded by a web of abstract theorising. 
This criticism shows the failure to comprehend the real purpose of the 
study and research that should be conducted in the 
universities.Academics do not compete with professionals and policy 
makers in the field of defence. Civilian strategists, working in an 
independent system like a university, raise the standard and tone of 
strategic debate at the highest level of decision, and provide some solid 
intellectual fare that subsequent generations, even if they reject it, are 
at least to recognize as a serious attempt to come to grips with the 
problem. Their skills may not be needed for policy making, but they 
generate a national security consciousness, initiate a national debate on 
national needs, evolve different alternatives for the policy makers and 
provide relatively untarnished policy ideas. Since there is no 
overlapping of functions, the civilian strategists should not be treated 
as competitors by professional policy makers. The civilian strategist 
cannot eschew his duty as a scholar to examine, continually and 
critically, the goals that are being sought and the means that are being 
adopted. It is only through the cooperation of the scholar-strategist and 
the policy-technician strategist that a cost-effective achievement of 
goals is possible. The Third World countries have found themselves 
constantly at a most serious political disadvantage in relation to the 
developed world in security matters because they have not had a body 
of strategic expertise of their own with which to frustrate attempts to 
overawe them. Whether they will acquire such expertise depends on 
the development of a national security consciousness; and this is 
precisely the role of the civilian/scholar strategists. The need for the 
study of strategy is implicit in the nature of international life, but it is 
difficult for narrow and prejudiced mind to comprehend this. 
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Amazingly, one objection—which comes from within the universities 
themselves—is that strategic studies is a very sophisticated, specialised 
and difficult subject for students to be exposed to. Interestingly, such 
critics do not object to teaching mathematics on the ground that 
calculus is a difficult subject. One has to learn to walk first before 
learning to run. But may be this is beyond the comprehension of those 
university dons whose mental crutches still drag them into the period 
of the twenty years' crisis. 
It is thus necessary that there be a continuous dialogue between 
political-strategic planners and independent strategists: " Separation of 
strategy and policy causes military power to become identified with the 
most absolute applications of power and it tempts diplomacy into an 
over concern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national 
policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and 
military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is 
such a thing as 'purely' military advice " (39). To slightly modify a 
famous dictum, national security is too serious a business to be left to 
politicians and generals alone. 
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IV 
Nuclear Strategy 
O' Curs'd device! base implement of death I 
Fram'd in the black Tartarean realms beneath ! 
By Beelzebub's malicious art design'd 
To ruin all the races of human kind 
Ariosto (1516), Orlando Furioso 
The dilemma of contemporary international relations is the 
question of what to do with nuclear weapons and what to do about 
them. The processes through which nations formulate their foreign 
policies are supposedly based on, or ought to be based on, precepts of 
rational decision making. But nuclear weapons have challenged the 
validity of traditional approaches and rationality of their own strategy 
because this strategy revolves around the problem of finding some 
possible political use of these weapons. 
Nuclear weapons have unalterably changed the way people 
think and nations behave. Given these weapons of mass 
destruction,victory is no longer possible in superpower confrontations, 
and large scale violence is no longer a useful tool of statecraft. It is the 
prospect of fighting the war rather than the possibility of losing it that 
induces restraint. This basic psychological condition,rather than highly 
diversified nuclear options, constitutes the essence of nuclear strategy. 
But a fundamental question in this regard is whether 'nuclear strategy' 
is not a contradiction in terms. A rational strategy for the employment 
of nuclear weapons does seem to be a contradiction in terms because 
rationality demands that these weapons may never be used because 
they will serve no purpose. Since strategy relates military power to 
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political purpose, and since no military purpose is furnished by nuclear 
weapons, there appears to be no political purpose for the exercise of 
nuclear power. There are strategists and scholars who believe that 
nuclear weapons can be used both for war fighting and war winning 
options through their first strike-pre emptive use and, on the other 
hand,are others who assume that the only political purpose for which 
nuclear weapons can be used is the deterrence of an enemy's 
attack.Whereas some believe in the use of nuclear weapons under 
circumstances prevailing at a particular decision-point, others sanction 
the use of nuclear weapons only for defense. The reason that the 
nuclear debate is perplexing is that strategists and scholars proceed 
from so many different premises. Either the impact of these weapons 
on military strategy is underestimated or attempts are made to 
comprehend the contemporary international situation with 
intellectual tools that might have been valid in the pre -1945 period. 
The failure of policy makers to comprehend the nature of nuclear 
weapons as instruments of war is sure to have catastrophic 
consequences for human civilization 
Averting War ? 
Nuclear strategy,thus,involves the use of nuclear weapons for 
purposes of persuasion and compellence at one end and for dissuasion 
and deterrence at the other end of a continuum. It is based on 
assumptions that: "nuclear weapons offer nations effectively unlimited 
force;that winning a nuclear war is impossible;that it is 
imperative,therefore,to stop such a war from ever beginning; that the 
weapons themselves play a crucial role in that effort; that an 
invulnerable retaliatory force is of particular importance;that there is a 
special danger inherent in any capacity, on either side, for destroying 
the nuclear forces of the other side in a first strike; and that 
'perceptions' and 'psychology' play an essential role in convincing the 
adversary that any aggression by him will lead only to his annihilation, 
and so in maintaining the 'stability' of the whole arrangement " (1). 
The strategic essence of the entire problem concerning nuclear 
weapons was comprehended by Bernard Brodie at the very outset of 
the nuclear age when, in his The Absolute Weapon (1946), he had 
pointed out that,till then,the chief purpose of military establishment 
was to win wars but, in the era of nuclear weapons, its chief function 
was to avert them.The main argument in this assumption was that the 
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mutual destruction capability of nuclear weapons would serve no 
useful purpose except to make a nuclear war irrational and suicidal. 
Brodie had believed that margins of superiority in nuclear weapons or 
the means of delivering them might count for little or nothing in a 
crisis as long as each side had reason to fear the huge devastation of its 
peoples and territories by the other.Though the more effective a 
weapon is the more it is used, nuclear weapons are so effective that 
they cannot be used.Armed forces have always adapted themselves to 
new weapons through the process of trial and error; but no one can 
even think of adapting national strategy through this process of trial 
and error with nuclear weapons. Vast sums of money, national 
resources, human knowledge and time are spent over something that 
cannot be used and should not be used and is only intended to make 
sure that others also do not use it.This paradox is at the bottom of 
nuclear strategy. 
War today is no longer a struggle but a technical process of 
destruction. Because of the horrendous consequences of any nuclear 
confrontation, nuclear weapons have not only made war less likely, 
they have also made major crises between great powers an infrequent 
occurrence. Aside from the nerve-racking period between 1958-1962, 
when the superpowers engaged in high stakes confrontations over 
Berlin and Cuba, the American and the Soviet leaders have acted with 
considerable restraint. Since nuclear weapons promote caution, they 
have served to reinforce the status quo,especially in terms of alliance 
relations, and super power nuclear arsenals seem to have provided 
more glue than solvent to alliance relationships. Historically,major 
shifts in territory and spheres of influence usually occur through 
conflicts or threats of war, and nuclear weapons have reduced both. 
These weapons also place a heavy onus on the super power that wishes 
to change the status quo. When full-blown crises have erupted or 
when the superpowers have jockeyed for advantage over lesser stakes, 
political outcomes have been unrelated to the nuclear balance or 
perceptions of it. 
In international relations, escalation acts as a technique to put 
pressure on a party to settle a dispute without resorting to war and is 
used to make negotiations possible. The fact that two states have agreed 
to negotiate indicates that they do not want war. At the same time,they 
do not want to indicate any sign of weakness by being too eager to 
negotiate and they want to achieve their objectives without war. Both 
hope that the other side will compromise before the risk becomes big. 
They do not want to gain some advantage at the cost of creating a 
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political situation that might lead to a general war; and they avoid a 
situation that might provoke an imprudent response from the other. 
Strategic gains may be obtained by increasing war efforts but such gains 
will be affected by the corresponding increase of efforts by the 
opponent. The apprehension that the opponent may either react,or 
over react, deters escalation. Such escalation may be a part of the 
conscious strategy of some state. A state may want to threaten the other 
with an all-out war or may want to provoke it into some recklessness, 
and so may decide to escalate the level of conflict in international crisis 
situations. This may be done by widening the area of conflict or 
violating a local sanctuary, by compounding escalation when attacks 
are made on other allies or clients, and by increasing intensity in the 
form of use of nuclear weapons or attacks on cities. Thus, in any 
escalation " two sets of basic elements are in constant interplay: the 
political,diplomatic and military issues surrounding the particular 
conflict, and the level of violence and provocation at which it is 
fought"( 2). Morton Halperin has suggested (3) that two terms should 
be used to describe different kinds of escalation: "explosion—the 
sudden transformation of a local war into a central war by the 
unleashing of strategic nuclear forces, and expansion—a gradual 
increase in the level of military force employed.These two processes are 
frequently described as escalation. However, it is important to keep the 
two processes separate. The considerations that go into the decision to 
begin a central war would be very different from the considerations 
that have gone and will go into decisions to expand a local war. These 
latter decisions will be influenced by a number of factors, including the 
foreign policy objectives of the two sides, their estimate of the risk of 
central war, their images of the role of force and their domestic political 
objectives". 
War can, in fact, be deterred by a balance of power based on 
nuclear weapons, though not necessarily. Possession of nuclear 
weapons does not mean an obsolescence of conventional forces, 
because such forces are still required for those wars which would have 
them as the main instrument or for many peace time functions as the 
main instruments, and they would be needed to complement the 
nuclear weapons in a nuclear war, or maintaining the balance of power 
to prevent a major war. Nuclear weapons have created a force in being 
which makes any potential attack a suicide risk to the aggressor.This 
situation has in fact created a state of structural terrorism in which 
international relations are based on the legitimization of violence and 
the continuation of a dreaded threat of universal extinction. 
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Deterrence: 
The primary function of this power has become to prevent the 
use of military force by one's opponent. There is the calculation that 
the adversary might be refrained from doing something or induced 
into doing something by threatening a punishment for non-
compliance. This policy of deterrence operates in a manner in which 
the conflict is contained within the boundary of threats that are not 
executed and not even tested.A strategy of deterrencemeans means (i) a 
strategy which may be a political strategy, in peacetime, by deterring an 
adversary from starting a war, (ii) a strategy of war if deterrence fails, 
and (iii)an elaboration of guidelines for force posture to meet the above 
requirements.This is not a strategy for the military but one for the 
politician because the threat of the use of nuclear force is a political act 
that reduces the relevance of military considerations. If the deterrence 
has failed, neither of the side will be interested in destroying the other's 
population centers. The main motivating force to exercise restraint will 
be the desire to induce the same restraint in the adversary. And the 
desire for restraint in the adversary will lead to self-restraint.Snyder 
has explained this through the phenomenon of limited retaliation in 
which " initial strikes, in fact, would be threats of further strikes to 
come, designed to deter the enemy from further fighting. In warfare 
limited to conventional weapons or tactical nuclear weapons, the 
strategic nuclear forces held in reserve by either side may constitute a 
deterrent act against the other side's expanding the intensity of its war 
effort. Also,limited wars may be fought in part with an eye to deterring 
future enemy attacks by convincing the enemy of one's general 
willingness to fight "(4). This was proved by the testimony of General 
Alexander Haig, former Supreme Allied Commander of the NATO, 
who,as the US Secretary of State, testified in 1981 before the US 
Congressional hearings that the NATO had plans to fire a nuclear 
warning shot in the early stages of the war in Europe (5). 
The consequences, in international politics, of nuclear 
deterrence revolve around four basic questions: 
i-what are the changing physical requirements for the 
continuing success of deterrence? 
ii-What kinds of wars does nuclear deterrence really deter? 
iii-What is the role, if any, for tactical nuclear weapons? 
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iv-If deterrence fails, how to fight a nuclear war and for what 
objectives? 
The starting concern of a state is to preserve sufficient retaliatory 
force against surprise attack, to deter the enemy in anticipation. In 
this,the precautionary measures would depend on the degree of the 
desire of the enemy to destroy the adversary. There may be a possibility 
that if the enemy believed in his capacity to destroy the other side 
without getting too much damaged himself, he might be tempted to do 
so. To be prepared for all the eventualities is to minimize that portion 
of one's forces that the enemy might be confident of destroying by a 
surprise attack, coupled with a posture that would open for the enemy 
the penalties for miscalculation. No opponent would try to eliminate 
just a missile force unless he was confident of eliminating major 
portions of the other retaliatory forces(i.e., submarines and bombers). 
This is so because each of the legs of the triad helps the other two. 
In the early nuclear age, the question was not important as to 
what nuclear weapons deter. It was with the thermonuclear weapons 
and the doctrine of massive retaliation that the necessity grew to 
separate general war from limited or theater war.Now it was believed 
that strategic nuclear power could be used to deter only the strategic 
nuclear power, and not other form of war. A quarter of the century 
back,there were attempts to delink nuclear weapons from diplomacy 
since they were not going to be used any way, and the idea developed 
that the best way to avoid their use was to build up the conventional 
forces(6).Actually, tactical nuclear weapons have escalatory effects and 
even one use may directly lead to a holocaust. It is precisely the fear 
that escalation is probable or possible which creates the sanction for 
deterrence. Then,the enemy is not likely to start a war and leave the 
critical choice of weapons to the other side. He would refrain from 
using tactical nuclear weapons only if he was confident of quickly 
overwhelming us without them.On the other hand, the other side also 
could not afford to wait and see whether the enemy would use them 
first. There is no logic in the argument that a conventional force would 
make a better deterrent than the nuclear force designed for tactical 
use.It is believed that nuclear weapons need not be used very rapidly in 
replying to an attack; and that the main war-goal should be to 
terminate the nuclear exchange quickly and with the least amount of 
damage possible. In practice,however,a different view is taken. Since 
the mid-Seventies, the US army (and,surely,the Soviet army must 
have been thinking on the same lines) is targeting a war recovery 
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capability (7),whose object is to make sure that in a strategic nuclear 
exchange, the Soviet Union will suffer such damage that its recovery 
would be much more prolonged. Furthermore, there is the related 
issue of excessive or excessively speedy retaliation to an attack and the 
possibility of striking first in the hope of winning advantages. If the 
posture of being prepared to initiate the exchange is to be maintained, 
as a deterrent, then the weapons are needed only for warning purposes 
and their number should be minimized; otherwise the enemy might 
misapprehend the intentions and do precisely that which one was 
trying to deter—that is, make a first strike. 
The strategy of deterrence is based on the idea that the 
favourable results of a nuclear war can never be sufficient to justify its 
costs. 
If a state does not want to initiate a total war, and does not 
favour a 'preventive war',then there is no option for it but to adopt a 
strategy that would deny to the enemy the advantages of attacking first; 
and it would mean a commitment to the policy and strategy of 
deterrence.A statement that a particular kind of conduct would be 
deemed ' an unfriendly act' is regarded as ultimatum and is taken 
seriously by states if a state issuing such an ultimatum possesses the 
power and has the capability of using it. 
The peculiar situation about nuclear deterrence is that it needs to 
be perfected without being actually used. It is effective and has some 
meaning only when it is not used. The strategy of deterrence must 
always envisage the possibility of deterrence failing. Deterrence justifies 
something that is relative, because its effectiveness is measured not by 
the quantum of power that it checks but also by the incentives to attack 
that lie behind that power. There has to be comparison of the degree of 
damage that each side is likely to suffer. Our forcing the adversary to 
consider the probable cost to him of attacking us is to be measured in 
the relative terms of damage to us also. Accepting enormous damage 
for the sake of inflicting greater damage on the adversary is beyond 
reason. The efficacy of deterrence lies in its promise to impose costs 
upon the aggressor out of proportion to his expected gains. To be 
effective, threats must retain a measure of credibility,even if only in 
the form of the threat that leaves something to chance. There is no 
sure way of telling whether massive retaliation, as a deterrence, would 
require bluff. Deterrence is a particular type of threat that is retaliatory, 
in response to a particular purpose—of preventing an attack. Threats 
are an intrinsic part of international politics, encompassing peaceful 
and hostile, cooperative and competitive relationships. 
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Deterrence is really based on the capability of carrying out the 
threat, and this requires the possession of a nuclear weapon arsenal 
that will match, or surpass, the enemy's. The capability to carry out the 
threat implies,also, the will to carry out the threat in the event of 
war,and the other side should perceive that such a will and such 
capabilities do indeed exist. The deterrent strategy has to correspond to 
the strategy of war to be waged in case of the failure of deterrence, and 
the other side should believe that it will be like this. If the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons is threatened but the preparations are going 
on for the use of conventional weapons, then the deterrence will not 
be effective. A rational calculation of the risk in military planning is to 
be made and due consideration is to be given to the irrational motive 
not to surrender under any circumstances. An allowance has to be 
made for the irrational actions on both the sides. Since there is 
uncertainty about the rationality of the behaviour of the parties 
concerned, nuclear strategy is difficult to calculate. While several 
options about level of deterrence may be there, there is no need to 
make the enemy aware of what the probable response would be and the 
risks and damages he might expect from one's own actions. The risk 
must remain incalculable, because it is the enemy's fear of escalation 
that is the best deterrence and best defense. If a definite scenario is not 
elaborated then the enemy is not given the possibility to choose the 
kind of war most convenient to him. Therefore, the best deterrence 
involves the principle of incalculable/uncertain risk, meaning that the 
enemy should not know the extent of risk in the event of aggression. 
This strategy would involve the threat of an automatic war of 
escalation, without any pre-determination concerning the extent to 
which nuclear weapons would be used. 
There are divergent views among the scholars on the real nature 
and the sanction of deterrence in the nuclear age. Some believe that 
fear is the key ingredient of deterrence(8). For some, it is the rational 
assessment of costs and gains (9). Some believe that risk and 
uncertainty are the key elements (10). Some see an element of 
rationality in it : " One requirement for deterrence is that decision-
makers act rationally—the leaders of state B must calculate the costs 
and benefits of the action that state A is seeking to deter and rationally 
calculate not to act"(n). Some believe that deterrence appeals to the 
self-interest of the deterred: " Deterrence is the inducement of another 
party to refrain from a certain action by means of the threat that this 
action will lead the deterrer to inflict retaliation or punishment. In 
other words, deterrence is persuading the deterred that his own interest 
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compels him to desist from committing a certain act. Such persuasion 
is achieved by calculations of gain against loss. To make deterrence 
effective,the deterrer makes certain that the level of retaliation 
overrides the gain the deterred anticipates. To the extent that such an 
action is motivated by psychological impulse rather than calculations 
of gain, the strength of the deterrent threat must of course also offset 
the pressure of such impulses (12). Herman Kahn also talks about 
psychological impulse v\^ hen he says that enough forces should be there 
to deter even the irrational and irresponsible (13). But for many 
scholars, several of these elements operate simultaneously (14). 
Sometimes, deterrence and denial overlap (15) while denial and 
defense have identical meanings. Denial is not the same as retaliation 
because the latter means inflicting punishment in response to an 
attack. Its example is the threat of nuclear attack that superpowers hold 
over each other. Denial would mean resistance to the attempts to 
attack. This is the NATO strategy, in Europe, against the Warsaw pact. 
Deterrence is stopping something which is unwanted before it occurs, 
and in involves both denial and retaliation. In this, it is different from 
compellence which means use of force to make adversary do 
something or force him to stop doing something. Retaliation, defence 
and denial are actually methods of that end which we describe as 
deterrence. The nuclear strategic thinking has been based on the 
assumption that strong defensive forces would prevent attacks. If 
deterrence by denial was expressed by the Maginot Line, deterrence by 
destruction is provided by the nuclear threat. However, a distinction 
may be attempted here between defensive deterrence, involving denial 
and defense, and offensive deterrence, involving retaliation and 
punishment. Whereas the theory of deterrence got started from the 
initial strategy of retaliation, soon it incorporated strategies of denial 
also. This was logical since the theory of deterrence itself had 
developed as a result of status quo policies of the West against the 
alleged Communist designs to alter the international system. Since the 
West was, immediately after the Second World War and at the time of 
the introduction of nuclear weapons, globally dominant, its security 
perceptions evolved through the policy of preserving the status quo. 
Nuclear strategies, geared towards denying alterations in status quo, 
harmonized well with these policies as defensive deterrence. The 
entire concept of security came to be identified with maintaining and 
ensuring stability, and no better and stronger means for achieving this 
were there than nuclear deterrence. Actually, there was nothing new in 
the logic of the argument. As E.H.Carr had observed, before the nuclear 
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age, the status quo powers always equated their own interests, in 
universal terms, with universal stability (16). 
The main theoretical problem in the field of national security 
policy is to distinguish between the two central concepts of deterrence 
and defense. Snyder has made an interesting distinction between the 
two: "Essentially, deterrence means discouraging the enemy from 
taking military action by posing to him a prospect of cost and risk 
outweighing his prospective gain. Defense means reducing our own 
prospective costs and risks in the event that deterrence fails. Deterrence 
works on the enemy's intentions; the deterrent value of military forces 
is their effect in reducing the likelihood of enemy military moves. 
Defense reduces the enemy's capability to damage or deprive us; the 
defense value of military forces is their effect in mitigating the adverse 
consequences for us of possible enemy moves, whether such 
consequences are counted as losses of territory or war damage. The 
concept of defense value, therefore, is broader than the mere capacity to 
hold territory, which might be called denial capability. Defense value is 
denial capability plus capacity to alleviate war damage " (17). 
Deterrence is not synonymous with the capacity to win a war. In 
the pre-nuclear age, a state having an inferior force did not necessarily 
possess a deterrence value against the superior rival. But in the nuclear 
age, the potential deterrence value of an inferior force is not small. If a 
menaced small nation could be in a position, while possessing only a 
couple of bombs, to successfully deliver this thermonuclear device on 
Moscow or New York, then this capacity would be sufficient to deter 
these superpowers. They would not accept the destruction of their big 
cities for some trivial gains. In this example, the deterrent capacity of 
such a small nation is of decisive value. In the face of large 
conventional and nuclear arsenals, a threatened state has the option to 
either comply with the deterrer's desires or resort to an all-out nuclear 
war. Such large arsenals, which are required for flexible response 
strategies, raise the costs and probability of risks. These arsenals would 
also bring under the effective threat range wider enemy targets, 
persuading him to comply.The heart of deterrence is that a threat 
promises costs in retaliation for an attack. The state finds that when 
such costs are added to the other drawbacks of an attack they are 
excessive in comparison to the anticipated gains. The result of such a 
calculation may be a decision not to attack. 
Deterrence is not the power to compel or coerce, but to dissuade 
and,hence,is a negative aspect of political power. A state may deter 
another by implicit or expUcit threat of some sanction, and this may 
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follow from any form of control which a state might have over the 
other. The state to be such deterred makes an estimate of the total cost-
gain expectations and these depend on its perception of the other's 
capability and intention to apply punishments or confer rewards. The 
state so being deterred will not just count its existing cost-gain position 
but the extent to which this position is likely to change if it conforms to 
the wishes of the adversary. A state is unlikely to undertake overt 
military action if its chances are good enough for making the same 
gains by peaceful means. On the other hand, a state is more likely to go 
to war, in spite of greater potential costs, if in not going to war is the 
possibility that the other side might attack first and inflict even more 
costs on it. This uncertainty is a key factor in determining the key steps 
about retaliation or deterrence because it is a process of influencing the 
enemy's intentions. In making this determination, a state has to make 
valuation of possible costs resulting from the adversary's response, as 
also the probability of achieving the objectives with each of the 
response of the adversary. 
There are two problems with deterrent strategies. The first is the 
credibility of the state that is threatening action because, to be effective, 
a threat has to be believed. A state has to believe that the other can 
deliver the threatened punishment and, under some circumstances, it 
may well do so; otherwise,the state against whom the threat was made 
may not be deterred.The state to which the threat is addressed must at 
least believe that the punishment may be administered. The second 
problem emanates from the actions that the threatened state may take. 
If the defense is strong, the aggressor may attempt to overcome it, or 
may seek to reduce the effects of deterrence by striking to destroy a large 
part of the adversary's deterrent force. To say that two states deter each 
other means that they create a condition of strategic stability. Strategic 
stability, however, makes it possible to use force on a fairly large scale 
without using nuclear power and, then, strategic strikes are deterred 
but not conventional actions.lt is a function of deterrence to make any 
preventive, pre-emptive or any aggressive attack on oneself look 
unattractive and useless to the other side. A certain way for creating 
this perception is to make it absolutely clear that an attack by the other 
side will be met in kind, and not necessarily confined to the same 
degree.The threat of a massive retaliation against the targets that the 
other state values most, and not just its military assets, must be 
maintained and made credible if deterrence is to work.A state 
intending to deter the other has to accept the necessity of going to the 
brink, and even beyond that,to counter the attacks on itself and has to 
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accept the option of using nuclear weapons for self-defense.If the 
decision makers of a state are willing to launch a counter-strike against 
the population and industrial centers of the adversary then and only-
then the deterrence has some viability. 
The nuclear superpowers have based their strategies on a flexible 
doctrine for strategic nuclear use and on the determination that hard-
target counterforce capabilities must be countered in kind. The former 
US Secretary of Defensejames Schlesinger had outlined four 
requirements for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence: " An 
equivalence with the Soviet Union in the basic factors that determine 
force effectiveness....a highly survivable force that can be withheld at 
all times and targeted against the economic base of an opponent so as to 
deter coercive or desperation attacks on the economic and population 
targets of the United States and its allies.... a force that, in response to 
Soviet actions, could implement a variety of limited pre-planned 
options and react rapidly to retargetting orders so as to deter any range 
of further attacks that a potential enemy might contemplate. This force 
should have some ability to destroy hard targets, even though we 
would prefer to see both sides avoid major counterforce capabilities. 
We do not propose, however,to concede to the Soviets a unilateral 
advantage in this realm.... a range and magnitude of capabilities such 
that everyone—friend, foe, and domestic audience alike—will perceive 
that we are the equal of our strongest competitors" (18). 
It is not easy to assess the effectiveness of deterrence and it is not 
possible to say with certainty that the desired result in the adversary's 
policies has been due to deterrence. It would be naive to assume that 
India was deterred from helping in the establishment of an 
independent Eelam,out of Sri Lanka,due to the super powers' presence 
in the Indian Ocean, because it presupposes that India was interested in 
such establishment, which might not had been the case. In the case 
when deterrence is employed,it is always easy to assume that the 
desired action or inaction is the result of deterrence policy.. The 
motivation of the adversary towards the action from which he is to be 
deterred is a major deciding factor coupled with the degree of 
probability that the action is likely to be undertaken if specific 
deterrence measures are not there. The adversary will also balance the 
costs/gains of the action for him against the costs/gains of deterrence 
and defense measures facing him. It is assumed that the adversary will 
attack unless the costs to him of doing so are increased more and more 
and gains of not attacking are made more appetizing, thus lowering his 
motivation to attack. If such motivation is fairly high, very substantial 
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deterrence measures will be needed to achieve the desired results. 
Perceptions of these levels of motivations may not be correct. The 
motivation of North Vietnam to unify with the South was of such 
high level that even the most formidable U.S. military actions failed to 
deter this from happening. Similarly, China under Mao had tried to 
establish such an image that, whatever the costs, she will not be 
deterred from undertaking the policy objectives. 
The strategy of deterrence reflects the global foreign policy 
interests of superpowers aimed at ensuring their own security. The 
underlying assumption here is that deterrence constitutes the means of 
foreign policy and that it is the basic function of armed forces in the 
nuclear age.Nuclear deterrence theory is primarily centered around the 
assumption that nuclear strategy involves the super power relations 
only. Though China and France had posed a challenge to this super 
power domination, the superpowers were able to maintain their 
superior and dominant position. Their arsenals had so grown that it 
was extremely difficult for any one else to match that position. Since 
nuclear deterrence was based on the missile-based defense, any 
effective defense against it was not possible and use of nuclear system 
that were themselves vulnerable became the first strike. The major 
infra-structure of society would still be vulnerable even if some,or 
more,warheads could be destroyed before they reached their targets. 
Further, an active super power hostility was central to the 
development of deterrent strategy; and the hostility was real and 
intense during the cold was period. This, coupled with the 
vulnerability of nuclear forces, made it imperative that each of the two 
nuclear powers must possess a secure second-strike force—that is, a 
capability of inflicting devastating damage on the opponent after 
suffering a massive nuclear attack. Bipolarity now centered around 
protective technologies. Command,control,communications and early 
warning systems became of paramount importance in the conduct of 
effective strategic relations (19). 
Deterrence is more effective under conditions of bipolarity 
because the fear of assured destruction restraints both the sides from 
going to war. In this situation,force relationship between the two sides 
is clearer and conflict management is based on the norm of parity. 
Though deterrence is effective in this condition,it is more difficult 
because technological imperatives for maintaining the capability of 
assured destruction are much more demanding, the relationship is 
based on zero-sum pattern and this focuses and concentrates on 
possibilities between the gains of one and losses of the other. Multi-
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polarity also makes Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) difficult to 
assess because each of the state will have to account for more than one 
deterrer and deterree. In this situation,two or more states may join 
together in an attack against the third;or a third state may trigger a war 
between two states during a period of crisis. Since the parity equation is 
undermined, more fingers on more nuclear triggers enhance the 
probability of war, whether intended or unintended (20). But this multi 
polarity reduces the zero-sum nature of deterrence and thus reduces 
the intensity of hostile relations. In this situation, there is a reduced 
need for extended deterrence. Also, since states abstaining from the war 
are more likely to benefit from this war, the incentives for going to war 
are reduced in such a multi-polar system. 
Small Nuclear Forces : 
Smaller nuclear powers of the future (i.e.,Brazil, Argentina, 
Pakistan and India) may not be central poles of power, nevertheless 
their possession of nuclear weapons would pose vital questions as far 
as deterrence is concerned. Kenneth Waltz, in The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons:The More the Better, (21) has argued for the essential 
universality of nuclear deterrence logic, and it would work for 
countries like India and Pakistan. The assumption that nuclear 
deterrence has sustained peace in the developed world is going to make 
it difficult for nuclear-capable countries not to adopt this strategy. 
Though Stephen P.Cohen has said that, between India and Pakistan, 
there would be the possibility of accident, misunderstanding or 
misperception since both of them have not done much work on 
nuclear doctrine and that both would face formidable command and 
control problems he is optimistic that nuclear proliferation in South 
Asia will stabilize the regional situation to the degree that it has done 
into the US-USSR relations (22). Because of various uncertainties, both 
have already achieved some deterrent stability and their so-far 
continuing resolve to exclude external powers from bilateral 
relationships may have been the result of the knowledge that even a 
conventional escalation could lead to a nuclear war.There is no logic in 
the argument given by some that the developing countries cannot be 
trusted with nuclear weapons and that they may not behave 
responsibly. As pointed out by K.Subrahmanyam ," It is irrational to 
argue that the same effect(stabilizing the situation)cannot be secured on 
the India-China or India-Pakistan borders unless one accepts the racist 
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nonsense...that nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of a senile Mao 
Tse Tung, a comatose Brezhnev, an inebriated Nixon, a drugged 
Pompidou and an unstable Eden, but not in the hands of a sober, 
cautious and cunning Ziaul Haq" (23). 
Nuclear proliferation thus may stabilize the nuclear order by 
spreading the war prevention imperative to regions that now suffer 
from sporadic periodic conflicts. 
Even a small state can have a deterrent capability against a big 
state. A couple of hundred nuclear warheads would be able to inflict 
unacceptable damage on a large state. Thus, if such a nuclear force can 
be retained safe against a first strike,then the state has achieved a 
capability of assured destruction and, therefore, an effective deterrence 
against the adversary, whatever the size and power of the adversary 
might be. The cost of the threatened act determines the effectiveness of 
deterrence and, if credibility of threats is ensured, the deterrence in the 
form of assured destruction has been achieved. Uncertainties deter if 
the costs are high, because then the unpredictabilities of war are 
amplified. Bernard Brodie, Jervis and Laurence Martin believe (24) 
that the basis of deterrence lies in the fear of war created by the 
existence of a surplus capacity of destructive power. This capacity is not 
that hard to achieve, even for a smaller nuclear power and, therefore, 
the requisite conditions for deterrence are also not hard to obtain for a 
smaller state. As Glaser argues (25), even a perfect strategic defense 
would not be able to ensure perfect security, because its perfection could 
never be tested adequately to convince, and constant doubts would 
exist as to whether one's opponent had developed new means for 
penetrating what was previously impenetrable. Another factor in this 
regard to be considered is the uncertainty of state behaviour under 
crisis as escalation dominance does not make it safe to stand 
firm.Protection for oneself cannot be achieved just by destroying many 
warheads of the other side and this would be possible only if the 
surviving warheads were able to persuade the enemy from sparing 
one's population centers. 
A condition of strategic stability denotes a condition in which 
the superpowers decide not to build or use nuclear weapons and it 
encompasses the complementary ideas of arms race stability and crisis 
stability. Whereas the former occurs when neither super power feels 
compelled to develop major new weapons programmes, the latter 
denotes a condition in which neither super power chooses to use a 
nuclear weapon in a conflict. 
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Superpowers' Nuclear Doctrines : 
Once the nuclear nronopoly of only one state was no longer 
there, there was no logic in the possession of superior destructive 
power as a method of dissuading the other side. Nuclear threats of one 
side would be of no use if the other side could also n\ake counter 
threats. This nautuality of destructive potential ensured that any policy 
objective would not be a sufficient justification for resorting to war. By 
the middle of the 'Sixties, even though the USA still had advantage 
over the USSR in nuclear strength, the latter had achieved position 
where it was possible to inflict unacceptable damage on the USA in 
retaliation. In this way, a bipolarity of effective nuclear vulnerability 
was established. There was a marked deviation in the Soviet strategic 
thinking which was a marked shift from the standard Leninism. 
Whereas Lenin believed in the inevitability of war between imperialist 
and socialist states, Khurushchev, after achieving this parity for the 
Soviet Union, believed that since the imperialists would not be able to 
win, they would not attack. 
With the Soviet Union acquiring nuclear weapons, the 
American strategic planners believed that the former might attack and 
this had to be deterred by threatening a massive retaliatory blow. This 
was the threat of striking after an attack had been made and, 
therefore,it was passive deterrence. On the other hand, there was a 
policy of active deterrence involving the threat of carrying out a 
nuclear strike before nuclear weapons were used by the other side, 
even against the allies. There was limited deterrence also to deal with 
revolutionary and guerilla strategies and the use of thermonuclear 
weapons was not necessarily envisaged in this. The first two types 
(active and passive), whether involving countervalue or counterforce 
strikes, were actually determined by their timing. The passive was a 
retaliatory strike after the enemy had struck,and the active was a pre-
emptive or preventive strike designed to forestal the enemy in his 
intention to attack. The strategy of limited deterrence was limited 
voluntarily and deliberately as far as the quantum of damage 
threatened and the targets involved were concerned. 
The early phase of the U.S. nuclear strategy was dominated by 
John Foster Dulles and Kennen who believed that the U.S. problems 
originated from the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. Dulles 
had, in fact, not only mis-judged the Soviet intentions, but had not 
taken into account the pace with which technological developments 
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were making not only the balance of power concept but also the 
strategy of thermonuclear bluff, obsolete. The U.S. strategy of massive 
retaliation and the policy of an elaborate alliance system were part of 
the over-all policy of containment. The Korean war was a stimulant to 
change in the US policy, and the Eisenhower administration shifted 
the US doctrine abruptly from a war-fighting to a war-deterring 
strategy. There was a desire to find a strategy that the USA could afford 
and could stick to without gearing its responses to the wayward actions 
of other states. There was a resolve not to fight even a war in which the 
country denied herself the use of her best(i.e.,nuclear) weapons; and 
the threat to drop Atomic bombs was intended to deter other states 
from starting war or carrying them through. This doctrine of absolute 
deterrence, based on the idea of the threat of a massive nuclear attack 
was termed " massive retaliation" and was intended to bring a halt to 
all aggression. 
John Foster Dulles had announced massive retaliation as US 
policy in January 1954 and this policy was presented as a means of 
countering what was perceived as a dangerously increasing communist 
threat in Europe and Asia.This policy relied on a credible commitment 
to launch a devastating nuclear attack in response to what may be 
comparatively even a trivial provocation. It reflected the US 
aspirations to utilize nuclear superiority against the Soviet 
conventional advantages in Europe and Asia and was motivated by the 
experience of the Korean war which was expensive and militarily 
indecisive. This was the period of assured US nuclear supremacy. The 
New Look in strategic doctrine emphasized nuclear power as a cut-
price of achieving US security. Not only that but tactical nuclear 
weapons gave more bang for the buck, that is maximum safety at 
minimum cost.But this strength was based on a nuclear advantage that 
the US possessed at the time but could not sustain for long. Once the 
Soviet Union also possessed the same capability the US retaliation 
against any Soviet action was not to be credible as that would have 
meant triggering a nuclear war.The doctrine was actually based on 
perceptions that were fast becoming outdated. The other side, with its 
own nuclear capability, would know that the party threatening massive 
retaliation does not mean it. This strategy evolved under the 
assumption that the utility of deterrence is based on the way one is 
prepared to fight. For instance, until McNamara's tenure as the US 
Secretary of State, strategic superiority was considered vital to 
deterrence of Soviet 'recklessness'. He evolved the notion of sufficiency 
of strategic forces. But again,since Nixon administration, up to now. 
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the notion has been revived that strategic inferiority is bad for 
deterrence. Henry Kissinger had said right in the beginning of the Age 
of Massive Retaliation that it seems to offer a technological solution to 
complex political, economic and strategic problems(26) 
Flexible Response replaced massive retaliation as the US nuclear 
strategy in the early 'Sixties. It meant countering enemy aggression 
with a variety of possible responses depending on the nature and 
seriousness of enemy aggression, and the response could range from 
limited defense with conventional military forces to all-out nuclear 
war. This strategy was adopted in 1967 as the official NATO strategy in 
Europe.The Kennedy administration had believed in the policy of a 
controlled and flexible response where the military force of the US was 
to be versatile enough to meet with appropriate force the full spectrum 
of possible threats to national security. This implied that the US would 
appropriately respond to any attack, at conventional or tactical nuclear 
level. On the strategic level,"the new doctrine meant a switch in 
targeting policy away from the 'optimum mix' assault,designed to 
destroy Soviet society and military power in one mighty spasm, to a ' 
no cities' counter force option aimed at destroying remaining Soviet 
armaments in place "( 27). Inspite of many modifications in 
terminology, this idea has guided the US nuclear policy for the last 
three decades. The idea is based on the possession of several options, 
both conventional and nuclear, intending to deter aggression at all 
level and moving the defence forward if deterrence failed, without 
having to make either/ or choices between conventional—nuclear 
means 
This doctrine, in fact, destabilized the presumptions on which 
deterrence depended because it considered nuclear war rational and 
winnable. It was believed that flexible strategic response implied a 
lower nuclear threshold and more political control. Actually, there is 
always the possibility of a war expanding rapidly beyond the control of 
political authority and there is no guarantee that the enemy will also 
observe the same rules of strategy. Since there is hardly any possibility 
of a clean and surgical nuclear strike, the collateral damage will be 
equally high. Further, the military defect about flexible response was 
that it made it difficult for military planners and strategists to prepare 
for any particular type of war.A proper response encompassing all the 
eventualities is not possible in strategic terms. 
At a speech at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in 1962, 
Robert McNamara had declared that: " The U.S. has come to the 
conclusion that, to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a 
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possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same 
way that more conventional military operations have been conducted 
in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives should be the 
destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian 
population" (28). Its clear implication was that the U.S. was prepared to 
take the nuclear initiative to secure a major gain and to limit damage. 
Such counterforce strikes were aimed at reducing the ability of each 
state to damage the other; and the city-avoidance were to mean that 
both would share an interest in limiting the scope of strategic 
actions.Whereas countervalue implied nuclear attacks against civilian 
populations and cities and industries in highly populated areas, 
counterforce refers to nuclear attacks against military targets, such as 
enemy's own nuclear weapons and facilities. The psychological impact 
of a countervalue nuclear strike could, in theory, coerce the enemy into 
giving up. Such a strike is also considered an effective way of 
preventing an enemy from recovering from a nuclear war and 
rebuilding so as to take revenge In this way, a deterrence based on 
countervalue would imply that no state can pursue aggressive policies 
without considering the possibility of a devastating nuclear attack on 
its own industrial and population centers. This countervailing strategy 
was the U.S. doctrine under the Carter administration but actually it 
was a strategic refinement of the Limited Nuclear War strategy that was 
formulated as the Schlesinger Doctrine of 1973. 
The international strategic context, in which assured destruction 
was operating for determining the character of strategic forces, had 
radically changed. Even as late as the mid-'Sixties, the U.S. believed 
that it had achieved a superiority over the Soviet Union in the 
quantitative dimension of the strategic arms race. McNamara had said 
at that time " The Soviets have decided that they have lost the 
quantitative race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that context. 
It means that there is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to 
develop a strategic force as large as ours" (29). Elaborating this later on, 
in a different report, he said: " In the case of the Soviet Union, I would 
judge that a capacity on our part to destroy,say, one-fifth to one-fourth 
of her population and one-half of the industrial capacity would serve 
as an effective deterrent. Such a level of destruction would certainly 
represent intolerable punishment to any 20th century industrial 
nation" (30). The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) sized 
the U.S. forces according to their ability to destroy the Soviet Union in 
a retaliatory strike, and it was believed that 25% of its population and 
50% of its economic infrastructure would represent intolerable 
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punishment and that a bigger strike than this would produce only 
marginally improved results. 
The MAD was based on the assumption that both the nuclear 
powers could hold the other's society under threat of an assured 
destruction if both possessed a secure second strike capability. In this 
case,there would be a less danger of first strikes against each other's 
nuclear forces and each would try to avoid war, though the hostility 
might continue. If MAD was there, possibility of counterforce strikes 
would not be there as that would be only counter- productive and 
suicidal. Stability depended on the maintenance of a secure second 
strike capability. An unstable hostility and rivalry could thus be 
transferred into something stable, wherein both the superpowers 
would share a common interest, out of mutual concern to avoid war. 
Since the advantages of a first strike were obliterated and the damages 
from the second strike were certain, there were very strong reasons to 
prevent war. A logical corollary of this common interest in war-
avoidance was the emergence of arms control as an additional sphere 
of common interest . The argument was extremely logical : " MAD 
rested on deterrence by the retaliation of punishment. That threat,in 
turn,rested on the vast increase in destructive power made available by 
nuclear weapons. Given that there was no effective defense against a 
nuclear attack on society, the threat to punish required only a finite 
military capability" (31). With limited means for defending against a 
nuclear strike, the superpowers rely on their ability to inflict enormous 
damage on each other in their second and subsequent strikes, thereby 
attempting to deter each other from launching a nuclear attack in the 
first place. This arrangement would work as long as both are in a 
position to absorb a nuclear attack and then counter with an 
unacceptable destructive retaliation through their strike-back capability. 
Since both the sides base their security on deterrence, and deterrence is 
based on the capability of punishment, it would be in their mutual 
interest to have some ceilings and limitations on such force levels as 
would constitute the capability of punishment. Maintaining the MAD 
stability at the lowest cost became the objective of arms control. In this 
way, arms control became distinct from the earlier concepts of 
disarmament. Attempts at arms control were based on the premise that 
arms were not just the problem but were part of the solution and what 
was required was not just a reduction of arms but such deployments 
that would stabilize MAD in a simple and cost-effective way. 
'Balance of Terror' describes the balance of power between the 
superpowers. It is characterized by MAD, a condition in which the 
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superpowers are restricted from going for aggression by their ability to 
inflict unacceptable damage upon each other. It is based on each super 
power's capacity to absorb a nuclear strike and then counter with an 
unacceptable retaliation. The threat of destruction, in this way, avoids 
war. One side's Assured Destruction problem is the other side's 
Damage Limitation problem, and the other's Damage Limitation 
problem is the first's Assured Destruction problem. 
The incentive to go for a pre-emptive strike is strong only if the 
adversary's strategy is perceived to be counter-city; and then the idea 
would be to save the damage to population and economic-industrial 
complex by inflicting a pre-emptive strike on the adversary. But if the 
adversarial strategy is perceived to be counterforce the incentive is not 
much for a pre- emptive strike. On the other hand, a side adopting the 
counter-force strategy is more likely to go for the first strike. A first 
strike against the cities might leave the major portion of the 
adversary's forces intact and this would mean the failure of the strategy 
of the attacker. If a side is going for the first strike there is no option for 
it but to attempt to destroy, as much as possible, the strategic forces of 
the other side. Even in a scenario of established deterrence, no super 
power is likely to limit its strategy from attacking vulnerable strategic 
forces of the other, at the start of the war. With the availability of 
invulnerable strategic forces with both the sides, the prospects of pre-
emptive strike are very low, notwithstanding any strategies involved. 
The Nixon administration in the US found the MAD strategy 
insufficient. An analysis was made at this time to determine the 
relative casualties if either of the two superpowers resorted to a first 
strike; and the finding was that there would be more US casualties in 
the case of a US first strike than in the case of a Soviet first strike, 
because it was figured that the side striking first would resort to counter 
force strategy whereas the retaliating side would resort to countervalue 
strategy.Therefore, new limited strategic nuclear options were 
formulated under which immediate massive retaliation against the 
Soviet citizens was no longer to be the only or principal option. This 
Schlesinger Doctrine of limited strategic options was a strategy of 
counterforce. This doctrine emphasized 'selectivity and flexibility' in 
choosing where and how nuclear weapons would be used in a conflict. 
This doctrine assumed that use of nuclear weapons would be 
coordinated with diplomatic and conventional military efforts in a 
conflict, providing a legitimate policy role for nuclear weapons. Tactical 
and theater nuclear warfighting is envisaged by the doctrine of limited 
nuclear war.It was based on the assumption that deterrence would be 
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enhanced with the ability to fight a Hmited war at a level of destruction 
that would leave enough to allow peace bargaining. Since multiple-
warhead technologies of both the superpowers were soon to nnature, it 
was appropriate for them to have a dialogue on reducing strategic 
armaments. The US, in the face of the Vietnam war, and the USSR,in 
the face of a militarily volatile Sino-Soviet rift, agreed to SALT-I, which 
included a Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System, an 
interim agreement with a Protocol on Certain Measures with respect to 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and a Statement on Basic 
Principles of Mutual Relations. But SALT had not covered European 
theater nuclear weapons. And a limited nuclear war was to be 
primarily limited to Europe and this fact made it more attractive to the 
US than,naturally,to Europeans. 
A limited nuclear war would have to be controlled to be limited 
and limited to be controlled. A limited war is a war fought to achieve a 
limited objective. In the achievement of this objective, a nation may be 
expected to plan to expend a limited amount of its national resources; 
and in carrying out the war it may be expected to plan to hold the war 
to a limited geographical area. But a limited war is not confined to 
limited objectives. The restraint that is applied in it is only on means 
and not on ends. Objectives become limited because the state involved 
in a war wants to keep it limited, and not the other way round. And 
the war is kept limited because the states realize that a 
total(nuclear)war is not just irrational but unthinkable. Limitation 
involves targets attacked, and this limit might be quantitative—in 
which each side may attack some but not all of a type of target,such as 
not trying to destroy all of the strategic forces while attacking some— 
,and it might be qualitative when the destruction of a particular type of 
targets is avoided.While strategic targets are avoided, the two sides 
might go for counter-population attacks. Population damage might not 
be possible to avoid unless a deliberate effort is made to do so.Both the 
two world wars were fought for limited objectives—which is amazing 
in view of the efforts and costs involved—but they were certainly not 
limited wars. The India-Pakistan war of 1971 had limited objectives but, 
in a conventional sense, was fought with all the resources and means 
available. The Middle East war of 1973 had limited objectives (~ 
mainly,a restoration of Egyptian/ Arab prestige) and it almost crossed 
the boundary of limited conventional war when Israel started thinking 
in terms of the use of nuclear power. But if two states decide to have a 
limited war only, then there is no option but to limit the objectives. In 
the face of nuclear capability of one or both the sides, the object can no 
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longer remain,in Clausewitzian sense, the imposition of one's will on 
the enemy. The process of imposition of will, involving another 
nuclear power as the adversary, may push it into a position of 
desperation thereby rejecting the limitations on war. There is always 
the possibility that the losing side may become constrained to reject 
limitations on war to avoid defeat. But to avoid pushing the losing side 
to this brink, the winning side has to show more restraint in imposing 
its will on the losing side. Because the objective in a nuclear war 
cannot be just the defeat or destruction of t he enemy, but the survival, 
as much as possible, of our own population, cities, politico-economic 
structure etc.It would definitely be very difficult because the armed 
forces everywhere work upon the notion that 'there is no substitute 
for victory'. 
All this involves a deliberate restraint. If one or both the sides do 
not possess a capability for a full war, this war is not limited. If the 
possibility is there for an unrestrained conflict but a deliberate restraint 
is applied, then a war becomes limited. Such a war is conceivable only 
involving nuclear powers, because only they possess the capability and 
resources of total destruction. It does not preclude the use of nuclear 
weapons, however. Strategic bombing may be carried out in a limited 
or selective way, involving nuclear weapons, on selected targets while 
being as careful as possible not to hit cities. This bombing may be 
carried out in a discriminatory way instead of an unrestrained and total 
bombing. Inherently it will be a very unstable situation, because even a 
limited nuclear bombing will be so much near the blow-out point that 
it will be very difficult to maintain any restraint. When the nuclear 
power is already in the stage of mobilization and is maintained 
constantly at a high level of effectiveness, it will require a very high 
degree of self-restraint for a state not to resort to an all-out use of this 
power in an unstable condition. 
Since Henry Kissinger wrote Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy, in the late 'Fifties, many strategies have shared his belief 
(though he himself had changed this opinion, later on) that even if a 
war is limited geographically, it can still be fought with nuclear 
weapons, not only because such a war will be cheaper but also to avoid 
the risk of a total defeat. No doubt, a nuclear posture against limited 
aggression can have great deterrent effect. But this posture will be 
affected by a necessary,tacit, understanding between the two sides about 
the rules governing the use of nuclear weapons and the necessity of 
observing the geographical limitations. Whereas the use of a nuclear 
weapon can be very easily distinguished from the conventional 
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weapons, it will be very difficult to impose any restraint on the size of 
the nuclear weapon so used. Of course,there is no use in distinguishing 
between a man killed by a conventional weapon and one by a nuclear 
weapon. There is no military reason as to why tactical nuclear weapons 
have to be small yield because if a small weapon is good,a large one is 
better. Whatever sound reasons there may be for using such tactical, 
'small', nuclear weapons in a limited war, they have to be politically 
sound—that is,if they will work for the realization of the political 
objectives of a war. The sound reason will involve the critical 
consideration that the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war may 
create that unstable situation in which the limited war may erupt into 
total war. Contrary to the popular belief that a nuclear war would have 
no restraint and that both the sides would fire off all of their nuclear 
weapons against all the targets of each other, actually some distinct 
limitations can be identified and analyzed. It is possible to have a 
quantitative and qualitative restraint about weapons to be used and 
targets to be attacked. This strategy of limited retaliation would involve 
single attacks on strategic targets rather than cities. Instead of attacking 
population concentrations and major weapon sites(— missile silos, 
force/armoured concentrations etc) targets such as staging bases, off-
shore oil plants, missile test ranges, or similar non-prime targets might 
be attacked to demonstrate determination, resolve and capability 
without involving a pre-emptive strike by the other side. Another 
strategy might be counter-city which would have qualitative restraint 
about attacks only on cities. This is more a pre-war threat position as it 
reduces the danger of a pre-emptive strike. The incentive to strike first 
would be reduced if the intention of both the sides to attack cities is 
known before hand. This is a type of limited deterrence. Another 
strategy would preclude attacks on cities and would involve attacks 
only on strategic targets. Qualitative restraint is there because attacks on 
cities are avoided; quantitative restraint is there because some weapons 
are held in reserve to threaten attacks on the cities if this strategy does 
not work. The nature and strength of the alliance forces in 
contemporary international relations make it possible for both the two 
superpowers to retain, even after a massive nuclear attack, sufficient 
striking power to destroy the large part of enemy population. This 
provides a strong incentive to each of the two sides to refrain from 
striking each other's cities. 
The strategy of controlled escalation formed the basis of the US 
policy of limited nuclear war in the mid-'Seventies. It required a 
deliberate and careful limitation of the use of nuclear weapons in a 
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conflict since an all-out nuclear holocaust is not necessarily inevitable 
just because nuclear weapons are introduced into a conflict. It is 
possible to restrict the use of nuclear weapons to specific military 
targetS/thereby limiting the scope of a nuclear war; and thus nuclear 
weapons would have a legitimate policy role. 
Behind the idea of a limited nuclear war was the assumption 
that neither super power would be in doubt about the survivability of 
its strategic forces (32). There would be no reason for them to escalate to 
strategic nuclear use because,in that case, there would be certain 
retaliation without any advantage. 
There are some problems with the limited nuclear war. The 
possibility of a stable MAD, at low force levels, is negated by the 
requirement of extra-nuclear forces that are needed for limited nuclear 
war. Thus the basic strategy of assured destruction is undermined. 
Also, once the limited nuclear war starts, it might not remain so 
limited and might escalate to a full-scale nuclear war. Further, the risk 
level for the opponent is lower in the limited nuclear war and, 
therefore, deterrence is weakened. With such a weakening of 
deterrence, and because of a misperception leading to a false sense of 
security that the conflict would remain limited, the limited nuclear 
war idea,in fact, increases the risks of nuclear war. No doubt, the risk of 
escalation is there but so is the uncertainty about it, and that might 
offer a temptation to attempt it, destroying thereby the credibility of 
deterrence. 
Scholars like Bracken, Russett, Sagan, Nye etc (33) have doubted 
the feasibility of conducting limited nuclear war. Limited nature of 
nuclear war would be impossible to maintain in case of any breakdown 
of political control over nuclear forces. Further, maintenance of 
command-control- communications and intelligence would be difficult 
under the effects of nuclear weapons. The limited' nature of nuclear 
war will be affected in case the enemy makes decapitating or counter-
combatants attacks against the command-control centers and then it 
would be difficult to maintain rational behaviour on which the limited 
nature of such a war rests. Limited war strategists were more interested 
in controlled responses whose object would be to diminish the 
adversary's resolve rather than his strategic capabilities. 
Arms control attempts of President Carter of the USA were 
widely jeopardized by various developments in the Middle East, Iran, 
Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, central America and the releasing of a 
controversial CIA report on Soviet civil defense estimating American 
dead in a nuclear exchange at 160 million and the Soviet casualties at 
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10 million (34).This was also a period of a lack of self-confidence,for the 
USA, following Vietnam and Watergate. The arms industry pressure 
groups and the rightist think-tanks built up fears of a Soviet first strike. 
It was believed that the Soviet Union would eliminate the Minuteman 
ICBM force in a first strike, while their own two-thirds missiles would 
remain safe in silos and submarines. With this wiping out of the 
counterforce option, the only US response might be a countercity 
strike, using her surviving systems, but this would invite, in return, a 
greater countercity strike and,so, surrender would be the only option. 
The MX mobile ICBM seemed the best possible remedy to enhance 
counterforce capability. Concepts of endurance and recovery were 
introduced in the strategic debate. In the words of Walter Slocombe: 
The policy had been dubbed the countervailing strategy in 
Secretary Brown's initial public discussion because its 
fundamental feature is the proposition that deterrence over the 
full range of contingencies of concern requires in an age of 
strategic parity that the United States have forces, and plans for 
their use, such that the Soviet Union, applying its own standards 
and models, would recognize that no plausible outcome of 
aggression would represent victory or any plausible definition of 
victory. In short, the policy dictated that the United States must 
have countervailing strategic options such that at a variety of 
level of exchange, aggression would either be defeated or would 
result in unacceptable costs that exceed gains (35). 
President Reagan introduced into the US nuclear strategy the 
concepts of nuclear superiority, prevailing,war-winning, prolonged 
nuclear war and controlled escalation (36).The strategy of 'escalation 
control' was intended to limit the use of nuclear weapons once they 
have been introduced into a conflict. This mechanism would enable a 
limited nuclear war to be fought as it would prevent an all-out nuclear 
holocaust. Escalation dominance and escalation matching were 
suggested as forms of escalation control. The former is a strategy of 
maintaining an ability to remain superior to an enemy at every 
possible stage of a conflict because the weaker nation would soon 
realize that launching an attack would invite undesirable consequences 
and would rather seek conciliation than conflict; and the latter is the 
strategy of maintaining an ability to effectively counter an enemy at 
every possible stage of a conflict, relying on a willingness to match 
another nation blow for blow in a crisis, limiting and controlling the 
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escalation of the crisis/ conflict by convincing the adversary of one's 
resolve and coercing the adversary into backing down. On the basis of 
the logic of effectiveness, denial is a better security approach than 
retaliation. Denial not only deters attack but also blocks it in case 
deterrence fails. It was this realization that had prompted the Strategic 
Defense Initiative of President Reagan 
The policy objectives of Reagan administration were to escalate 
the arms race thereby denying to the Soviet Union any parity, to 
consolidate the US nuclear commitment to Europe, and to build the 
US non-nuclear forces to a level to ensure successful US intervention 
in the Third World.The Hoffman and Fletcher Studies had 
recommended building a system against attacking ballistic missiles and 
had believed that an effective BMD system would reduce the 
likelihood of a nuclear war. The Single Integrated Operational Plan 
(SIOP-6) was now based on a doctrine that involved operations under 
conditions of prolonged war. The General who was in charge of 
developing SIOP-6 had commented : " The US strategy is one of 
counterforce. That is, it is not a mutually-assured-destruction strategy 
or a city strategy. It goes after the Soviet military-leadership and, of 
course, the land-based ICBM capabilities" (37) The basic objective was to 
prevent a first strike against the US and this meant that the US would 
rather use the nuclear weapons first than losing them. A threat of 
disarming nuclear first attack was perceived as necessary for coercing 
the Soviet Union in international relations. This strategic defense 
programme, at the cost of $ 1,80,300 million spread over six years was 
designed to achieve, by the turn of the 'Nineties, upgrading of strategic 
defense and strategic 'C3' systems, development of long-range weapon 
system(B-l bomber) and of stealth advanced technology radar-
penetrating bomber, development of 100 MX missiles, further 
development of Trident SSBNs,operationalization of Cruise missiles, 
and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI, or the Star 
Wars)— a defense system based in space that would prevent missiles 
from reaching the U.S. Most of the missiles would have been 
destroyed, along with their warheads, shortly after launch as they 
carried their pay-loads into space and were detected by the satellites; 
and those that survived the boost phase would have been targeted by 
the post-boost Vehicle, the device on the top of the missile and 
dispensing warhead.The US believed, correctly, that it would not be 
possible for the Soviet Union to compete in this high technological 
race in space.If the Soviet Union wanted to penetrate the SDI layers 
with a 90% effectiveness of warheads, it would have to spend ten times 
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than the current $ 8,5004,300 million on the n\issile force and it would 
take them more than 15 years to have a fast-burn missile required to 
penetrate the SDI layers (38). It was assumed that,instead of a mutually 
assured destruction, this would ensure a mutually assured survival 
(MAS). But, by the middle of the 'Eighties, it was conceded that, since 
the Soviet Union had too many warheads, the SDI will not be able to 
guarantee safety of the US cities against a Soviet attack. 
The current conceptual approach to nuclear war plans to utilize 
nuclear weapons against specific targets in a complex of nuclear war-
fighting situations intended to be limited, as well as the management 
over an extended period of a general nuclear war between the 
superpowers.The Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance outlines the 
option of conducting a protracted nuclear war for which the US should 
have the capability to inflict very high levels of damage on the Soviet 
Union and in which the US must prevail or out of which it must 
emerge with terms most favourable.The US Secretary of Defense, 
Casper Weinberger,defending this strategy,commented: "You show me 
a Secretary of Defense who's planning not to prevail and I'll show you 
a Secretary of Defense who ought to be impeached" (39). 
In early 1990, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a new military 
assessment that indicates that NATO has the ability to mount an 
effective defense of western Europe without resorting to nuclear 
weapons (40). Improvements in warning time of a possible attack and 
the unilateral withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Europe would 
enable NATO to achieve a strong conventional defense of western 
Europe, without loss of territory. The Eastern European nations used to 
contribute 40% of Warsaw Pact ground forces, which might not be the 
same in future considering the fast changing east European political 
scene. To ensure an agreement on reducing conventional forces in 
Europe, the US is currently not insisting for on-site inspections of 
weapons plants and ports and airfields. Though the Soviet Union is 
willing to accept these measures the West European allies of the US are 
vehemently opposed to it. 
The West European countries were,from the beginning,trapped 
in a dilemma in that they wished to be defended by a deterrent threat 
possessed by the US; but they also feared that such a defense would 
mean a transfer of decision making power to the US.The US policy, 
during the last two and a half decades, has been intended to reduce the 
NATO's dependency upon tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and 
they have advocated a stalwart conventional defense for NATO. 
Inherent in it was the idea that both the superpowers accept the 
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outcome of any non-nuclear conflict in Europe, without escalating to 
nuclear confrontation. The Europeans viewed this as a US attempt to 
reduce their risks in American security connection to the NATO (41).It 
was widely believed that any resort to tactical nuclear weapons would 
diminish the chances for controlling the escalation. On the other hand, 
a protracted delay or 'pause' before nuclear weapons were used could be 
made to ensure that war would not escalate to super power's 
homelands. The NATO allies,naturally, were not enthusiastic about 
these prospects. They believed that the presence of European nuclear 
forces ensured that the Soviets could not be confident that nuclear 
weapons would not be used. They were not convinced that the heavy 
conventional emphasis was necessary. They believed that so long as 
NATO retained a substantial nuclear posture, deterrence was assured. 
NATO had not been much interested in deterrence by denial, 
which would have required matching the Soviet conventional 
strength. The Europeans believed their security depended on nuclear 
deterrence. The problem for the US was not just her own security, 
which was relatively easy, but that of European allies also. The 
dilemma was that if this extended security was maintained, the 
symmetry of MAD was undermined. The US had committed her 
security to the extended deterrence, to cover West Europe, at a time 
when, because of the US nuclear superiority, the task was relatively 
easy. Under the conditions of nuclear bipolarity, it was not that easy. 
Up to the last decade, solving this dilemma has been the theme of the 
strategic debate in the western world. MAD had effectively ensured that 
the superpowers would not resort to force against each other's 
homeland, but the uncertainty was with regard to the similar 
reluctance to use force against each other's allies. Because it was not 
possible to safeguard the alliance-commitments by conventional 
military means, strategies had to be developed to safeguard these 
commitments with nuclear forces. This led to the development of 
doctrines of limited war and deployment of additional forces and then 
to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Though the possibility was always 
there that the security considerations of the allies would be covered by 
the risks of escalation acting as deterrent, the denial factors of 
deterrence policy led to an escalation of arms race, more deployments 
and more initiatives. 
The European strategists, as contrasted with the Americans, were 
more interested in the strategy of graduated deterrence, from the very 
beginning (42). This was the policy of graduated action, applying the 
minimum force required to repel any particular attack and to deter any 
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extension of it. In the beginning, the action was to be directed mainly 
against the fighting forces and nuclear weapons use was to be restricted 
to the immediate battle zone. Enemy's airfields and command-control 
centers were to be targeted in the second stage; and, if the war was to 
finally escalate, then the third stage nuclear strategic weapons were to 
be used. This led to the idea of the proportionality of the value of a 
possible conflict to the extent of the risk to be incurred. What is needed 
to deter a political aggressor is the ability to bear on him a threat 
proportionate to the importance he ascribes to the desired conquest. It 
was believed that a medium-sized nuclear country might deter a 
stronger aggressor because the latter's losses even from a small 
retaliatory nuclear attack would be much bigger than the expected 
gains. Proportional deterrence idea was combined with the one of the 
third partner; and this assured that the possession of nuclear weapons 
by a third partner(i.e., an ally of a super power,such as France) would 
prevent any war in a region, like Europe, than the mutual deterrence 
between the two superpowers. The superpowers might be mutually 
deterred, but if the ally was to threaten the use of nuclear weapons the 
superpowers would have to go to war. This possibility of triggering a 
nuclear war by the third partner is a powerful deterrence mechanism. 
The hazards of such a situation were seen to generate strategic 
dissuasion to the advantage of the third country. But the model 
envisaged was based on irrational action undertaken by the third 
partner and on the semi-automatic escalation of the level of weapons 
used. The West German strategists had adopted a slightly different 
approach and insisted on war deterrence by the threat of using nuclear 
weapons from the very beginning (43). Deterrence could be achieved by 
a war scenario in which the use of nuclear weapons was automatic 
from the very beginning, or by not announcing any definite scenario. 
The West German strategic scholar, Adelbert Weinstein, insisted that 
the concept of graduated deterrence should not make a distinction 
between conventional and the nuclear defense systems : " Even if 
NATO should not have a sufficient number of units but all of them 
including the Bundeswehr were equipped with atomic weapons, the 
enemy would not be able to foresee the magnitude of the reaction of 
the NATO forces. He should know, however, that the answer would 
be atomic. Thus it would be a mistake to remove atomic weapons 
from the forward defense lines in a mid-European front, on the 
grounds that the use of them would mean an escalation.... It would not 
be possible for the enemy to calculate the risk"( 44). The West European 
strategists, generally, believed that the enemy should not be given the 
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option to chose a war-scenario most convenient to him. Instead, the 
strategy should be based on the principle of 'incalculable risk', in which 
it might not be possible for the enemy to know in advance his risk in 
undertaking an aggression, the calculus of gains and losses or the form 
of the war. Deterrence would be successful if the enemy would not 
know when,where,how,how much and under what conditions to 
expect the use of nuclear weapons by the other side. 
The Soviet Nuclear Strategy : 
The Soviet strategy is based on the belief that the principal 
military capability of a great power is and must be far more than merely 
a reflection of perceived external threats. Instead of remaining confined 
to the ideas of mutual deterrence or mutual destruction, the Soviet 
strategy is geared to the development of a posture that would ensure 
the best possible outcome in case of a war. Soviet strategy accepts 
uncertainty and unpredictability in the nature of war. In a nuclear 
conflict, strategic objectives are not the guaranteed conditions of 
security but are objectives to be achieved. War,in Clausewitzian terms, 
is regarded as a continuation of policies by other means and, 
consequently, is considered both as feasible and winnable, provided the 
Soviet Union maintains the initiative to pursue the offensive and to 
utilize the element of surprise. This would involve an initial blow 
against the adversary and it may prove ultimately decisive but may 
not ensure that the conflict would be short. It is recognized that an all-
out nuclear war would prove extremely destructive to both parties, 
nevertheless the state better prepared for it and in possession of a 
superior strategy would win. 
Soviet nuclear strategy always remained part of their overall 
policy. A military policy is meant to deprive the enemy, and destroy his 
capability and will to resist.The Soviet nuclear doctrine is based on the 
related elements of preemption, quantitative superiority in arms, 
counterforce targeting, combined-arms operations, and defense. The 
difference between the strategic doctrines of the two superpowers is 
that whereas the USA views nuclear weapons as a deterrent, the Soviet 
Union sees them as compellent. The initial nuclear inferiority of the 
Soviet Union had forced it to rely, in the beginning, on city-targeting. 
When the US was shifting the policy to mutual assured destruction, 
the Soviet Union was also achieving the capability of fulfilling the 
objectives of miUtary policy,mentioned above. They believed that a 
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European war would be nuclear, and they concentrated on Europe 
more so because the forward strategic bases of the US were actually 
there. After the shaking up of Soviet prestige and confidence during 
the 1962 Cuba crisis, their strategic rocket forces eliminated the US 
advantages in ICBMs and medium range strategic missiles in Europe. 
This continued till the advent of MIRV. 
In accordance with the logic of an interaction between strategy 
and technology, the Soviet Union also revised its strategic thinking 
and geared it towards the development of precision missiles carrying 
lower-yield warheads. This was inevitable considering their peculiar 
geostrategic needs. But a comprehension of precisely this is generally 
lacking which prevents a clearer appreciation of the Soviet strategy. An 
awareness of their historical experience is needed to comprehend the 
Soviet policies for which the context and style of Western strategic 
analysis is insufficient. The Soviet strategy for achieving superiority in 
weapons and victory in war based on offensive weapons is the 
continuation of a historical process, extending over centuries, by which 
invaders on Russia were repelled. If, and when, the Soviet strategic 
planners decide upon a major offensive against the NATO, they would 
have to take account of the strong probability that NATO would 
introduce tactical nuclear weapons. Their strategic doctrines are based 
on the assumptions that any future war involving the Soviet Union 
would be a nuclear version of the second World War. And, knowing 
what they had suffered during the Second World War, one can assume 
that they would never look forward with enthusiasm to the Second 
World War again, and that too with nuclear weapons. 
In the early 'Sixties, the Soviet leaders had calculatingly bragged 
about some weapon systems that, in fact, they neither had at the time 
nor planned to build immediately. They were about supposed Soviet 
capability for defence against a missile attack and included 
Khrushchev's famous statement of July 1962 that the Soviet Union had 
an anti-missile missile that can 'hit a fly in outer space'. This was a 
pure boast as actually they were far behind the USA in missile force 
deployment. This was an attempt to generate some uncertainty about 
the real Soviet capability and about the ability of the US to take on the 
Soviet nuclear forces. But, by the mid-Sixties, they had realized that the 
realities of the balance of terror favoured the 4:1 in favour of the USA. 
They were against the thermonuclear war as self-destructive. The party 
theoretician, Mikhail Suslov, had admitted that " if a thermonuclear 
conflict arose, it would be a most terrible tragedy for mankind and 
would, of course, be a heavy loss to the cause of communism". (45). 
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This realistic trend continued later on also.A Soviet author was of the 
view that the development of an ABM system capable of making 
victory possible would be a discovery bordering on a miracle and that 
there is no available defense against a missile salvo (46).This 
realization of the 'Sixties, that it was not possible for the Soviet Union 
to win a nuclear war, was still uppermost in the minds of the Soviet 
strategists two decades later. Brezhnev had pledged in 1982 that the 
Soviet Union would not use nuclear weapons first. This was 
reaffirmed,in 1984, by the Soviet Chief of Staff : "He who fires his 
missiles first will perish second, but perish just the same.... One can 
turn the adversary into ashes, but cannot thereby emerge victorious... 
Nuclear might is a means not only of annihilation but also of self-
annihilation" (47). This was not just the perception of the Soviets only. 
Writing about the nature of the Soviet leadership, George Kennan had 
commented : " As this leadership looks abroad, it sees more dangers 
than inviting opportunities. Its reactions and purposes are therefore 
much more defensive than aggressive. It has no desire for any major 
war, least of all for a nuclear war. It fears and respects American 
military power even as it tries to match it, and hopes to avoid a conflict 
with it. Plotting an attack on western Europe would be, in the 
circumstances, the last thing that would come into its head"(48). It was 
acting under such perceptions that the Soviets had reduced their 
defense spending and stabilized their nuclear weapon programme, and 
this was confirmed by a 1984 US report itself; " New information 
indicates that the Soviets did not field weapons as rapidly after 1976 as 
before.Practically all major categories of Soviet weapons were 
affected—missiles, aircraft, and ships. ... the rate of growth of over-all 
defense costs is lower because procurement of military hardware—the 
largest category of defense spending—was almost flat in 1971-1981.... 
and that trend appears to have continued also in 1982 and 1983" (49). 
There were persistent doubts in the Soviet strategic thinking 
about the rationality of the US strategy. These doubts and 
apprehensions led the strategists to respond by bolstering up the Soviet 
strategic forces to a degree where its destruction by a US first strike 
would be impossible. A theater nuclear doctrine was developed that is 
to be implemented by vehicle-mounted, short range ballistic missiles 
and by the strike aircraft of Frontal Aviation. Whereas in the mid-
'Sixties, their ICBMs were one-fourth of the US, by the end of the 
decade they had achieved a parity. But at the same point of time the US 
was at least two years ahead of the Soviet Union in MIRV. Then , " just 
as the leaders of the US had cited in 1970 Soviet achievement of ICBM 
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'parity' as proof of their wisdom in the 1960s, the Soviet MIRV 
program of the 1970s was cited as further evidence of their inherent 
wisdom" (50). 
The western deterrent concept is viewed by the Soviet Union as 
ustrashnie (threatening intimidation), while the Soviet concept is 
illustrated by sderzhivanie (constraining and restraining).This is 
understandable in view of the fact that the Soviet Union does not 
accept the metaphysics of deterrence. They believed that the fact of the 
US capabilities being developed beyond what was required for 
'deterrence through punishment' makes it impossible to accept the 
mutuality of assured destruction because the reality points to further 
expansion of US counterforce capability. Mutual deterrence was 
possible in the absence of the US attempts at coercion.This created the 
situation in which the US doctrines professed war avoidance and the 
unthinkability of a nuclear war,whereas the Soviet doctrines adopted 
war-prevention coupled with the acceptance of the possibility of a 
nuclear war. Deterrence is effective in the face of anticipated war-
fighting competence, and war, at any level, can and should be won. The 
entire strategy is based on a balanced and combined arms approach, 
and,therefore, the Strategic Rocket Force is linked with the military 
capabilities of the other armed forces.Therefore, Soviet capabilities of 
strategic forces should be determined keeping in view the relative 
competence of the ground and air forces. The entire strategy is based on 
the comprehensive development of a triad of capabilities composed of 
strategic offense, active strategic defense, and passive strategic defense. 
This triad is to conduct four basic strategic operations in a nuclear war: 
intercontinental, continental, oceanic, and defensive. Whereas the 
offensive one are to destroy the enemy's nuclear forces, military-
industrial complexes, troop groupings and political-mihtary command 
/ control systems, the defensive elements are to protect these same on 
the Soviet side. The level of development of these two types is not 
symmetrical, at a given time and one often attains superiority over the 
other. In view of this, it is not possible to have the theoretical 
development of an absolute weapon for either the offense or the 
defense; and neither offense nor defense is to be totally effective in 
implementation. 
What the Soviet Union is experiencing now at the beginning of 
the 'Nineties, and how that is going to affect her strategic 
considerations, was definitely not foreseen in the mid-'Sixties. But it is 
interesting to note that, in 1966, Alastair Buchan's War in Modern 
Society had analyzed the same factors of Soviet strategy that are still 
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relevant in the present conditions and for the same reasons: "Two 
factors make the Soviet concept of deterrence a different and cruder 
one from that of the United States. On the one hand she is restrained 
by economic necessity from developing as large a force of bombers and 
missiles; on the other, the direct threat she wields exists primarily to 
deter attacks on the Soviet Union since she has nothing like the 
ramifications of alliances which the United States possesses" (51). 
References, Chapter IV 
1-Jonathan Schell, The Abolition, (Knopf,New York: 1984), p 36 
2-Herman Kahn,"The Concept of Escalation", in John Garnett, 
Theories of Peace and Security ,(Macmillan:1970),p 250 
3-Morton H.Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, (Wiley,New 
York: 1963), p 3 
4-Glenn Snyder, "Deterrence: A Theoretical Introduction", in John 
Garnett, op.cit., p 108 
5- The New York Times, 5 November 1981 
6-C.Enthoven, "US Forces in Europe.How Many? Doing What?", 
Foreign Affairs, April 1975, pp 512-532 
7-General George Brown, CJCS, quoted in The Defense Monitor, vol6 
No 6 
August 1977, p 2 
8-Bernard Brodie, War And Politics ,(Macmillan: 1973),p430-l 
9-Colin S.Gray, " The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing", 
World Politics, January 1974, p 210 
10-Glenn Snyder, "Deterrence and Power", Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 
vol.4 no.2, pp 163-178 
11-Eugene Rosi(ed.) American Defense and Strategy (New York: 1973) 
p96 
12-Y.Harkavi, Nuclear Age and Nuclear Peace (Jerusalem: 1966),p 9 
13-Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable,(New York: 
1962)pll2 
14-Andre Beufre, Deterrence and Strategy,(Fraeger,New York: 1966)p24-
5 
Chapter IV, p-144 
15-Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment ,(London: 
1982) p 84; and Jan M.Lodal/'Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy", 
Daedalus, CIX, p 155 
16-E.H.Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (2nd ed..l946),p 79 
17-Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory Of 
National Security ,(Princeton: 1961),pp 3-4 
18-James R.Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report,FY 1976 
and FY 1977/GPO,Washington DC) February 5,1975, pp 1-13-14 
19- Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons 
(New Haven: 1983) 
20-Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito, Nuclear Proliferation and 
the Problem of War, (UCLA: 1979), p 11 
21-Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The More the 
Better (Adelphi Paper 171),1981 
22-Stephen F.Cohen,"Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction in 
South Asia", paper presented to the Midwest Conference on Asian 
Affairs, Michigan State University,East Lansing, October 18,1989 
23-K.Subrahmanyam,, Nuclear Challenge,(Lancer: New Delhi),p 286 
24-Bernard Brodie,"The Development of Nuclear Strategy"' 
International Security,!! 65-83; Robert Jervis "Deterrence Theory 
Revisited"' World Politics XXXI, p 289-324; Lawrence Martin," The 
Determinants of Change: Deterrence and Technology" in The Future 
of Deterrence,Part-II, Adelphi Papers 161, 1980 
25-Charles Glaser, "Why Even Good Defense May Be Bad", 
International Security, IX-1984,p 92-123 
26-Henry A.Kissinger,"Force and Diplomacy in Nuclear Age", Foreign 
Affairs,Apn\ 1956,p 349 
27-Christy Campbell, Weapons of WariNew York: 1982),p 167 
28-The New York Times, 17 June 1962 
29-Robert S.McNamara, quoted in Colin S.Gray, Strategic Studies and 
Public Policy: An American ExperienceilJmy.oi Kentucky: 1982),p 102 
30-Robert S.McNamara, The Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 
the 1969 Defense Bu%f,(GPO,Washington DC: January 22,1968),p 50 
31-Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military 
Technology and International Relations (Macmillan: 1987) p 150 
32-Henry A.Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the 
Atlantic Alliance (McGraw Hill: 1965), p 179-80 
33-Paul Bracken, Opp.Cit.; Bruce Russet, The Prisoners of Insecurity 
(Freeman: 1983); Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe" 
in Foreign Affairs, LXII, 1983-4,p 257-92; Joseph S.Nye "Nuclear Winter 
and Policy Choices", Survival XXVIII, 1986,p 119-27 
Chapter IV, p-145 
34-quoted by Christy Campbell, Opp.Cit., p 177 
35- Walter Slocombe/'The Countervailing Strategy", International 
Security,5 (Spring 1981),p 21 
36-Daniel Ford "US Command and Control", The New Yorker, April 
8,1985; Michael Klare "The Reagan Doctrine"' Inquiry ,(April-May 1984) 
p 2 ; Peter Pringle & William Arkin, SIOP: The Secret US Plan for 
Nuclear War (Norton, New York: 1983) p 243 
37-General Lennie Davis, quoted by Daniel Ford, Opp.Cit..,p 50 
38-Andre Allison,"Who is Racing Whom?",Armed Forces, Feb.l985,p 
38 
39- quoted by Theodore Draper "Nuclear Temptations", in Charles 
W.Kegley & Eugene R.Wittkopf (ed) The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, 
Weapons, War (St.Martin's, New York),p34 
40-Representative Les Aspin,Chairman of House Armed Services 
committee, in The New York Times, March 14, 1990 
41-Ken Booth , "Security Makes Strange Bedfellows", RUSI 
Journal,Decl975,p5 
42-Anthony Buzzard, "Massive Retaliation and Graduated 
Deterrence"' World Politics, January 1956; Pierre M.Gallois "New Teeth 
For NATO", Foreign Affairs, October 1960 
43-Foreign Affairs, January 1965 
44-quoted by Julian Lider, Essays on West German Military Thought, 
Research Report 9, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 
Stockholm: 1984, p 121 
45-Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy,(Prsieger: New York: 
1966)pl93-4 
46-G.Gerasimov, quoted in William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives 
on International Relations 1956-1967 (Princeton: 1969) p 229-230 
47-Marshal Arkomeyev, quoted in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
February 1985, p 5 
48-George Kennan, quoted in Kegley & Wittkopf,0/?p.C//., p 96 
49-Raymond Garthoff, "The Spending Gap", Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists May 1984, p 5 
50-Edgar Bottome, The Balance of Terror (Beacon: Boston: 1986), p 146 
51- Alastair Buchan, War in Modern Society (Watts,London: 1966),p89 
V 
Arms Race and Arms Control 
And Damn'd he him that first cries "Hold,enough!" 
Shakespeare, Macbeth,v.7 
As long as war is a probability in international relations, the 
question is not whether states need military power. The relevant issue 
is how much and what kinds of military power are appropriate in 
order to achieve a state's goals and aims. The application of balance of 
power rules in international relations have not excluded war but have, 
in fact, made it the ultimate method for preserving the balance as a 
system. Vital national interests can be defended only by an ability, 
capability and willingness to employ force. A state's preparedness and 
willingness to go to war is the criteria by which its ability and 
willingness to defend its national interests is measured. If a state feels 
that a threat to some vital national interest is serious enough, it has to 
commit, or threaten to commit, significant military resources to 
resolve the dispute; and herein lies the importance of arms and 
military resources for the state. 
Arms make all the difference in the capability of states in 
achieving their goals—the difference between taking what you want 
and making someone give it to you. The political value of arms is 
more elusive than their military worth, because it is constituted in the 
perceptions of individuals and states. Also, states may go on 
accumulating military power in the form of more and more weapons if 
they are not overly imaginative about what else to do in the field of 
international relations. If ideologically and economically, a state has 
not much to offer to international relations, then to influence 
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international relations it has to accumulate military power through 
weapons. As pointed out by David Singer: "Nations arm—and over-
arm—for many reasons, of which self defense is merely the most 
obvious and legitimate. They also arm for aggrandizement, to exercise 
clout in world arena, to maintain or expand a sphere of influence, to 
inhibit other nations' efforts to encroach on their turf, to support their 
colonists, to help defend friendly regimes and so forth. Then there are 
the essentially domestic incentives to absorb the unemployed or other 
potential trouble makers, to stimulate the economy, to aid certain 
industries, to develop a lucrative export activity, to maintain political 
order, and to perpetuate a given regime. Most important, of course, is 
the fact that each incremental addition to a nation's military 
establishment or arsenals will increase the political and economic 
power of those who favour such arming" (1). 
The Meaning and Nature of Arms Race : 
An arms race would involve two or more states in competition 
to accumulate military power against each other. This has to be 
differentiated from the 'normal' process of military relations between 
states who are not at war with each other. The normal operations of 
the arms dynamic would be the maintenance of the military status quo; 
and arms race would be the extreme manifestation of this arms 
dynamic. Both are just the opposite of each other, but both can lead to 
each other. It may also happen that a state may resort to arms build up 
without attracting a response and there may be no arms race, 
consequently.The forces of mass production have led to the 
institutionalized innovation in the international system making the 
arms race a distinctive phenomenon in international relations. A war 
may be preceded by an arms race; but it does not mean that it was 
caused by the arms race. It is the perceived possibility of war that 
actually generates an arms race . An arms race actually enables the 
states to display their military and technological prowess without 
actually going to war. 
Huntington defines arms race as "A progressive, competitive 
peacetime increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states 
resulting from conflicting purpose or mutual fears"(2). And, according 
to Colin Gray, an arms race is there when there are " two or more 
parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who 
are increasing or improving their armaments with a rapid rate and 
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Structuring their respective military postures with a general attention 
to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of 
the other parties'^ 3). He has listed certain basic conditions for an arms 
race: 
i-There must be two or more parties, each conscious of their 
mutual antagonism 
ii-They must structure their armed forces with attention to the 
probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or a deterrent 
to, the other arms race participants 
iii- They must compete in terms of quantity (men,weapons) 
and /o r quality (men, weapons, organization, doctrine, 
deployment) 
iv-There must be rapid increases in quantity and /or 
improvements in quality. 
Many believe (4) that arms race is causally related to war. Some 
believe(5) that it is the institutionalized arms race that maintains 
deterrence. Marek Thee (6) uses the term 'arms dynamic' to refer to 
pressures that make states acquire armed power and change the 
quantity and quality of the armed power they already possess. 
According to Galtung (7), arms race is the referent for arms control and 
non-provocative forms of defense. And Barry Buzan (8) believes that 
arms racing identifies an important element in relations between states 
that is distinct from other political and economic sources of conflict 
and cooperation. 
It is the anarchical nature of the international system that 
produces military competition. Such a competition is particularly 
intense if attempts are made by a state, or alliance, to enhance its 
influence and to attempt to control the international system at the 
expense of others. This becomes a power struggle between status quo 
states and those who want to revise and modify it. The latter make 
efforts to generate enough political pressure in their favour through 
their enhanced military power so as to change the status quo in their 
favour; and such attempts are countered by others through their 
military power. For the goal achievement of both of them, 
enhancement of military power is necessary. In such cases, political 
rivalry initiates a power struggle that leads to arms race, and further 
political rivalry. No state can afford to take chances with national 
security and, therefore, prepares for a worst-case scenario to counter the 
steps taken by the other state with the same view. Both the two sides 
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tend to perceive each little adjustment as a threat to their national 
security and make even greater efforts to increase their military power; 
and this produces competitive accumulations of military power. Barry 
Buzan (9) talks about this security dilemma of states in which they 
cannot take steps to strengthen their own security without making 
others less secure; and because the others, feeling now less secure, 
would take similar steps to strengthen their security, the former would 
feel less secure and would take further steps to further strengthen their 
security. This action -reaction process can go on and on unless and 
until one side gives up (which hardly ever happens), or a new balance 
of power is reached which may be acceptable to both, or (more 
frequently) the issue is resolved by war. The security dilemma is 
characterized by an unbalanced perception wherein states are actually 
aware of the threats that others pose to them and are unaware of the 
threats that they pose to others. In this way, they always over react and 
escalate the cycle of provocation. Deployments of long-range theater 
nuclear weapons (LRTNW) by the NATO in Europe, and the Soviet 
deployments of submarine-launched missiles near North America are 
examples of forward deployments that explain the action-reaction 
dynamic of arms race. Also, even political actions sometimes may 
result in military reactions of the other side; and no consistency in 
reaction can be predicted. But the danger of war is most acute when the 
race is close to resulting in a shift in the balance of power. An 
exaggerated over-reaction is a signal that war is more likely to occur. 
The fundamental proposition about arms race is that states 
consolidate their military position because of the perceived threats 
from other states. Such an action by a state raises the perceived degree 
of threat for the other state and causes the reaction in which the other 
consolidates its own military position. Within the framework of 
domestic resource constraints and some internat ional 
counterpressures, states in their efforts to achieve political objectives 
against the interests of other state, feel compelled to increase their 
military power. And increases in the military capability in one state 
create pressures for responsive increases in the other state(s). There is 
an abnormal and simultaneous rate of growth in the military outlays 
of states involved in an arms race and this growth results from the 
competitive pressure of the adversary. Such an arms race is feasible 
only between those states whose policies are inter-dependent, and 
whose intentions, programmes and capabilities are of utmost concern 
to each other. There is no arms race between states who are not 
interested in each other or whose strength and capabilities are not 
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comparable. Whatever the differences between them and whatever the 
rapid growth of their armed capabilities, there can be no arms 'race' 
between the USA and Cuba, or the Soviet Union and South Korea, 
and, since their policies are not inter-dependent ,between India and 
Brazil. 
Because of modern technological developments, states have to 
long anticipate the intended behaviour of adversaries and even 
potential adversaries. There is a long time required for a weapon 
system to travel between the stages of conception and deployment and, 
therefore, future deployments have to take into account what the real 
strategic situation might be when the new weapons become 
operational. This results into a spiral arms race, which is a process of 
simultaneous and anticipatory interaction and which may be called 
self-reinforcing pattern of mutual military stimulation. 
The fast pace of technological innovation, and the requirement 
of keeping up with the pace of change, has not made it easy to make a 
distinction between arms race and maintenance of the military status 
quo. This is particularly true with regard to the offensive and defensive 
nature of the prevailing weapons-systems. Which nature (of weapons) 
is prevalent in any particular age determines the inter-state relations 
and international stability. Advancement of military technology results 
in a decline in international security. The anarchic pattern of 
proliferation of advanced weapons may upset the balance of military 
relationships on which regional political systems rest. If the regional 
stability is fragile, then changes in perceived military capabilities by 
large-scale arms transfers may lead a state, not satisfied with attempted 
changes, to act militarily without these changes becoming stable. If a 
state feels that its own military position is deteriorating because of the 
adversary's accumulation of weapons, it may resort to preventive war 
before its military position is completely eroded. Arms race increases 
the uncertainty in a state about the first strike/ pre- emptive strike 
intentions and capabilities of the other state and about the security of 
its own second-strike capability. This uncertainty acts against the 
restraining conditions of MAD. A problem of categorization of 
weapons concerns the offensive versus defensive capabilities of 
weapons. No doubt a state might feel less threatened by the acquisition 
of defensive weapons by the other. But the difficulty is that very few 
weapons can exclusively be placed in one or the other categories, and 
mostly weapons have potentialities for both the applications. Not only 
this, but even the transferred advanced technology also can be used for 
civilian as well as military purposes. Misapprehension about the 
Chapter V, p-151 
Strategic doctrine of the other side results in limiting the possible 
grounds for arms control. This was the position between the 
superpowers before the start of the easing of tensions from the mid-
Eighties 
Though much has been said about the arms race, the central 
question is still whether the existence of an arms race between two 
states significantly increases the probability of their going to war. There 
are some who believe that military expansion enhances the danger of 
war and, since it provokes a countervailing expansion by the other 
side, it is self-defeating. But, on the other hand, is the argument that it 
is a strong military posture that can deter the adversary's miHtary 
action and, if unchecked, the adversary's adventurism would lead to an 
armed conflict. Instead of arms race, it is a state's failure to maintain 
capabilities towards its potential rivals that leads to war. 
A balance of military power between two states can exist if they 
were symmetrical. Of course, there is no precise measurement of the 
balance of strength and one has to rely on judgement, which may be 
influenced by biased perceptions. Whatever these perceptions, a 
pursuit of balance among two states is bound to initiate and perpetuate 
an arms race. If it is believed that balance brings security then a state is 
bound to escalate its armed preparedness because it cannot be proved 
that there is balance. Because of security considerations, when one 
attempts to get ahead, the other is forced into the arms race to maintain 
balance. Efforts of states towards maintaining and increasing their 
security result in enhancing the threats, or perceptions of threats, for 
others. A competition, revolving around military technology, results 
which is self-stimulating. This military technology has its own logic of 
spreading in geographical and qualitative sense; and its impact on 
international relations is known as arms race. 
An arms race does seem to enhance the likelihood of war 
between the states involved. This temptation is especially there when 
one state possesses a newly-developed/deployed weapon which the 
adversary does not yet have but might acquire in the future. Then the 
temptation is to start a war when the prospect for victory is greater 
instead of waiting till the adversary might acquire equality, or even 
superiority. The unending arms race may produce a technological 
breakthrough which will bring war closer. Having its own dynamics, 
an arms race leads to the militarization of social life of a state and 
affects the development of conflicts. Even then, it is difficult to find a 
causal hnk between arms races and conflict escalation. No doubt, a 
rapid military growth, on the competitive basis, may convert a military 
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confrontation into war. But arms races in themselves do not lead to the 
escalation of conflicts or initiate such conflicts.lt is not possible to 
assume that an arms race will be like any other; whether it will lead to 
war; or, whether there really is an arms race (10). And several authors 
have discussed it as an alternative/substitute to war in the 
international relations (11). 
Arms Acquisition : 
Arms acquisition programmes of states may be independent, in 
which the acquisition is self-reliant and indigenously designed and 
developed; may be interdependent which involves cooperation 
between two or more states in design-development and production of 
some weapon; and may be dependent, in which procurement may be 
in the form of import or may be local production of foreign technology. 
Klaus Knorr (12) has argued that national scientific and technological 
progress enhances defense production potential by stimulating 
innovation through the adoption of new manufacturing methods and 
increased labour and resource productivity. He believes that the higher 
the proportion of the defense budget devoted to R&D, the more likely 
it is that the country will remain on the cutting edge of military 
technology and be capable of implementing a self-reliant acquisition 
strategy; and,therefore, the option of a self-reliant weapons acquisition 
can be successfully adopted only by countries who have highly 
developed and diversified scientific, industrial and technological 
capabilities. Joint acquisition necessarily involves cooperation between 
two or more states who presuppose shared perceptions of military 
threat and the ways of dealing with it, and this method is usually 
adopted because of economic reasons as the rising costs of self-reliant 
acquisition may not be within the reach of every state. It is intended to 
foster greater alliance, integration and cohesion, as among the West 
European NATO countries, as well as the reduction of dependence on 
military technology of a superior partner, like the USA. Dependent 
acquisition may be in the form of a direct import of foreign military 
equipment or the licensed indigenous assembly-and-production. It 
leads to military dependence and a curtailment of political freedom, 
and it is most prevalent in the Third World. In the absence of 
scientific-technological-industrial capability and confronted with 
perceptions of external threats and internal instability, the Third 
World countries became dependent on arms imports from the 
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industrially advanced countries. The superpowers, in a scramble for 
the Cold War allies, became the major arms suppliers for the Third 
World, and their arms-transfer policies fostered the Third World 
dependence on them. The vulnerabilities and limitations of a single 
source of arms suppHes led many of the Third World countries to 
diversify these resources to reduce their dependence on a predominant 
source of supply. Dependence was thus distributed and spread around 
across a number of supplier countries and large scale military import 
substitution was resorted to (13). 
By the end of the 'Eighties, some thirty countries had 
demonstrated their ability to manufacture major weapon systems and 
even producing indigenously designed and developed systems. The 
desire to reduce the level of foreign dependence and promoting 
military self-reliance and political-military independence and 
autonomy triggered yet another aspect of arms race. This is so because 
of inherent political and strategic considerations. Whatever advantage 
a country, like India, might have achieved by indigenous development 
of weapons and reducing its foreign dependence, is usually eroded by 
the presence of countries in the neighbourhood (like China) who have 
very large military establishments or countries (like Pakistan) who 
offset any advantage by acquisition of more advanced and better 
weaponry from their allies and friends. 
In the Third World, the form of arms proliferation greatly 
depends on the political economy of the state concerned. 
Organizational pressures from the military structure(for weapons 
acquisitions) and the internal insecurity of the ruling elite determine 
the requirements for arms, for these states. During the last two decades, 
the Third World's share in global military expenditure ($ 2 billion a 
day) has increased from 9% to 25%.Whereas it is true that in many 
such states, internal security considerations, resulting from their 
internal political weaknesses, determine their weapons requirements, 
it is not correct to believe that weapons proliferation is more in states 
in which the civilian elite is subordinate to the military leadership. 
Similarly, it is not correct to believe, as Colin Gray does(14), that Third 
World arms races are local proxy manifestations of races among the 
great powers. It ignores the real independence of the arms dynamic in 
the Third World; and the one between India and Pakistan is its 
example. External suppliers can affect the arms race by the amount and 
quality of weapons supplied, but the race in itself remains independent 
and is not a proxy. 
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Those states who are in a position to acquire high-technology 
and advanced weapons try to offset the balance of power with their 
adversary. If they are not in a position to acquire such weapons, they 
make some political concessions and obtain the requisite weapons in 
exchange of military bases, political support or access to economic 
resources. And one of the ways a major power obtains the support of 
the lesser powers is through arms aid and arms supply. Politico-
economic interests ensure that arms will invariably reach where they 
are perceived to be needed. Since the suppliers have strong motives to 
sell and the recipients have strong interest to obtain the advanced -
weapons, the arms trade continues to be one of the most durable 
features of international relations. 
Arms transfers are not just simple acts of supplying and 
receiving but involve bargaining relationships that are reciprocally and 
mutually advantageous and affect short-term and long-term interests, 
of both the sides. A compatibility of strategic interests or purposes 
between the two sides, involved in arms transfer, is not necessarily 
required. This transfer is not just a mutual concern of the two sides but 
also affects third states. Arms transfers, affecting third states, have 
continued though a convergence of interests did not exist between the 
supplier and the recipient. The US interests, in arming Pakistan, were 
governed by the policy of containment of communism through allies, 
but Pakistan's motives focused on her relationship with India. Many 
times supplier states have used arms transfers to bolster regional 
security. The US had identified her regional interests in the Persian 
Gulf with the security interests of Iran and, consequently, Iran, under 
the Shah, asked for huge supplies of arms. This method is not confined 
to the superpowers alone. Iran provided arms supplies to Oman out of 
concern for regime stability there, just as the US had supplied arms to 
Iran for the same objectives. Further, arms are supplied not just for 
regime stability but also to dissident groups against the government of 
a state. Interventions in Laos, Cambodia, Congo, Angola, Chad, Cyprus, 
Philippines, El Salvador and Nicaragua, not just by the superpowers 
but also by other states of the Third World, were in the form of 
massive arms supplies to various rebel groups. States have also 
increasingly diversified their sources of arms supplies. Whereas earlier, 
many suppliers used to provide free arms assistance under their 
military assistance programmes, now they require payments for their 
supplies and this has led the recipients to be more selective in their 
choice of not only the weapons but also the suppliers. 
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Neuman and Buzan, in their separate studies (15), have shown 
that the phenomenon of arms trade has created a stratification of states 
based on their capabiUties for mihtary production. At the bottom are 
those who neither have, nor hope to possess in any near future, a 
capabiUty for miUtary production. They think they have the need but 
do not possess economic resources, industrial capability, scientific and 
technical know-how and, in some cases, not even enough capital. Since 
they do seek advanced-weapons for their security needs, they have to 
depend on the arms trade. In the middle are 'part producers' who have 
some arms production capability, produce some arms, but do not have 
enough resources and capability to match the quality and quantity of 
production done by the main producers. In this category are countries 
who have started production of small arms (like Pakistan), and 
countries who have a broad-based arms industry (like India and Brazil), 
and countries who produce a wide range of arms for the international 
market (like Sweden and Israel). But, as Brzoska and Ohlson have 
pointed out (16), all of them depend on main-producers for vital 
elements of their arms industry, particularly in areas of high-
technology such as special materials and precision engineering. 
Further, countries in this category are both producers and buyers in the 
arms-trade. Since both the demand for armaments and sources of 
supply for armaments are invariably increasing, more and more states 
are likely to be in this complex middle hierarchy. At the top of this 
hierarchy are major supplier states who are capable of producing the 
widest spectrum of advanced weapons. They have sufficient capability 
for R&D, sufficient industrial capability, all the technological know 
how they need, do not have to import anything for their arms industry 
and can meet the supply demands of any one from the other categories 
of this hierarchy. Though only the superpowers can claim the first-
rank status, Britain, France and, to some extent, Germany can also be 
placed in this category and, should it choose to do so, Japan can very 
easily become a member. But what is apparent for the future of 
international relations is the trend of a slow diffusion of technological 
capability for military production among a growing number of states. 
There has been an imbalance in the power of the states who had a 
surplus of arms and those who were deficient in arms and this 
deficiency has been sought to be reduced through arms trade (which 
includes sale, aid, transfer etc.). Even then, a qualitative advance 
continues to be there for the states who have the technological 
advantage. The dynamics of technological progress in weapon-
manufacturing leads on its own to the process of weapon-proliferation. 
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For political reasons, states mar\ufacturing high-technology weapons 
have to continually and qualitatively upgrade their technology so as 
not to decline in military capability relative to others; and for economic 
reasons, they have to channel this technology for arms sales and aid. 
When the advanced technology is thus piped down to a large number 
of states, not only the standard of military power is increased in these 
states but there is a demand for more, because of diverse political 
reasons. The technologically advanced states thus get more reasons, 
political and economic, to further advance their weapon-technology to 
maintain their own strategic superiority. States are always suspicious of 
their, present or potential, rivals achieving/ obtaining some 
technological breakthrough or some more advanced technology and 
are ever sensitive to the quality of their opponent's weapons. States, 
like Pakistan, for this reason, have sought to acquire superior 
technology which may, in fact, be not commensurate with their 
requirements or capabilities. 
Before the nuclear age, there was no such thing as too much of 
military strength for its effective political utility. Any and every small 
addition of power was politically useful. This traditional concept came 
to an end in the nuclear age. The unlimited power has politically 
become useless, and has made its possessors vulnerable to stark 
feelings of insecurity. Nuclear weapons have become something of a 
status symbol and the strategy operates on the principle that 'they' 
should not have more than 'us'. A state may want to acquire nuclear 
weapons so as to demonstrate political independence, like France; or to 
get a 'seat at the head table', like Britain. A state in the Third World 
may like this acquisition as a way of improving its position in the 
international hierarchy, or to gain the status of a great power or even a 
regional power.The ongoing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
among the existing nuclear-weapon states, enhances the incentives for 
others also to seek nuclear status. The most powerful incentive for 
nuclear proliferation has been the success of the concept of deterrence 
in maintaining security and stability. This incentive, mixed with the 
diffusion of a wide range of technologies, has been the basis of nuclear 
proliferation. The purpose of, and incentive for, going nuclear is the 
prospect of becoming a major power and achieving a high degree of 
strategic autonomy.Since the deterrence has supposedly worked among 
the superpowers, it legitimizes similar hopes among present non-
nuclear but threshold states. In spite of all the technological 
competition, constraints, difficulties and high costs, the status seems to 
offer such a position in international relations that the temptation is 
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overwhelming. There have to be con\pelling reasoirs for states to doubt 
the competence of nuclear weapons, in improving their national 
security, in not going nuclear. 
With the spread of nuclear technology, it is not easy to avoid and 
prevent a horizontal proliferation through the means of technology-
denial. Since there has been a continuous erosion of confidence in the 
capability of the international system to generate security of the 
individual states, and since conventional weapons are becoming not 
just more costly but technologically not much-less advanced, many 
states which find themselves in a threat environment, or perceive so, 
consider nuclear weapons an attractive option. Many of these states feel 
that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is discriminatory and should 
be replaced by a Comprehensive Treaty, which would make weapon 
development difficult equally for all the states. A more equitable and 
just NPT regime can emerge if it is based on an effective nuclear 
disarmament by nuclear weapon states and there is an undeterred 
access,for all the states, to technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. Whereas the Third World is understandably keen on getting 
certain regions accepted as Peace Zones or Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, 
there is a strong possibility of a nuclear arms race among themselves 
also, not in a distant future. It was on these issues that the 1980 Geneva 
Review Conference had broken down.Small nuclear forces will 
generate vulnerabilities and intensify conventional arms acquisitions 
and conventional arms races. This would be done to improve 
deterrence and to keep high and make costly the imperative of nuclear 
first use. Actions of SNF states against local targets would increase the 
risk of escalation and miscalculation on the part of the superpowers. As 
Stephen Cohen has pointed out (17): " Nuclear proliferation is.... 
troubling not because of the number of new weapons that it would 
produce, but because of the number of new decision-centres it would 
produce, subsequently increasing the risk of nuclear accident, nuclear 
theft, nuclear transfer, or nuclear war.... The critical period is the years 
in which a new nuclear state is still absorbing the strategic implications 
of nuclear weapons, when it has not yet developed effective command 
and control arrangements, and when its neighbours and potential 
enemies have not yet absorbed the implications of nuclearization". 
Although there has been cooperation between the USA and 
Britain, the USSR and China, the USA-France and Israel, there has 
been no direct trade in nuclear weapons, though attempts have been 
made to purchase them from the nuclear powers. Actually, nuclear 
weapon states have cooperated to ensure nuclear non-proliferation. 
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They have tried to monopolize for themselves, and retain, the edge in 
international relations that the nuclear weapons are supposed to 
provide. Whereas they maintain that proliferation is risky for 
international security because it will increase the probability of some 
accidental or irrational (as if there can be some rational use also!) use, 
but in fact such apprehension is due to the uncertainty of deterrence 
and because such a proliferation will be against the dominant position, 
of a limited number of states, in international relations. This streak is 
perceptible in a number of writings from the 'Eighties (18) 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons has had no effect on the 
security of states or on the credibility of deterrence. A state may achieve 
an ability to destroy some part of the adversary's means of destruction; 
but it would have no effect on the general capability for an over-all 
destruction. Whatever the quantum of nuclear arsenals or the degree 
of the nuclear balance at a particular time, between the superpowers, 
mutual deterrence nevertheless remains valid. It is the development 
of tactical nuclear weapons that enhances the destructiveness of war 
because, ultimately, their use could not be limited in the geographical 
sense. Such weapons have changed the degree of acceptable damage, 
and the concept of limited nuclear warfare has weakened deterrence. 
The increase in the nuclear potential of the superpowers,or of their 
alliances, did not result in a superiority or security for them. If 
anything, their security got weakened by the weakening of deterrence 
which was the result of the idea of a limited nuclear war to redress the 
consequences of a conventional setback. Nacht and Wohlstetter (19) 
have questioned the existence of any 'arms race' between the 
superpowers, which appears more of the maintenance of the military 
status quo. No doubt, quantitatively the weapons-stockpiles are not 
increasing, neither is the explosive yield of warheads; defence-budgets 
have not suddenly grown as a percentage of the GNP; technological 
advances are not different from normal advances of technology; and 
SALT negotiations indicated that the superpowers treat each other as 
militarily equal. In spite of all this, the super power military 
relationship is not just the maintenance of the military status quo. To 
start with, the level of arms possession with them is much too high 
than what would be needed for a minimum deterrence. If they have 
accepted the equality of relationship, it was a question of accepting the 
inevitable after it had happened and, therefore, there is no genuine 
acceptance of the balance of power as each tries to take immediate 
advantage of the weaknesses of the other. They may not desire war but 
the high level of hostility does not rule that out either and. 
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consequently, they prepare for it also. Actually, when political relations 
between them deteriorate and resemble the Cold War, the military 
relations are symbolized by arms race, and when political relations 
improve and resemble detente, the military relations are symbolized by 
the maintenance of military status quo. Since deterrence achieves the 
political goal of avoiding the war, it serves to maintain the military 
status quo. And since deterrence is the condition that properly defines 
the super powers' strategic relations, the maintenance of military status 
quo has, at least, to be accepted as a normal condition of super powers' 
relations. The inevitability of this ensures the workability of arms 
control as against the more idealistic disarmament. As Rattinger has 
pointed out (20) there are no accepted criteria to ascertain whether a 
situation of arms race exists between two states. 
The non-nuclear military strategy with peaceful aims is 
'Defensive Superiority', and with offensive aims is 'Offensive 
Superiority'. Whereas the SDI might be placed in the former, the deep-
strike capability is of the latter strategy. As Robert Neid has argued, the 
defensive superiority can be used as a technique of arms control : " To 
give your forces an offensive stance when your aims are peaceful is to 
provide grounds for doubt as to your intentions in the minds of your 
potential enemy: your capacity to attack he can see; your intention not 
to attack he must take on trust. On the other hand, to give your forces a 
defensive stance will reassure him: the limits to your ability to attack 
will be visible; and your declared intention not to attack will be 
confirmed by the evidence of your military stance" (21). In this way, 
two states engaged in arms race, but without any offensive aims against 
each other, can get over the arms race. Even for the same states, there 
may be different military requirements for different areas in the world. 
Both the two superpowers have the intervening capability in the Third 
World, primarily to keep each other out of the areas they consider 
paramount to their security; and the corresponding military strategy 
would be of an offensive capability. In areas, such as Europe, on the 
other hand, there is a wide agreement on frontiers and status quo and 
political aims of both the sides are peaceful and, therefore, the 
corresponding miUtary strategy would be a defensive capability. There 
is no wonder, then, that it is much more easier to arrive at some arms 
control agreement in Europe. One way of solving the problem of arms 
proliferation and arms transfers would be an agreement to set up 
intervention-free zones in regions that are unstable. If the big powers 
accept an obligation not to intervene in such regions, crisis 
management among the Third World countries would become easier 
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The Idealism of Disarmament: 
Though direct, disarmament is a crude response to the threats 
that arms are supposed to pose for peace and security. It is based on the 
assumption that since arms are a threat for peace and security, the best 
way to ensure the latter is to get rid of the former. The simple trick of 
reducing the possibility of war was thought to be the removal of the 
weapons which make war possible and attractive and, sometimes, 
certain. Though the international public opinion has generally been in 
favour of disarmament, and there has been much enthusiasm for it, 
disarmament has centered around a series of unsuccessful 
negotiations. On the part of the superpowers, disarmament 
negotiations have not gone beyond propaganda exercises. On the part 
of the rest of the international community, it has been based upon a 
fear of a war between superpowers, providing devastation for every 
body else also. There have been some isolated desires, may be genuine, 
to use the vast resources, being spent on arms, for socio-economic 
development. But the dominating motive has been the desire to avoid 
and prevent a war. This desire, experiencing the failures of idealistic 
attempts at disarmament, and mixed with varying degrees of realism, 
soon was centered around arms control as the main idea for 
international negotiations. 
Disarmament was always beset with the problems of verification 
and the fears of cheating by the adversaries, of parity and rearmament 
and the conversion of potential resources into military technology and 
the uses of this conversion and mobilization for the balance of power. 
All of these were political problems which reflected insecurity 
apprehensions that would still be present after disarmament because 
of the continuance of the anarchical nature of international relations. 
Without the solution of these political problems, disarmament only in 
military terms, can not sustain. As pointed out by the Harvard Nuclear 
Study Group (22), this system would soon lead to a headlong 
armament race. In the anarchic system of international relations, the 
balance of power rests on the instrumentality of order provided by 
weapons; and disarmament is no way of dealing with the political 
problem of insecurity. Whereas political differences continue, 
disarmament offers no alternative to replace military power as a 
deciding factor in inter-state relations. As Lenin had said, disarmament 
simply means running away from unpleasant reality, not fighting it. 
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There will always be apprehension that the other side is 
cheating. Since total and complete verification is not possible, of 
measures under disarmament agreement, cheating will always be a 
possibility. States will consider even the small-scale cheating significant 
because they will perceive their security as being dependent on full and 
honest compliance of disarmament measures, by all. Since, in practice, 
this cannot be guaranteed, disarmament will fail to satisfy the states 
about their needs for security. Even if disarmament is achieved, the 
anarchical nature of international relations will continue. The inter-
state relations then will be evaluated, instead of on force and military 
power, on the mobilization potential of a state; not on the resources 
available with a state but on the speed with which such resources and 
capability can be converted for military use. Since military potential in 
the anarchical condition of international relations will continue, the 
fear of war will also continue to haunt and it will always be possible to 
convert the leisurely arms walk into a headlong arms race between the 
more capable states. Disarmament will hardly make a difference. 
Paradoxically, disarmament may be shown to enhance, in a way, 
the chances for war. Since disarmament attempts to prevent war, it 
weakens the working of deterrence and thus removes restraints on 
waging a war. The restraints on war work because states fear the 
damage that they are sure to suffer from the devastating power of 
weapons that the adversary possesses. The removal of this devastating 
power, or deterrence, because of disarmament, removes the reason 
states do not go to war. There is no force in the argument that the 
disarmament would remove more deadly weapons, such as nuclear, 
and war would still be possible and states would still fear war and, 
therefore, deterrence would work. Massive destruction was still there 
in the Greco-Persian war, the conflict between Rome and Carthage, the 
Crusades, campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon though they were all 
fought without the weapons of overbearingly devastating nature. 
Disarmament cannot ensure that destruction will not occur or that 
wars will not be there. 
It is not difficult to see why disarmament had an appeal that 
appeared to be workable, simple, definite and decisive. The periods 
following the world wars were dominated by idealistic leaders, starry-
eyed with their visions of a future world of peace and harmony which 
would have no need for weapons of mass destruction. Disarmament 
appeared to them an unambiguous and clear way of building such a 
world. Since the military build up symbolized the problems that were 
there in achieving this ideal, the solution was seen to be dismantling of 
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this build up. It was easy to believe in the ideas that military build up 
meant huge wastage of resources that could be utilized more usefully 
for socio-economic development and that the establishment of peace 
required the abandonment of violence, and the means of violence, in 
inter-state relations. The idea may not be politically feasible, but 
morally and logically it was definitely appealing. But then,in politics, 
the popular appeal of an idea is inversely proportional to its logical 
power. 
It is not difficult to see the difference between disarmament and 
arms control. According to Ken Booth(23), disarmament is a 
continuation of politics by a reduction of military means, and arms 
control is a continuation of politics by a mutual restraint on military 
means. Disarmament implies arms reductions, or banning of the arms, 
on the assumption that they are a major source of international 
tension and promote the likelihood of war. Arms control implies the 
creation of a stable military balance and, therefore, desires that the 
superpowers retain their nuclear weapons so as to ensure mutual 
deterrence. This belief is based on the assumption that political 
conflicts, rather than the consequent military build up, are the primary 
causes of international tension. The advocates of disarmament have 
stressed the need of not depending totally on the military 
interpretations of security and have pointed out the tendency of states 
to channel arms competition into new areas. The advocates of arms 
control have stressed upon the concern of states for their military 
security and their consequent reluctance to agree to comprehensive 
disarmament measures. Whereas disarmament views weapons as the 
main problem for international security and aims at rendering arms 
racing and deterrence unnecessary, arms control attempts to manage 
and restrain arms racing, thereby reducing instabilities in the 
international system. For arms control, arms are not the problem and, 
as Freedman observes, if managed properly, arms control process may 
be used for the maintenance of international security. Arms control 
believes that international security is threatened, not from arms racing, 
but from the mutual fears and suspicions of states and their resultant 
attempts for attaining superiority. Arms control, therefore, aims at the 
maintenance of military status quo at the lowest possible level required 
to achieve some deterrence stability. This is a more realistic 
management of inter-state conflict, and as Hedley Bull points out (25), 
it aims at strengthening the balance of power against arms race and 
technological developments, and at restraint rather than 
reduction.Arms control gained priority over disarmament when 
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ambitious-idealist plans for disarmament were found to be unrealistic 
and failed to make any progress. Since it was not practically possible to 
disinvent nuclear weapons and to roll back the technological 
developments, there was no logic in states disarming themselves of the 
existing weapons. With the development of nuclear strategies, states 
came to believe that the best way to establish peace was to be prepared 
for war and, therefore, deterrence became the operative strategy in the 
nuclear age. Whereas disarmament may be said to be based on the 
assumption that peace and security can be promoted by abolishing 
weapons, arms control is based on the assumption that this can be 
achieved even by a skilful management of weapons. Whereas 
disarmament necessarily involves, at least, a reduction of armaments, 
arms control may not necessarily require a reduction, and may freeze 
armaments at existing levels or at mutually agreed levels. Even arms 
increase may be included in arms control measures if this increase 
promotes the goals of arms control. Arms control involves cooperation 
among potential adversaries for the achievement of some goals in 
managing and controlling potential conflict.In this, all the sides aspire 
for preferred positions but give an advantage to each other thereby 
achieving potential mutual gains.Whereas disarmament may even be 
unilateral and does not have to be internationally agreed, arms control 
is necessarily a matter of international agreement. Further, arms 
control is broader than disarmament as it includes a variety of 
agreements that do not affect the acquisition, or deployment, of 
particular weapons.The essential element in arms control is restraint 
not reduction. It is the restraint that provides stability, which is the goal 
of arms control. It is based on the assumption that security is a shared 
value and states, without renouncing their rivalry or even hostility, 
can share in its pursuit because it is not to be acquired at the expense of 
the other.The aim of arms control is to reduce to the minimum the 
possibility of an unlimited conflict. Arms control does not pretend to 
be a single solution to the problem of arms race. What it provides is the 
maintenance of military status quo and a method and a process of 
crises-management in changing political and technological 
conditions.lt came to be generally believed (26) that small successes in 
arms control might prepare the ground for disarmament at some 
future date. 
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Management and Limitations of Arms : 
Since arms control is concerned about reaching an agreement on 
military measures that are to be undertaken in a graduated manner so 
as to de-escalate the crisis, the focus is on controlling the use of 
weapons and controlling the actions that escalate the crisis, and not on 
reducing the number of weapons. Arms control includes both arms 
management and arms limitations: reducing the incentives and 
reasons for military conflict, and attempting weapons reduction. The 
former is done by establishing crisis stability and enhancing deterrence, 
and the latter is done by reduction, prohibition or even renunciation of 
the ability to make some particular weapons. This balance of deterrence 
is achieved by creating a situation wherein the incentives for going to 
war are outweighed by the dis-incentives, and such a balance creates a 
stability which is required for successful arms control. 
Thomas Schelling, who is considered intellectual father of the 
arms control concept, defines it to include "all the forms of military 
cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the 
likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political 
and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential feature of 
arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the 
possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential 
enemies with respect to their military establishments." (27). According 
to Hedley Bull, "arms control, in its broadest sense, comprises all those 
acts of military policy in which antagonistic states cooperate in the 
pursuit of common purposes even while they are struggling in the 
pursuit of conflicting ones.... It is a restraint internationally exercised 
on armaments policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, 
their character, development or use"( 28). And, according to Ken Booth 
(29), arms control encompasses all measures which make war less 
likely; make it less catastrophic in terms of death and destruction; and 
reduce the economic costs of military programmes. The whole policy of 
arms control is based on the assumption that arms race can and should 
be controlled so as to reduce its war generating effects. It is a restraint 
internationally exercised on armaments policy and in the qualitative 
design, quantitative production, deployment, protection, transfer, and 
planned, threatened, or actual use of arms for political-strategic 
purposes. In this way, these definitions emphasize on the motive of 
arms control as being the reduction of the likelihood of war and the 
mitigation of its effects. The focus is on the control of the use of 
weapons and on the control of actions, not on the reduction of the 
quantity of weapons. The goals of arms control are thus, first of all, to 
ensure strategic stability, that is to reduce the chance of war ; secondly. 
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damage limitation, or to reduce or limit damage if war breaks out ; and 
thirdly, cost containment and reduction of the cost of armaments. 
Arms refer to quantity, quality and configurations of weapons, and 
control refers to control over their potential use. 
Comprehensive measures for arms control would cover 
immediate problems of reducing the probability of accidental war, short 
term problem of preventing the decline of mutual deterrence, and long 
term problem of controlling a proliferation that might destabilize the 
military status quo, and all of this would have to involve unilateral, 
bilateral and multilateral approaches of dealing with the problem. 
Paradoxically, arms control encompasses the interest of both the sides 
in each other's strategic force security. The former US Defence 
Secretary, Robert McNamara had testified the US preference for the 
Soviet Union developing secure, hardened underground missiles 
rather than soft missiles above ground, as the latter both invited and 
threatened pre-emptive strike and the former would be conducive to 
Soviet patience in a crisis (30). Brodie and Kahn, in their separate 
studies (31), believe that if arms control measures are to act to reduce 
the possibility of an accidental or unintended war, then they must deal 
with the problem of the potential failure of warning systems, of a 
potential loss of control by the national command authority, and of a 
potential escalation from a regional conflict. These measures would 
cover all the modifications affecting the use or effectiveness of arms so 
as to reduce the probability of war. It would involve, not just weapons 
reductions changes in weapons configurations or modifications 
affecting the effectiveness of the use of weapons, but bilateral 
negotiations, a maintenance of military status quo, establishment of a 
deterrence-based stability, cooperation with adversaries/potential 
enemies in achieving certain goals of controlling potential conflict and, 
if the goals of arms control can be achieved by it, then even some arms 
increases also. 
The approaches for the achievement of arms control can be 
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. A state may take some unilateral 
initiative and there may be no reciprocal action from other states. This 
may involve some self-imposed restraint in the development/ 
deployment of some weapon by a state, like chemical weapons or anti-
satellite weapons. The bilateral approach would mean formal 
agreements, in the form of inter-state treaties, requiring mutual similar 
actions by parties to the treaty, and its examples would include the 
limited test ban treaty of 1963 and SALT-I etc. The multi- lateral 
agreements, like the NPT, involve mutual understandings, through 
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formal treaties, among a number of states. An agreement to declare a 
region a nuclear weapons free zone, or peace zone, would also be part 
of such a multilateral approach. Such designated regions may be a 
country, like Japan or Norway, or areas like Antarctica, seabed and 
outer space. 
Before the advent of the Second Cold War, arms control meant 
an initiative for reducing the war probability and damage-limitation, in 
case of war; and this concept included all the changes in types of 
weapons or their deployments modifications that were expected to 
reduce the war probability; and this broad concept of arms control, as 
developed on the basis of a deterrence, was reflected in the writings of 
Kahn, Brodie, Schelling and Peter Jarvis (32).Several international 
agreements and developments affected arms control since the 
beginning of the 'Seventies. The 1972 SALT-I and ABM Treaties, the 
1979 unfinished SALT-II, START since 1982, several summit meetings 
between leaders of the superpowers, during the course of a period that 
witnessed the second Cold War, led to the narrowing down of the 
concept of arms control to mean super powers' negotiations on 
limiting and reducing strategic weapons, and giving it only a bilateral 
character. 
Military tension is not the cause but the effect of the political 
process and, therefore, arms control cannot resolve some political 
deadlock. In arms control negotiations, military concessions are useful 
for clear political objectives, and a policy based on technical priorities is 
not very successful. Some general conditions for the success of arms 
control negotiations would include: 
i-Perceptions of participants that negotiations are in their own, 
and the others', interests; 
ii-Conditions of stable detente under which negotiations 
proceed; 
iii-Political understanding among the allies and their common 
political strategy. 
Arms control agreements are effective when they can be 
verified (33). No doubt, verification is a technical process but it is more 
than that. Essentially, it is intelligence gathering which is used to find 
out what the other side is doing. For this, states use National Technical 
Means(NTMs), which is the capability to verify, unilaterally and 
without any cooperation from the other side, adherence to or violation 
of arms control agreement. Such technologies range from covert 
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means, like espionage, to space-based surveillance systems. They 
include radar and satellite surveillance, communications intercepting, 
radioactive air sampling, geophysical observations by teleseismic 
methods etc. There are certain cooperative means of verification also 
and they include making available certain features of technology to 
surveillance; on-cite inspections of technology and installations; and 
conventional methods of verification through analyses of information 
leaks.The negotiations for an arms control agreement, by themselves, 
lay down different measures and procedures for verifying the 
adherence to the terms of the agreement. After that, a monitoring 
process starts which obtains and interprets the technical data about 
adherence. The results of such monitoring are then evaluated to 
determine whether the agreement is being followed. This evaluation 
determines compliance or a violation of a specific agreement. Any 
enforcement process, including any sanctions, is the result of all this 
verification and evaluation. In this long and tedious process, it is 
possible for some interests to find some technical/ technological fault 
on the part of the other side, or its intentions, and then to sabotage the 
whole process of arms control.Its example is the refusal of the US 
Senate to ratify the SALT-II agreement because its one technical expert, 
Senator John Glenn, believed that it was technically non verifiable(34). 
The feet dragging over what constitutes adequate verification and 
effective verification has politicized the whole issue. Since non-
technical means of verification are not generally acceptable, there are 
big difficulties for verification process,and arms control itself, if 
technology thus becomes politicized, or if the political aspects of 
verification do not keep up with technology. 
Effective and acceptable means of verification are those that do 
not violate either the national security and sovereignty or purposes of 
an arms control agreement. The national security implications of an 
arms control violation are definitely the most important criteria for 
determining the response of a state. In such cases, what is generally 
overlooked by states is the distinction between their evaluation of the 
adversary's compliance and their own desires to pursue new military 
programmes in accordance with their perceptions of national security. 
Many times, accusations of violations of agreements by the other side 
are only a smoke screen for own projected programmes. Not only 
verification is good for military and political reasons; strategically also, 
a good capability for verification acts as a deterrent against any 
intending violations. Since an exposed violation will not just be an 
internationalized embarrassment, but may as well jeopardize the 
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agreement, which the violator would not want (otherwise why would 
he sign the agreement ? and why the sneaky attempt to violate, instead 
of an open ?).In this way, verification technology deters any possible, or 
intended, violation. 
Efforts for non-proliferation include measures for the 
prevention of the spread of particular weapons to a region, 
containment of that weapon in a region, preventing its spread to other 
regions and management of the effects of proliferation. 
Peace Zones and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones concepts are 
considered practical means of preventing the horizontal proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. This is supposedly done by banning them from 
specified areas. Further, it is believed that the security concerns of non-
nuclear weapon states will be met by this measure, as it is considered 
part of confidence building. The United Nations General Assembly, on 
December 11, 1965, (in its Resolution 3472 B -xxx) had defined the 
concept of the NWFZ : " A NWFZ shall, as a general rule, be deemed to 
be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the UN, 
which any group of states, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has 
established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby—(a) the statute 
of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, 
including the procedure for delimitation of the zone, is defined; (b) an 
international system of verification and control is established to 
guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute". 
The Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, in 1978, was of 
the view that the establishment of the NWFZs on the basis of 
arrangements freely arrived at among the states of a region concerned 
constituted an important disarmament measure, and that the process 
of establishing such zones in different parts of the world would be 
encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely 
free of nuclear weapons(35). Such attempts involve prohibitions of 
nuclear weapons in certain geographical areas and in certain 
environment. The Antarctica Treaty, the 1967 Tlateloco Treaty and the 
1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty symbolize the former; and 
in the latter are the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, 
and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies. In 1984, the Disarmament Commission had 
submitted to the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly its 
Chapter V, p-169 
proposals regarding the NWFZ: " The establishment of nuclear 
weapon free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of 
agreements and or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of 
the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure 
and should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a 
world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing 
such zones, the characteristics of each region should be fully complied 
with and the effective respect for the status of such zones by nuclear -
weapon States should be subject to adequate verification procedures, 
thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons 
(36). 
Under the NWFZ agreements, states are prohibited: 
i-to test, use, manufacture, produce, possess, acquire or have 
control over, by any means whatsoever, of any nuclear weapons, 
directly or indirectly, or on behalf of anyone else in any other 
way; 
ii-to receive, store, instal, deploy any nuclear weapons, directly 
or indirectly, by themselves or by anyone on their behalf in any 
other way; 
iii-to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or 
acquisition of any nuclear explosive device; 
iv-to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or 
acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any state. 
For over three decades, the prospect for a Comprehensive Test 
Ban (CTB) agreement has remained on the arms control agenda, 
without any success. CTB may appear of interest to threshold states, 
not party to the NFT, because it is comprehensive and, unlike the NPT, 
is non-discriminatory; does not restrict the development of peaceful 
nuclear technology; is less intrusive in terms of verification; and has a 
wider global acceptability than the NPT. A CTB agreement would 
signify a determination to gradually move away from reliance on 
nuclear power for the national security. No doubt, nuclear weapons 
would continue to exist. But a prohibition on their tests would limit 
the development of new types of weapons. By this demonstration, 
states will indicate their intention to finish the existing conditions of 
nuclear arms race and proliferation. Verification of existing and 
expected arms control agreements involves detailed and technical 
proposals.Already there are regimes for the treaty eliminating 
medium-range nuclear weapons, the expected strategic missile and 
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Open Skies agreements and confidence building measures. All of these 
require states to let others see vital elements of their military 
preparations and activities. And that is an effective deterrent against 
secret arms buildup. It is a long-term programme, since not only will 
destruction of existing weapons and withdrawl of troops be monitored, 
but inspections will continue to make sure they are not replaced. Once 
they have gone into effect and states feel they have adequate warning 
against new threats, broader agreements may be possible 
Arms dynamics among the superpowers was attempted to be 
controlled through parallel restraints on the nature and quantum of 
their strategic forces. Because of these restraints, it was possible for 
them to arrive at understandings about not deploying in areas like the 
Antarctica, space and the seabed and not to engage in some acts, such as 
atmospheric nuclear testing. Not only a framework was created to 
maintain the military status quo, but more open arms race was 
attempted to be curtailed. Just as MAD signifies a parity of equal 
vulnerability, arms control can operate on parity as a basis of 
understanding between adversaries. The need for parity has been 
stressed in terms of such concepts as 'balanced asymmetries' wherein 
states agree to trade off areas of preference in their force structure rather 
than try to find a uniformity (37). For instance, whereas the US prefers 
strategic warheads at sea, the USSR prefers large land-based ICBMs. If, 
within the parity framework, such balanced asymmetries are not 
allowed, arms control becomes difficult. All this was evidenced during 
the US-USSR closed door negotiations, in March 1990, about a ban on 
land-based missiles with multiple warheads but excluding sea-based 
ballistic missiles which the Soviets wanted to cut. This proposal, which 
may form part of a possible strategic arms treaty to be finalized by the 
end of 1990, would prevent the deployment of 10-warhead MX missiles 
and SS-24 missiles, and then,in the second stage, elimination of all 
land based missiles with multiple warheads. This agreement would be 
significant from arms control and stability point of view as the 
multiple-warhead missile increases the likelihood that a state may 
decide to launch a pre-emptive strike in a crisis and wiping out ,as 
many as possible, the other side's nuclear weapons so as to reduce 
damage from retaliation.No doubt, eliminating multiple-warhead 
missiles on land would reduce each side's offensive ability to launch a 
pre-emptive strike; but the Soviet objections also have a logic that 
similar capability can be obtained by the sea-based ballistic missiles. 
Arms control may be seen as a result of improved political 
relations because, only under such improved relations, any arms 
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control negotiations or agreements are possible. Thus, it is not correct 
to assume that arms control promotes detente, as it is the other way 
round.If a state feels aggrieved after an arms control agreement and 
considers the terms of such an agreement unequal, then all this may 
cause tension.Further, perceived violations of arms control agreement 
lead to distrust, hostility and more tensions. Arms control do not lead 
to goodwill; it is required to achieve arms control. No doubt, an arms 
control agreement does consolidate moves for better political relations, 
but these moves must have been already initiated. Detente symbolizes 
attempts by two states for benefits through cooperation, in spite of their 
continuing international competition. This is also the objective of 
arms control—cooperation in various fields, in spite of continuing, but 
balanced, military competition. Also, detente is not sure to result from 
arms control negotiations because it may not be the objective of these 
negotiations. States may be engaged in arms control negotiations for 
gaining some unilateral advantages, for winning diplomatic prestige or 
simply to politically embarrass the opponent. Arms control merely 
symbolize a lowest common denominator of military balance of power, 
agreeable to all the parties. 
Both the superpowers have linked their commitment to arms 
control on their own perceptions of good bahaviour of the other side 
and they feel that their policies are not inconsistent if they suspend 
negotiations or refuse to ratify a treaty or adopt delaying tactics and 
juggle concessions. The US has done this "when the Soviets actively 
supported national liberation movements in Angola or the Horn of 
Africa, invaded Afghanistan, engineered the imposition of martial law 
in Poland or reduced the rate of Jewish emigration" (38).Similarly, the 
Soviets, while agreeing to an East-West arms control see no harm in 
the East-West competition in the Third World. They agreed to SALT-I 
at the time of the heaviest US bombings on North Vietnam, a Soviet 
ally. The Soviets have a feeling that the US, to begin with, overstates 
the Soviet capabilities as a ploy to justify the increases in US arms 
capability. They feel that the objective is to regain a military superiority 
and to put the Soviet Union into a position of permanent inferiority. 
These Soviet apprehensions about being left behind get reflected in 
their bargaining/ negotiating behaviour, and then this is cited by the 
US as additional proof of the insincerity of the USSR towards arms 
control which necessitates further increases in the US capability. 
Actually, arms control only consolidates certain aspects of the 
status quo, and even this is possible if there are various conducive 
conditions available. Instead of achieving some confidence-building, 
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the two sides in arms control negotiations get embroiled in such 
coercive bargaining tactics that, in fact, eat up whatever trust might 
have existed. This leads to more arms race instead of arms control. 
Many weapons are used, in arms control negotiations, as bargaining 
chips and, thus, arms control in a way accelerates arms control. Many 
military programmes, like binary gas programme, are justified in these 
terms, to prevent a weakening of the position in arms control talks. 
Accumulation of new weapons as coercive bargaining chips in fact 
toughens the bargaining position of the other side also. Such postures 
actually strengthen those, on both the sides, who are against any 
cooperative arms control. Both sides may perceive parity requirements 
as resulting in levelling up to the higher numbers of the other side, 
thus accelerating the arms race instead of achieving some arms control. 
Such negotiations actually consume, rather than create, trust and hope 
and make the anarchic nature of international relations even more 
anarchic. Negotiations, for arms control, in a way aggravate and 
perpetuate the arms race by intensifying the arms competition. Such 
agreements are usually about non-important, and peripheral, issues 
and areas(— such as, the demilitarization of the Antarctica and the 
Seabed). Not only those who have some stake in the arms race are not 
offended by these methods; the international public opinion feels 
reassured, by these trivial agreements, that progress towards arms 
control has been made, and there is a big international sigh of relief. In 
the meantime, the arms race goes on as before. A particular weapon or 
a military activity is chosen and negotiations follow as how best to 
achieve a balance on it. Both the sides highlight the other's alleged 
superiority and then to achieve a balance, and to justify their threat 
perceptions, deploy some new, better and more offensive weapon. The 
pursuit of balance makes it difficult to prevent this, because then 
disagreements start cropping up over questions of verification which, 
in its totality, is unattainable. The differences as to what constitutes the 
'balance' and how best to verify it become the focal point of interest in 
any arms control negotiations and are used to justify the perceptions of 
perfidity of the other side, and thus the race goes on spirically. 
States do not have the requisite confidence in themselves, or 
trust in the others; and make a distinction between mere rhetoric and 
concrete proposals about arms control.. Not only states are afraid of 
making any move that might be suggestive of giving the adversary 
some advantage, but they are highly suspicious about the possible 
cheating behaviour and actions of the other. As Louis J. Halle has 
pointed out (39), the pervasive mistrust of the Cold War led the US to 
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be even more suspicious of reasonable Soviet proposals, believing 
them more dangerous behind the cloak than proposals that were 
downright unacceptable, searching grounds on which to discredit the 
opponent. A similar rejection by the US was there of Gorbachev's test 
moratorium proposal of 1985. There are reasons to believe, from past 
experience of super power styles of negotiations, that when emphasis is 
on large-scale arms reductions or sweeping proposals for disarmament, 
there is a high propaganda content in the proposals and that a state 
proposing these measures is not serious. The other side immediately 
becomes suspicious and doubts the sincerity of the proposals. This 
factor gets mixed with that of diplomatic prestige to be gained from 
these proposals, and together they delay the arms control negotiations, 
which is usually fatal for these negotiations. Actually, so far no real 
limitations have been placed under various arms control agreements. 
The agreements that have been reached concern weapons that either 
are obsolete or do not exist or are irrelevant immediately, like the 
treaties concerning Outer Space and Seabed, treaties concerning 
biological weapons and ABM defences; or these agreements apply very 
marginal and inconsequential limitations, such as the ones in SALT-I 
& II. No success could be achieved to limit weapons developments in 
spite of the test ban treaties because all of them had more of a political, 
rather strategic, significance. 
In the formulation of arms control policies, states have to take 
into consideration their national security requirements, potentialities 
and risks of war, the probability or risk of dilution of status or 
influence, and a risk of domination by the adversary. Their primary 
fear is a radical change of the whole political system and, to preserve 
this status quo, they are prepared to risk a war also, instead of going in 
for arms control. 
Though Evan Luard believed that any negotiations for arms 
control would be incomplete if they involved only the great powers 
and exclude states which may pose a threat to stability or equilibrium 
and which engage in armed conflict, he concludes differently and says 
that " ultimately the only way out of the impasse will be through the 
development of an effective collective security system to ensure the 
certainty that there is always available a superiority of power to deter" 
(40). But such an involvement of the superpowers would preserve the 
existing status quo in the international balance of power and would 
preserve the relative spheres of influence of the superpowers; and such 
an arms control process would naturally be not welcome in the Third 
World, on ideological, political and economic grounds. 
Chapter V,p-174 
Confrontationalist thinking and behaviour among policy 
makers, and those who have some influence on the decision making, 
is the main detriment for any arms control measures. Such 'hawks' in 
international relations are fairly common in all the countries, 
particularly big and superpowers: John Foster Dulles, Senators Joe 
Mcarthy and Jesse Helms, Casper Weinberger and William Casey, 
Colin Gray and Paul Nitze on the US side, and Mikhail Suslov, Boris 
Ponomarev, Gromyko and Ligachev on the Soviet side. They view 
their respective adversaries in a negative light and their foreign 
policies aggressive and expansionist and believe that international 
relations are conflictual in all respects and that force is the only 
language which is understood by the adversary; and, therefore, military 
superiority is the only viable technique. This technique envisages 
deterring an armed attack by covering every conceivable target of the 
adversary and maintaining a numerical edge over the adversary's 
arsenal. They want to curtail the adversary's forces while maintaining 
own superiority and continued modernization. Even during any 
negotiations, they adopt coercive bargaining tactics, treat conciliation as 
weakness, negotiations as zero-sum games that have to be either won 
or lost. The hawks, in short, make worst case assumptions and judge 
the adversary guilty until proved innocent. 
The difficulty in compliance with arms control agreements is 
understandable. In the presence of conflicting interests between states, a 
perfect agreement, without the possibility of divergent interpretations, 
is not possible; and there will always be suspicions about the intentions 
and behaviour of others. But this should not be taken to discredit arms 
control agreements. These agreements have to operate within the 
environment of sophisticated advanced technology, but such a 
technology makes it difficult to distinguish between allowed and 
forbidden activities under arms control. Depending on geographical 
locations, tactical systems can perform strategic missions also, and 
defensive technologiesdike the SDI) have offensive capabilities also. 
April Carter has categorized (41) obstacles to arms control agreements 
between the superpowers and they include: the propaganda contest, 
seeking to acquire or maintain prestige, seeking political advantage, 
political linkage and political conflict, alliance politics, strategic goals in 
negotiations, strategic asymmetry, ideological conflict and perceptions, 
psychological obstacles, the momentum of weapons technology, 
military and bureaucratic resistance, political , organizational and 
technical problems, divergent negotiating styles, bargaining tactics, 
problems of verification, bargaining chips effect, military price tag. 
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parity and levelling up, displacement and channelling of weapons, 
erosion of trust during talks. 
The need for maintaining a military capability is common to all 
the states, and that is to ensure its security. The logical contradiction in 
arms control and disarmament is that they aspire for the security of the 
states by limiting and reducing their capabilities for ensuring this 
security. The basic difficulty in arms control and disarmament efforts is 
the result of this inherent dilemma. It is for this reason that states go 
on enhancing their military capability even when they are engaged in 
arms control and disarmament efforts and negotiations. An arms 
control agreement has to provide assurances for the basic needs of 
security for each of the states party to that agreement. Otherwise, such 
an agreement will never last long. 
The process of arms control results into diversion of resources 
from one military activity to another. If arms control places some 
restrictions on specified military activity, some new weapons 
development or further deployments, then the resources thus saved 
just flow into the R&D of some new military programmes. Whereas 
the shape of the arms dynamic may thus be regulated by arms control, 
the size and pace is not affected by it. Sometimes, by defeating its own 
purpose, arms control may even stimulate the arms dynamic. Since the 
objective of arms control is conflict management, rather than conflict 
resolution, it gets merged into the political rivalry framework. Since, in 
this framework, related strength has to be displayed, concessions over 
arms control are treated as signs of weakness. Even if concessions have 
to be given, they are regulated in the process of bargaining in such a 
way that new weapons programmes are first introduced so as to be able 
to give concessions over it, thereby managing to save other 
programmes, and also to be able to bargain from a position of strength. 
This process of arms control bargaining legitimizes virtually any 
weapon system in the competitive context, because someday it may be a 
bargaining chip to wrest concessions from the adversary. The slow 
process of arms control may not keep up with the fast pace of weapons 
development. Arms control thus even generates more weapons than it 
controls. Arms control operates and is effective within the general 
framework of deterrence in which both the sides believe in MAD. In 
such a situation, arms control attempts at the maintenance of the 
military status quo. The chances of arms control are reduced, not only 
by a high degree of hostility, but also the higher degree of maximum 
deterrence. If states increase their level of deterrence for the other side 
and widen their scope of strategic options, the possible areas for arms 
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control become, accordingly, narrow. The effect of counterforce eats up 
the deterrence framework and dampens arms control. Conditions 
which are difficult for deterrence are difficult for arms control. 
During the period of a developing detente between the 
superpowers, there were some successes for arms control, but with the 
development of a second Cold War between the superpowers, since 
late 'Seventies, and their competitions for the Third World, arms 
control not only got entangled into political rivalries of the 
superpowers but could not cope with the new technological 
developments, like the cruise missile, back-fire bomber and the SDL 
The new rivalries led to the dissolution of political control for arms 
control and soon, like disarmament, arms control also became a victim 
of propaganda duel between the superpowers. A common interest in 
arms control and war prevention /avoidance result from conditions of 
MAD. These common interests were supposed to lead adversaries 
towards a joint action to manage destabilizing developments in their 
arms race. This military rationale was to transcend the political 
differences and rivalries between adversaries. States were not required 
to surrender their military strength, and even political rivalries were 
allowed; only some actions were to be taken for mutual security within 
an interdependence framework. 
It would be appropriate to round off this discussion by a 
narration given by Winston Churchill : " Once upon a time all the 
animals in the zoo decided that they would disarm, and they arranged 
to have a conference to arrange the matter. So the rhinoceros said 
when he opened the proceedings that the use of teeth was barbarous 
and horrible and ought to be strictly prohibited by general consent. 
Horns, which were mainly defensive weapons would, of course, have 
to be allowed. The buffalo, the stag, the porcupine, and even the little 
hedgehog all said they would vote with the rhino, but the lion and the 
tiger took a different view. They defended teeth and even claws, which 
they described as honourable weapons of immemorable antiquity. The 
panther, the leopard, the puma and the whole tribe of small cats all 
supported the lion and the tiger. Then the bear spoke. He proposed that 
both teeth and horns should be banned and never used for fighting by 
any animal. It would be quite enough if animals were allowed to give 
each other a good hug when they quarrelled.... " (42). 
f^napier v,p-i// 
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